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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis proposes a theory of interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It investigates the 
normative relationship between the right to freedom of religion and the values of 
liberty and equality, as well as the doctrinal implications of that relationship for the 
connections between the right to freedom of religion and other rights, including the 
right to freedom from discrimination.  
This is a combined normative and doctrinal project. The central normative claim 
is that the right to freedom of religion is justified on the abstract principle of equal 
respect for our personal responsibility to assess and choose ethical values for 
ourselves, authentically and independently from the coercive interference of others. 
The thesis argues that this principle is the moral bedrock of the rights to freedom of 
religion and freedom from religious discrimination, and that the moral fusion of the 
two rights explains their interchangeable use in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Moreover, this thesis argues that the relationship 
between freedom of religion and equal respect is better explained through a reason-
blocking account of the right, according to which the permissibility of state 
limitations on the right depends on the nature of the justification that must be given 
for them, not solely on their consequences examined independently of that 
justification. Compared to interest-based accounts, it is argued that a reason-blocking 
interpretation of the right better fits significant parts of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and is ultimately more conducive to distinguishing which kinds of state 
interference with our choice and expression of ethical values are justifiable. 
Finally, this thesis applies this interpretation to various current legal problems: 
the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious 
discrimination as well as between religious discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination; the wearing of religious symbols, including the full-face veil, in 
public; and the regulation of blasphemous forms of expression. Whereas the theory 
developed in this thesis explains the relevant case law in many of those areas, certain 
other parts of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR seem to deviate from the proposed 
theory. In these cases this thesis not only shows why the proposed theory advances a 
more attractive and more specific account of the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion, but, importantly, it also shows why that interpretation better fits the 
principles underlying the jurisprudence of the ECtHR across a number of rights that 
involve public expressive dimensions, including respect for private life and freedom 
of expression. So, despite the fact that in certain cases the ECtHR has reached 
different outcomes to those that the normative theory defended here would point to, 
overall this thesis aims to show that tracking the normative justification of religious 
freedom to a more general right to equal respect for ethical responsibility consolidates 
religious freedom into a more general theory of rights which could be conducive to a 
more coherent interpretation of the Convention. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Individual and group exemptions from general rules or practices interfering with 
religious commitments have been products of complex social negotiations and 
political compromise for a long time in Europe. If one rejects the possibility of 
haphazard resolution of questions about the scope and role of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief in European human rights law – as this thesis is inclined to do, not 
least because those issues are important – then one is left with certain important 
questions. How should the European Court of Human Rights deal with claims of 
religious accommodation? What does equal respect for everyone’s conscience entail 
in a liberal democracy? What is the relationship between the right to freedom of 
religion or belief and the values of liberty and equality? Do answers to the last two 
questions unveil anything morally significant about the scope of the right and its 
connection with other rights, including freedom from discrimination, freedom from 
religious discrimination, and freedom of expression? Is an interpretation of the right 
that complements and reinforces, rather than rivals, the values of liberty and equality, 
and consolidates freedom of religion into a more general theory of rights, plausible? 
The central argument of this thesis is that the right to freedom of religion is 
grounded on our personal responsibility to assess and choose ethical values for 
ourselves, authentically and independently from the coercive choices of others. This 
general, albeit substantive, principle of personal ethical responsibility that every 
government that claims moral authority to coerce us should respect, is the moral 
bedrock of the right to freedom of religion as well as of other rights, including the 
right to freedom from religious discrimination. Ethical responsibility helps us explain 
the role of those rights in a political community as well as distinguish, for instance, 
which kinds of state interference with our choice and expression of ethical values are 
justifiable and which are not. The main idea is that the permissibility of state 
limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief depends on the nature of the 
justification that must be given for them, not on their consequences examined 
independently of that justification. Regardless of whether our perspective is based on 
freedom of religion or on freedom from discrimination, questions on the justifiability 
of specific limitations on our rights remain the same. They can be answered by 
asking, in much more detail, what equal respect for our personal ethical responsibility 
requires in each case. 
My arguments are tacitly yet decisively supported by an interpretation of liberty 
and equality as intertwined, rather than antagonistic, values. The following pages 
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infuse that idea into a substantive theory of the right to freedom of religion or belief. 
For instance, I argue that the antagonism between liberty and equality-based theories 
of freedom of religion, much influenced as it is from the popular political theme that 
liberty and equality conflict, is elusive. The main claim of liberty-based theories is 
that the right to freedom of religion protects certain enduring and important interests 
against demands of the common good, and that those interests are so important that 
they require special protection. That is a familiar theory of what the right to freedom 
of religion or belief is and what it is for, and the first two chapters of this thesis will 
give some reasons for thinking that it is in the end an inadequate theory of the right. It 
fails to adequately capture several important dimensions of our shared legal practice, 
such as the egalitarian ideal of equal respect that underlies individual complaints 
about lack of accommodation of religion. It also fails to fit a significant number of 
important European human rights law cases where individual interests play limited or 
no role and the ECtHR focuses not on balancing between them, but on tracking and 
excluding certain impermissible kinds of reason for official action. 
More specifically, this thesis argues that the shortcomings of liberty-based 
approaches that ground freedom of religion or belief on the immunisation of 
particular interests for their own sake can be overcome through a non-teleological 
reason-blocking account of the right. Reason-blocking accounts of human rights 
understand them in terms of exclusion of certain inappropriate kinds of reason for 
official action, rather than in terms of rendering certain important interests immune to 
considerations of the common good. Limitations on the right to freedom of religion 
are unjustifiable not whenever – or simply because – they invade especially important 
individual interests. They are unjustifiable whenever their interpretation unveils 
illegitimate moral preferences, such as prejudice, featuring among the interests that a 
government, unjustifiably, seeks to satisfy. Again, the point of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief is that legislation limiting the right should not be enacted for certain 
reasons, rather than simply because of its consequences for important individual or 
collective interests.  
I think that that interpretation captures important dimensions of the moral right 
to freedom of religion. The first involves the distinction between influence and 
subordination. Inevitably, our common culture influences our choice of values, our 
expectations from others, what we like and how we design our everyday lives. A 
culture that has been historically influenced by a particular religion, exactly the way 
Europe has been by Christianity,1 may subsume a plethora of values and socio-legal 
arrangements that are, unsurprisingly, more reflective of the religious traditions 
having impacted on its formation. But that does not necessarily breach our rights 
under freedom of conscience. Our personal ethical responsibility is not inconsonant 
                                                        
1 See M. Mazower, The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day (Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 2000) 50-86. Also S. Moyn, ‘From Communist to Muslim: European human rights, the 
Cold War, and religious liberty’ (2014) 113(1) The South Atlantic Quarterly 63; T. Judt, Postwar: A 
History of Europe Since 1945 (Vintage Books, 2010) 1-13; R. McCrea, Religion and the Public Order 
of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2010) 16-51; J. Habermas, Europe: The Faltering 
Project (Polity Press, 2009) 59-78; M. Lilla, The Stillborn God (Vintage Books, 2007) 217-296; R. 
Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 69-85. 
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with those inevitable forms of influence. It does forbid subordination, however, which 
is different. As I explain in Chapter Three, subordination occurs through the 
deliberate deployment of collective power in order to dictate choices of ethical value 
and their expression, or to disadvantage certain members of the community because 
of the views people may have about the value of others or the worthiness of others’ 
desires. Subordination denies our responsibility to decide for ourselves what ethical 
values our lives should reflect. It is an affront to dignity even when we are not 
personally affected or when it is justified on assumptions that that impact is ethically 
beneficial for the affected people or the community as a whole.  
This is not to suggest that the distinction between influence and subordination 
lies in the pervasiveness of those forms of collective impact. Traffic rules, income tax 
rates, the distribution of social security benefits, state regulations on environmental 
protection and neighbourhood planning all drastically affect major decisions about 
how we can and how we should live. They do not violate our ethical responsibility to 
define value though. For the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable instances 
of state influence lies in their moral justification. Again, the important practical 
dimension of the principle is that it blocks collective action only whenever it is likely 
to have been polluted by impermissible kinds of reason, such as reasons connected 
with personal, rather than political, morality. 
A reason-blocking interpretation of the right to freedom of religion also makes 
better sense of the relationship of the right with freedom from religious 
discrimination. This is an important challenge for any substantive account of the right 
to freedom of religion under the ECHR given that, as Chapter Four discusses, the 
ECtHR uses Articles 9 and 14 (in conjunction with Article 9) of the Convention – on 
freedom of religion or belief and freedom from religious discrimination respectively – 
interchangeably and without a consistent pattern in the examination of factually 
similar complaints. The normative confusion over the relationship between the two 
rights is exacerbated by the recent surge in individual applications featuring dual legal 
bases, namely both a complaint of a violation of the individual right to freedom of 
religion or belief and a complaint of a violation of the right to freedom from 
discrimination on grounds of religion.2 Time and again individual applicants claim 
that the state fails to treat them with equal respect to other citizens whenever it 
prevents full enjoyment of the expressive dimensions of their conscience, such as to 
wear religious symbols in public or to have their religious practices accommodated at 
the workplace. Thus, the argument is that limitations on the right to freedom of 
religion, either in direct or in indirect ways such as refusal to provide accommodation 
through exemptions from general rules or practices, encroach both on the right to 
freedom of religion and on the right to freedom from direct or indirect forms of 
religious discrimination.  
                                                        
2 See e.g. Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, Application nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 
36516/10, 15 January 2013. 
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A significant idea underlies this argument.3 That is, at least on an abstract level, 
the moral right to freedom of religion seems to entail protection from religious 
discrimination and vice versa; the two rights give the impression of being intertwined 
since in principle strong protection of freedom of conscience cannot but extend 
equally to majority and minority (or unpopular) religious and secular convictions. But 
this abstract idea requires further explication. Is there anything morally important 
hanging from the practice of the ECtHR that uses those provisions interchangeably? 
Is freedom from religious discrimination part of the right to freedom of religion? Are 
violations of the right to freedom from religious discrimination also violations of the 
right to freedom of religion? Which view best matches our ideals of human dignity?  
Chapter Five offers an interpretation of the right to freedom from religious 
discrimination is order to unravel its relationship with the moral right to freedom of 
religion. It argues that both discrimination and disadvantage can be understood under 
descriptive and moralised senses, and that in our shared legal practice, including the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, religious discrimination is used in the moralised sense, 
meaning wrongful discrimination. I then argue that moralised discrimination depends 
on a moralised, rather than a descriptive, sense of disadvantage, according to which 
wrongful disadvantage occurs regardless of how others have been treated. Seeking 
comparators therefore plays only a diagnostic role in the establishment of 
disadvantage. That is, the availability or unavailability of comparable cases is not 
constitutive of a violation of the right to freedom from religious discrimination. 
Rather, I argue that amidst various moral interpretations of the wrong of 
discrimination equality-based theories successfully capture that discriminatory rules 
are wrongful because they count prejudice and stereotypes as valid reasons for 
collective action, in violation of the principle of political legitimacy that the state has 
no moral power to enforce obligations unless it treats its members with equal respect 
and concern. That interpretation of the wrong of religious discrimination explains the 
interchangeable use of the two provisions by the ECtHR because both rights protect 
our ethical independence through blocking reasons based on prejudice from the 
distribution of resources, risks and opportunities. The rights to freedom of religion 
and freedom from religious discrimination are therefore interwoven, rather than 
independent, or even antagonistic. This argument also makes sense of the relationship 
between different grounds of protection from discrimination, such as religion and 
sexual orientation, and of the principles capable of resolving potential tensions 
between them. 
Central to my argument is the claim that a moral interpretation of the reasons 
behind limitations on rights is essential to resolve tensions between the right to 
freedom of religion and other rights. Apart from religious discrimination, I offer such 
an interpretation in cases involving tensions between the right to freedom of religion 
                                                        
3 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of freedom of religion or belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 
33, 38-9; F. Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and church-state relations: 
Pluralism v pluralism’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2575; C. Evans, ‘Time for a treaty? The legal 
sufficiency of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination’ 
(2007) Bringham Young University Law Review 617-638. 
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and the right to freedom from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, in 
cases of limitations on the right to wear religious symbols in public and in cases on 
freedom to express religiously offensive speech. All those arguments spring from the 
idea that the moral right to freedom of religion or belief, along with other moral 
rights, secures our personal responsibility to define value free from subordination to 
the moralistic preferences of others, including the majority of a community. This is 
what being treated with equal respect and concern by the state requires. 
The argument set out above challenges prevailing orthodoxies concerning 
theoretical perspectives on the right to freedom of religion or belief. Significant parts 
of the existing European human rights literature theorise law and religion through 
conventional dualisms reinforcing fragmentation of rights into a collection of 
competing interest groups. The divide between ‘private’ beliefs and ‘public’ 
manifestation, the distinction between individual believers and religious groups as 
well as the emphasis of political theory on secularism and establishment, amongst 
various models of constitutional entanglement of church with state, are just some 
examples of the prevailing modus operandi. By contrast, this study suggests that those 
perspectives on the right to freedom of religion are unhelpful and overshadowed by 
the need to interpret the right in harmony with human dignity and our equal 
entitlement to the full range of rights including, primarily, our treatment as equals by 
the state. 
 
* * * 
 
I elaborate my argument and review opposing arguments in Chapters Two, Three and 
Five, but first it is important that I emphasise what I am not arguing. First, the 
argument here is not that we should expect the jurisprudence on law and religion to 
converge rapidly or completely on an anti-discrimination approach. The rise of 
egalitarian forms of theorisation of law and religion involves reliance on the 
importance of religion and on respect for its diverse meanings and manifestations, not 
a complete convergence with concepts of anti-discrimination law. Indeed, one could 
hardly expect total convergence when the principles underlying anti-discrimination 
law vary themselves substantially across different grounds of protection. And more 
importantly, entrenched national legal arrangements on church and state relations will 
limit the spread of anti-discrimination methodologies. While the existing institutional 
and cultural landscape of European legal systems will not block the spread of anti-
discrimination techniques by the ECtHR, this landscape will surely channel and 
moderate these developments and modify their impact across member states. Thus, to 
say that equality-based methods of interpretation of freedom of religion are cropping 
up in European human rights law is not to suggest that the ECtHR will soon or ever 
experience a total disaggregation of religion into discrimination. As I explore in 
greater detail in Chapters Three and Five, reconstructing our answers to questions of 
religious exemptions so as to complement equality principles helps us focus on the 
justifiability of the reasons behind certain limitations and find answers in a more 
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principled way. A reason-blocking theory of the moral right to freedom of religion is 
a rather subdued effort to seek unity where others only see conflict. 
Second, the argument is not that religion cannot conflict with the state duty to 
treat everyone with equal respect and concern. To argue, however, that the right to 
freedom of religion should be interpreted in harmony with that fundamental state duty 
is not to deny that religion, as a doctrine, cannot conflict with equality legislation, 
such as legislation protecting from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
marital status or disability. In modern societies there is a remarkable range of moral, 
ideological and religious conflicts. Citizens are deeply divided on issues of taxation, 
social welfare, religion, sexual expression, abortion, environmental protection, urban 
planning, foreign policy, and the list could continue indefinitely. But conflicts 
between religion and homosexuality, or between the pro-life and pro-choice 
movements, are not about the best way to achieve peaceful coexistence in a liberal 
democracy. They are about fundamental values. 
There are two main ways to address those fundamental conflicts. The first is to 
ground our political and legal arguments on first-order principles concerning 
fundamental beliefs about, for instance, religion, abortion, or homosexuality. This is 
what Trigg, among others, suggests when he argues that religious commitments take 
second place to the idea of equal, inherent human dignity that animates the 
Convention, which assumes the role of ‘civil religion, and cannot be questioned.’4 
Sullivan boldly claims that the ‘European way to be religious is to be secular.’5 Thus, 
a sense that the courts resolve conflicts between fundamental values by preferring 
some of these values and disregarding others underlies this type of criticism. The 
familiar idea that liberal neutrality can never be truly liberal or genuinely neutral 
depends on that very same sense.6  
But there is a second way to resolve conflicts between fundamental values. We 
can ground our arguments on second-order principles about which first-order 
principles can justify the exercise of political and legal power.7 Liberalism, as shaped 
by thinkers such as Rawls and Dworkin, holds that we should pursue those 
fundamental conflicts in the second way. The state is a human creation subject to 
certain moral constraints on the forms and extents of individual subordination to the 
collective will. For Kant and Rawls the right is prior to the good, which means that 
the principles that define our rights and duties should be neutral between competing 
conceptions of the good life.8 This is not to suggest that those principles are neutral 
themselves. Rather, they depend on the non-teleological idea that ‘the sovereign 
power of the state over the individual is bounded by a requirement that individuals 
                                                        
4 R. Trigg, Equality, Freedom, and Religion (Oxford University Press, 2012) 50. 
5 W. F. Sullivan, ‘We are all religious now. Again.’ (2009) 76(4) Social Research 1181, 1183. 
6 C. Stychin, ‘Faith in the future: Sexuality, religion and the public sphere’ (2009) 29(4) OJLS 729, 
748. 
7 T. Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford University Press, 2010) 110. 
8 This is why Kant argues that to arrive at the moral law we should stay away from our contingent 
interests. Similarly Rawls argues that to deliberate about the principles of a theory of justice we should 
imagine ourselves behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ where we know nothing about our aims, attachments, or 
conceptions of the good. See M. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (Penguin, 2009) 242. 
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remain inviolable in certain respects, and that they must be treated equally.’ 9  Of 
course the idea that the right is prior to the good echoes the familiar moral intuition 
that the ends do not always justify the means. Rather, there are principles of right, 
associated with how citizens may (or may not) be treated by the state, which should 
not be violated for reasons of expediency or because most people prefer so.10 Thus, to 
ground our arguments on second-order principles means that defending a woman’s 
right to abortion does not require debate on whether the Catholic position that human 
life must be protected from conception is right or wrong. We do not have to argue that 
religious arguments are wrong. We only have to insist that, under the best 
interpretation of human rights, first-order principles, such as fundamental religious 
beliefs, must not ground coercive prohibitions of individual choices no matter how 
many people share them. 11  Likewise regarding equal rights for homosexuals. 
Defending equal rights regardless of sexual orientation does not require an argument 
about the moral rightness of homosexuality. Rather, we can base our defense of equal 
rights on the narrower political principle that private sexual conduct should not fall 
under state control or impose disadvantage. As I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 
Three, the seminal, albeit significantly overlooked, distinction between teleological 
and non-teleological accounts of rights is central to the theory of freedom of religion 
that this thesis defends. 
Finally, the argument is not that juridification12 (or judicialisation13) of religion 
or a sturdy anti-discrimination toolbox can resolve every tension in the area of law 
and religion. The 1990s have witnessed the proliferation in the EU of demands for 
legal rights of various sorts: economic and social rights; fundamental human rights; 
and antidiscrimination rights for various groups – including religious minorities. In 
the past decade, apart from freedom of religion, discrimination has also experienced a 
multifaceted, profound juridification in Europe. An expansive literature on 
discrimination law explores this juridification and identifies a number of factors that 
have encouraged it, including increasing emphasis on human rights 14  and the 
expanding scope of EU regulation.15 
                                                        
9 Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament, 113. 
10  J. Habermas, ‘Pre-political foundations of the democratic constitutional state?’, in J. Cardinal 
Ratzinger and J. Habermas, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (Ignatius Press, 
2006) 48-52. 
11 R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 1996) 72-129. 
12 N. Doe, Law and Religion in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2011) 1-13. 
13 E. Fokas, ‘Directions in religious pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the shadow of European 
Court of Human Rights religious freedom jurisprudence’ (2015) 4(1) Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 54, 60. 
14  G. De Burca, ‘The trajectories of American and European anti-discrimination law’ (2012) 60 
American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 3; K. Linos, ‘Path dependence in discrimination law: 
Employment cases in the United States and the European Union’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of 
International Law 115-169; J. Suk, ‘From antidiscrimination to equality: Stereotypes and the life cycle 
in the United States and Europe’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 75-98. 
15 R. Daniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Harvard University Press, 2011) 9; B. De Witte, ‘New institutions for promoting equality in 
Europe: Legal transfers, national bricolage and European governance’ (2012) 60 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 49-74; M. Bell, ‘Gender identity and sexual orientation: Alternative pathways in EU 
equality law’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 127-146. 
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Meanwhile, recent trends in law and religion scholarship focus on the 
desirability of a robust and judicially enforceable anti-discrimination rights 
framework at European level.16  Although most scholars are attracted to the idea, 
proliferation of legally enforceable anti-discrimination rights has been associated with 
the spread of a European variant of American ‘adversarial legalism’,17 which involves 
justiciable regulations backed by strict public enforcement and increased 
opportunities for private enforcement.18 That sort of legalism has started to shift the 
European landscape by dramatically increasing judicial review of administrative 
decisions and practices and raising litigation rates and costs.19 It has also prompted 
the debut of newfangled constitutional jargon such as ‘Americanization of Europe’20 
and ‘Eurolegalism’,21 which American constitutional scholars have coined to describe 
recent developments in European human rights regulation. 22  Importantly, in the 
United States adversarial legalism has contributed to the weakening of anti-
discrimination law after transforming American courts into an arena for social and 
ideological conflict as different groups and interests have been mobilised ‘to use the 
judiciary to contest, rather than to promote or enforce, anti-discrimination laws and 
programs that were intended to redress social inequity.’23  
                                                        
16 R. Wintemute, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs: Harm, clothing or symbols, and refusals to serve 
others’ (2014) 77(2) MLR 223; J. Gerards, ‘The Discrimination grounds of Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) Human Rights Law Review 1-26; M. Gibson, ‘The God 
“dilution”? Religion, discrimination and the case for reasonable accommodation’ (2013) 72(3) 
Cambridge Law Journal 578; S. Pei, ‘Unveiling inequality: Burqa bans and nondiscrimination 
jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 122 Yale Law Journal 1089-1102; K. 
Alidadi, ‘Reasonable accommodation for religion and belief: Adding value to Art. 9 ECHR and the 
EU’s anti-discrimination approach in employment?’ (2012) 37(6) European Law Review 693-715; G. 
Caceres, ‘Reasonable accommodation as a tool to manage religious diversity in the workplace: What 
about the “Transposability” of an American concept into the French secular context?’, in K. Alidadi, 
M. Foblets and J. Vrielink (eds.) A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation in the 
European Workplace (Ashgate, 2012) 283-316; M. Cartabia, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: 
Judging nondiscrimination’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 808; E. Bribosia, J. 
Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable accommodation for religious minorities: A promising concept 
for European antidiscrimination law?’ (2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 137; V. Guiraudon, ‘Equality in the making: Implementing European non-discrimination law’ 
(2009) 13(5) Citizenship Studies 527-549; R. Wintemute, ‘Within the ambit: How big is the “Gap” in 
Article 14 European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Review 366; 
R. Wintemute, ‘Filling the Article 14 “Gap”: Government ratification and judicial control of Protocol 
no. 12 ECHR’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Review 484. 
17 R. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press, 2001). 
18 D. Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union 
(Harvard University Press, 2011) 9. 
19 S. Besson, ‘Evolutions in non-discrimination law within the ECHR and the ESC systems: It takes 
two to tango in the Council of Europe’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 147-180; K. 
Wald, ‘Religion and the workplace: A social science perspective’ (2009) 30 Comparative Labor Law 
& Policy Journal 471-484. 
20  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘State and nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue – the trailer’ (2010) 8(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 157-166. 
21 Kelemen, Eurolegalism (cited above). 
22 A. Stone Sweet and H. Keller, ‘The reception of the ECHR in national legal orders’, in A. Stone 
Sweet and H. Keller (eds.) A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR in National Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 3-31. 
23  G. De Burca, ‘The Trajectories of American and European anti-discrimination law’ (2012) 60 
American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 3. 
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Without necessarily embracing that skepticism, this thesis is careful not to 
cultivate unrealistic expectations of anti-discrimination law as a sufficient mechanism 
to achieve social inclusion of disadvantaged groups, or even strong protection of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief. From a policy perspective, as exemplified in EU 
law by the complementarity between the anti-discrimination Directives and the 
European employment strategy,24 equality laws need to be buttressed by principles of 
social inclusion and solidarity to achieve broader social objectives, such as integration 
and equal participation.25 This study is aware of all these concerns as well as of the 
availability of ‘new governance’ legal tools26 and negotiation strategies27 that stretch 
beyond mere legal prohibitions. The focus, however, will be on the moral principles 
underlying the rights to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination and 
their implications for a substantive theory of rights, rather than on the policy 
ramifications of furthering juridification of discrimination in European human rights 
law. 
There is overlap between some of the arguments found in the literature on 
discrimination theory and parts of the argument developed in this thesis, for instance, 
arguments concerning the role of liberty and equality in explaining why 
discrimination is wrongful. However, while the normative connections between the 
rights to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination that are part of the 
focus of this thesis are related to broader efforts of theorisation of discrimination law, 
they are not synonymous with those. It is more than interesting that the emerging 
trend of theorisation of law and religion coincides with an emerging trend of 
theorisation of discrimination law and that both share important concepts, such as 
liberty-based and equality-based theoretical accounts.28 Those efforts of theorisation 
in religion and discrimination currently follow divergent paths and whereas recent 
works have attempted to connect the two by picking and sewing threads from each 
seemingly independent normative tradition,29 those processes continue to arise non-
systematically. Broader processes of theorisation of human rights have certainly 
                                                        
24 O. De Schutter, The Prohibition of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law (European 
Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2005) 6. 
25 C. Barnard, ‘The future of equality law: equality and beyond’, in C. Barnard, S. Deakin and G. G. 
Morris (eds.) The Future of Labour Law: Liber amicorum Sir Rob Hepple QC (Hart Publishing 2004) 
213-229, at 227. 
26 D. Ashiagbor, ‘Multiple discrimination in a multicultural Europe: Achieving labour market equality 
through new governance’ (2009) 61 Current Legal Problems 265. 
27 M. Minow, ‘Should religious groups be exempt from civil rights laws?’ (2007) 48 Boston College 
Law Review 781. 
28 With reference to discrimination law see e.g. S. Moreau, ‘In defense of a liberty-based account of 
discrimination’, in D. Hellman and S. Moreau (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 71-87; A. McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2014); D. Hellman, ‘Equality and unconstitutional discrimination’, in D. Hellman and S. 
Moreau (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 51-
71. With reference to law and religion see e.g. C. Laborde, ‘Equal liberty, non-establishment and, 
religious freedom’ (2014) 20 Legal Theory 52; C. Eisgruber and L. Sager, Religious Freedom and the 
Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013); M. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of 
America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (Perseus, 2008); N. Feldman, ‘From liberty to equality: The 
transformation of the Establishment Clause’ (2002) 90(3) California Law Review 673. 
29 See Wintemute, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs: Harm, clothing or symbols, and refusals to serve 
others’. Also Gibson, ‘The God “dilution”?’ (both cited above). 
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supported the developments described in this thesis, but these broad processes do not 
provide an adequate explanation for the necessity to spell out the conditions under 
which a political community has moral power to create and enforce obligations 
against its members’ conscience. 
This thesis builds on the rich literature on law and religion, but the focus here 
differs. Much of the leading scholarship on law and religion in Europe analyses how 
and to what extent the ECtHR should protect public manifestations of religion in 
various fora and forms, and highlights the role of domestic constitutional 
arrangements of church and state relations in the interpretation of the right to freedom 
of religion by the ECtHR. Meanwhile, there is – enduring30 – consensus that the 
ECtHR lacks a coherent, principled account of the competing interests at stake and 
how they should be properly balanced.31 While this thesis shares those concerns, it 
does not concentrate on questions of how European legal systems protect freedom of 
religion or to what extent, if at all, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR affects domestic 
constitutional arrangements of church and state. Rather, the research question of this 
thesis concerns what the state duty to treat everyone’s ethical responsibility with 
equal respect means for a substantive theory of the rights to freedom of religion and 
freedom from discrimination, and how this affects traditional interpretative patterns of 
law and religion. Thus, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature through 
the introduction of a specific normative analysis of the right to freedom of religion 
that incorporates equal respect into the core of the right, and through explicating how 
this normative argument could resolve existing doctrinal problems concerning 
different forms of accommodation of conscience as well as freedom from religious 
discrimination. This study is equally concerned with the construction and defence of a 
particular normative argument linking freedom of religion, equal respect and ethical 
independence and with the practical implications of this process of theorisation for 
the interpretation of the Convention. 
 
 
                                                        
30 Criticism related to the lack of principles in European law and religion endures at least since the 
early 1990s. See M. Shaw, ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, in R McDonald, F. Matscher 
and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993) 463; P. W. Edge, ‘Current problems in Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (1996) Juridical Review 42; M. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 281-282; P. W. Edge, ‘The European Court of Human 
Rights and religious rights’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 680. 
31 R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, 
2013); M. Malik, ‘Religion and sexual orientation: conflict or cohesion?’, in G. D’Costa, M. Evans, T. 
Modood and J. Rivers (eds.), Religion in a Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 67-92; S. 
Ferrari, ‘Religion in the European public spaces: A legal overview’, in S. Ferrari and S. Pastorelli 
(eds.), Religion in Public Spaces: A European Perspective (Ashgate, 2012) 144; J. Ringelheim, 
‘Rights, religion and the public sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in search of a theory?’, 
in L. Zucca and C. Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and 
Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 283-307; N. Doe, Law And Religion In Europe: A 
Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2011) 237-58. D. Feldman, ‘Public law and 
freedom of religion: General conclusions’ (2005) 17(1) European Review of Public Law 735, 749-753; 
C. Evans, Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
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Methodology and Chapter Structure 
 
The argument of the thesis will develop in six chapters, excluding the introduction 
and the conclusion. More specifically, Chapters Two and Three will examine the 
relationship between the right to freedom of religion or belief and the values of liberty 
and equality, as well as the connections of our interpretation of the right with different 
conceptions of human rights in general, including interest-based and reason-blocking 
approaches. Chapters Four and Five will then focus on the relationship between the 
right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom from discrimination, including 
freedom from religious discrimination. Finally, Chapters Six and Seven will discuss 
two distinctive themes of law and religion, namely the wearing of religious symbols 
in public and state limitations on blasphemy. The exact methodological relationship 
both between those chapters and between is outlined in further detail below. 
Before returning to the structure of the thesis, a few methodological points 
require clarification. Firstly, this is a project that combines normative and doctrinal 
elements. The aim of this research is to assess the degree to which an interpretation of 
freedom of religion that links the right to a particular conception of the values of 
liberty and equality, which I call equal respect for ethical responsibility, is reflected in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, Chapters Three, Four 
and Five show that the case law of the ECtHR, properly analysed, already follows an 
interpretation of the right to freedom of religion according to those terms. Chapters 
Six and Seven, on the wearing of religious symbols and blasphemous speech 
respectively, highlight, on the other hand, that the ECtHR often deviates from such an 
interpretation. It is of course no coincidence that those parts of the case law have been 
repeatedly criticised, and this thesis will make specific suggestions about how those 
areas of case law could be adapted to improve consistency, not only with other cases 
on freedom of religion, but also with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on freedom of 
expression and respect for private life, and with other international human rights law 
mechanisms, such as the UN Human Rights Committee. 
Moreover, theoretical analyses of human rights usually undertake either of two 
main forms.32 The first is to focus on questions about the nature of rights, viz. whether 
freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination should be classified as human 
rights and what distinguishes them from other legal and political rights. 33  The 
following pages, however, presume that our established national and international 
human rights legal practice provides sufficient answers to the classificatory question. 
Thus, the analysis treats both freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination as 
human rights and although occasionally I refer to them as ‘rights’, I mean ‘human 
rights’ throughout. A second group of questions focuses on the grounds of human 
                                                        
32 See A. Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013) 3-50; C. Beitz, The 
Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009) 7-14 and 128-136; Griffin J, On Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 20-29; J. Finnis, Natural law and natural rights (Oxford University 
Press, 1980) 198-205. 
33 For an analysis of questions related to the nature of rights see J. Tasioulas, ‘Towards a philosophy of 
human rights’ (2012) Current Legal Problems 65, 1-30. 
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rights, or what is usually referred to as their normative justification. The question then 
is not whether there is a right to freedom of religion, but the circumstances under 
which we enjoy it. The following analysis takes up the second theoretical standpoint. 
Meanwhile, we use the values of liberty and equality in two senses. We use 
each as a flat description that carries itself no suggestion of endorsement or 
complaint, and we also use each of them normatively to identify political virtues or 
ideals that we do endorse.34 I think that those two senses – flat and normative – of the 
value of liberty permeate our conversations about freedom of religion as well. That is, 
we use religious freedom in a flat sense to indicate absence of constraint. We claim, 
for instance, that some people’s religious freedom is constrained by laws prohibiting 
symbols in public schools.35 On the other hand, we use religious freedom in the 
normative sense to describe the ways in which we believe people ought to be 
protected in their religion or belief. When Christians claim that their religious 
freedom has been in danger in Europe lately,36 they use religious freedom in that 
second, normative, way. They do not mean that people in other parts of the world 
enjoy better protection, but that they are themselves less protected in the specific 
ways contemplated by religious freedom as a fundamental moral right: to act and 
express themselves in accordance with their conscience, for example. It is mainly 
through this normative lens that freedom of religion will be examined in this study. 
The liberal egalitarian ideal of the state duty to show equal respect and concern 
towards everyone draws influence from the work of Ronald Dworkin.37 The idea it 
expresses, namely that everyone is worthy of equal concern and respect merely by 
virtue of being human, is a familiar theme in liberal theory and political philosophy 
that finds expression in the moral and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant38 and 
can also be traced in the liberal theories of John Locke, Thomas Paine and John Stuart 
Mill. 39  This is certainly not to suggest that the idea is uncontroversial. On the 
contrary, the ideal of equality has been widely contested.40 Raz argues that nothing 
significant, other than rhetorical vigour, is added to the claim that each person is 
entitled to respect and concern by saying that each person is entitled to equal respect 
and concern.41 John Finnis adds that paternalist programmes guilty of far-reaching 
restrictions because of forgetting that ‘personal authenticity’ is an important adjunct 
of human well-being should be criticised for exactly that failure, not on the basis of 
denial of equal respect and concern. Moreover, according to Frankfurt, equality has 
                                                        
34 R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press, 
2002) 125-126. 
35 See e.g. Dogru v France, Application no. 27058/05, 4 December 2008. 
36  Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 2036: Tackling intolerance and 
discrimination in Europe with a special focus on Christians, adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 
2015 (8th Sitting). 
37 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 273. 
38 Best known as Kant’s theory of the categorical imperative. See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785). 
39 For more details see J. Waldron, ‘Introduction’, in J. Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
40 P. Westen, ‘The empty idea of equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537-596. See also E. 
Anderson, ‘What is the point of equality?’ (1999) 109(2) Ethics 287. 
41 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986) 228. 
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no moral importance as such because the mere fact that one person has or is entitled 
to something is no reason for another person ‘to want the same thing or to think 
himself entitled to it.’42 And those are critical voices from inside the liberal tradition 
lato sensu. Outside that tradition, the critique of equality by both conservative and 
socialist thinkers is much more radical. 
Even so, the research question and space constraints of this thesis do not leave 
enough space for direct engagement in the dialectic on the value of equality or on the 
validity of egalitarian principles of justice. This is not to suggest that my arguments 
do not take sides though. In various sections, and especially in Chapters Three and 
Five, I argue that the claim that everyone is entitled to respect for his personal ethical 
responsibility, instead of equal respect, as well as the implications of this claim, are 
obscure. When a collective decision injures some people but is nevertheless supported 
by the claim that the community as a whole will be better off, or that the fulfillment of 
some widespread important interests in the community requires it, the most plausible 
objection springs from the impact of that decision on the affected minority. The claim 
that such a decision does not treat people as equals because, for instance, it does not 
properly consider the damage it causes to a specific section of the community is just a 
natural extension of that sort of objection. It is this comparative aspect that puts ‘meat 
on the bones of the concept of treating a person with the respect that personhood 
requires.’43  
Turning to the structure of the thesis in more detail, Chapter Two starts with the 
popular idea that the right to freedom of religion or belief comes into conflict with 
other rights as well as with the demands of equal treatment, and that some form of 
reconciliation is therefore essential. The principles of this process of reconciliation are 
then commonly derived either from liberty or from equality-based theories of freedom 
of religion, which presumably furnish opposing accounts of the scope of the right and 
its relationship with other rights. Those two theories are habitually portrayed in an 
antagonistic fashion. Chapter Two challenges this dualist narrative. I examine various 
versions of liberty-based theories of freedom of religion and argue that their most 
plausible and attractive interpretation, namely the one best explaining the legal 
practice of the ECtHR in the examination of complaints about violations of the right 
to freedom of religion, is egalitarian. That is, it includes an egalitarian dimension of 
equal respect that ultimately both theories of the right to freedom of religion share. 
Chapter Three develops this argument further. I argue that a reason-blocking 
account of our right to freedom of religion or belief makes better sense, compared to 
an interest-based account, both of the diffusion of interests that underlie the right and 
of the seminal distinction between influence and subordination. Moreover, a reason-
blocking account of the right makes better sense in connection with the more abstract 
principles of equal ethical responsibility and authenticity, which are discussed in 
                                                        
42 H. Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 149-150 Notably 
Frankfurt draws a distinction between equality and respect. He considers the former as aiming at 
outcomes ‘that are matched specifically to the particularities of the individual’ while the latter as 
matched ‘specifically to the particularities of the individual.’ 
43 D. Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard University Press, 2008) 175.  
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detail. In my view, this reason-blocking account of the right also explains certain 
morally important parts of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; and more specifically, 
why in a significant number of cases the ECtHR does not balance between individual 
and other collective interests and focuses instead on reading principles such as 
neutrality, impartiality, autonomy and non-subordination into the text of Article 9 of 
the Convention. A reason-blocking interpretation of the right helps us make sense 
both of those principles and of the methodological discrepancies between cases that 
involve balancing and cases that do not. More precisely, it helps us recognise that 
actually the ECtHR focuses on the interpretation of the reasons underlying certain 
specific limitations on our right and not on the satisfaction of important interests for 
their own sake. 
The interconnections between equality and the right to freedom of religion have 
certain implications for the relationship between the right to freedom of religion and 
the right to freedom from discrimination. Chapters Four and Five investigate that 
relationship from different perspectives. Chapter Four sets the doctrinal basis, 
organises the relevant typologies, and highlights some important issues relating to 
direct and indirect discrimination. It also tracks the implementation of the provisions 
protecting from religious discrimination through a parallel examination of Articles 9 
and 14 (read in conjunction with Article 9) of the Convention. The main argument of 
the chapter is that the ECtHR, in the relevant parts of its jurisprudence, makes no 
principled distinction between the two provisions to the extent that the relationship 
between religious freedom and religious discrimination ends up being doctrinally 
confusing.  
Unraveling that seeming confusion requires analysis of the moral wrong of 
religious discrimination. Chapter Five engages in that inquiry. The chapter discusses 
descriptive and moralised conceptions of discrimination and disadvantage, and 
challenges the claim that egalitarian accounts of freedom of religion are based on 
inconsistent analogies between religion and other non-religious claims. I argue that, 
under a moralised sense, disadvantage is not inherently comparative and that the 
availability, activation or selection of comparators is not constitutive of a violation of 
our rights to freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination. Rather, 
religious discrimination is morally wrong because it counts stereotypes and prejudice 
towards certain religious groups among the legitimate interests that a government can 
satisfy. The duty of a political community to treat the independence and authenticity 
of its members as equally important blocks those impermissible kinds of reason from 
the justification of political action, even if that action would improve the welfare or 
well-being of the community as a whole. This principle unifies the moral rights to 
freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination, and explains why the 
ECtHR uses the two rights interchangeably. Freedom of religion is intertwined with 
freedom from discrimination to the extent that state measures failing to show equal 
respect and concern regardless of conscience could never be compatible with either of 
those rights. 
Even taken together, the normative arguments presented in Chapters Two, 
Three and Five cannot fully capture the practical implications of the proposed theory 
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of interpretation of the right to freedom of religion. For even though the interpretative 
principles underlying significant parts of the case-law of the ECtHR – including cases 
on proselytism, equal rights of registration for religious groups, regulation of religion 
outside the workplace and religious discrimination – seem to be congenial, when 
properly analysed, to the argument that the right to freedom of religion normatively 
flows from a more general right to equal ethical responsibility, this is not the case 
throughout the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. So, in order to explore and understand the 
pathways linking ethical responsibility, equality and freedom of religion, this thesis 
also includes detailed discussions of two particular and distinctive areas of law and 
religion that seem to stand in tension with the proposed theory.  
More precisely, Chapter Six examines cases of prohibitions on religious 
symbols in public spaces, including the recent S.A.S. v France on the blanket 
prohibition on full-face veils from the public space. I argue that the reason-blocking 
theory of the right to freedom of religion that Chapters Three and Five develop does 
not entail complete lack of limitations on the wearing of symbols in public, but that 
the justifiability of those limitations depends on a moral inquiry focusing on the 
reasons behind those limitations in order to ensure protection from subordination to 
the moralistic preferences of the majority. Given that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
has recently recognised a right to ‘living together’, as a legitimate dimension of the 
rights of others that could justify limitations on our rights under the Convention, the 
chapter distinguishes between a responsibility and a conformity interpretation of 
‘living together’. I argue that in cases involving state limitations on the wearing of 
religious symbols in public a reason-blocking interpretation of freedom of religion not 
only favours a responsibility conception of ‘living together’, but also shows why that 
interpretation better fits the jurisprudence of the ECtHR across a number of rights that 
involve public and potentially offensive expressive dimensions, including respect for 
private life and freedom of expression. So, despite the fact that in cases on religious 
symbols in public the ECtHR has reached different outcomes to those that the 
normative theory defended here would point to, Chapter Six shows that tracking the 
normative justification of religious freedom to a more general right to equal respect 
for ethical responsibility consolidates religious freedom into a more general theory of 
rights which could be conducive to a more coherent interpretation of the Convention. 
Chapter Seven discusses justifiability of state restrictions on religiously 
offensive speech. The chapter challenges the approach of the ECtHR, which has been 
over-protective of religiously offensive forms of expression. More specifically, 
similarly to the approach followed in Chapter Six, the ECtHR is criticised because the 
more general duty to treat everyone’s ethical responsibility with equal respect is 
incompatible with a right not to be offended in one’s religious beliefs. This chapter 
will also argue that a reason-blocking approach would improve consistency both 
internally, given that the ECtHR has repeatedly held that freedom of expression 
protects speech that ‘offends, shocks or disturbs’,44 and externally with international 
human rights law, where the latest soft law developments support criminalisation of 
                                                        
44 See e.g. Handyside v United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, at §49. 
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expression inciting to violence and not bans on merely offensive forms of expression. 
Once again, according to a reason-blocking approach limitations on offensive forms 
of expression are unjustifiable neither because we think that we can secure more 
individual rights by rejecting such limitations, nor because the interests of the artists 
are more important than the interests of the affected religious believers. They are 
unjustifiable simply because the values and considerations supporting the putative 
right not to be offended in one’s religion are incompatible with the very idea of equal 
respect for our personal ethical responsibility that the right to freedom of religion 
itself asserts. 
 
 
* * * 
 
A theory of interpretation of the right to freedom of religion that forbids restrictions 
justified on certain impermissible kinds of reason favours a tolerant state that does not 
privilege religion over non-religion. This is one the main burdens of the argument that 
this study offers. I hope that any disagreement will be supported with reasons about 
why my arguments are wrong. You might reject the distinction between influence and 
subordination that I find crucial, or you might disagree about the claim that the 
inquiry under either Article 9 or Article 14 involves the same concerns, that is, to 
smoke out impermissible reasons underlying restrictions on freedom of conscience. 
Nevertheless, if we accept that the normative justification of our moral right to 
freedom of religion is our personal responsibility to make deep ethical choices 
independently and authentically, then any contrary argument about the scope of the 
right to freedom of religion and its interaction with prohibition of discrimination has 
to fit that principle. Disagreeing with some, or all, of the practical implications of the 
forthcoming argument is not enough, I think, to declare it wrong. 
This PhD thesis was written with the aim to be as meticulous and 
methodologically sound as possible, but I cannot prevent that some of my conclusions 
about the limits of the right to freedom of religion and its relationship with liberty and 
equality will be controversial. I do not think, of course, that any substantive theory of 
the right to freedom of religion can make hard cases, many of which will be examined 
in the following pages, look easy and straightforward. My aim, however, is not to 
resolve every issue of law and religion, but to channel further thought about why 
sufficient protection of the right to freedom of religion cannot but include principles 
in the interpretation of Article 9 ECHR. My argument is that the way to add principles 
to the area of law and religion is through constructing, testing, and evaluating 
different conceptions of liberal equality in order to figure out which of them best fits 
the history and practice of the Convention. Ultimately, this thesis interprets freedom 
of religion, ethical responsibility and human dignity on the basis of an ideal, liberal 
equality, so controversy is expected and welcome.  
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Freedom of Religion, Equality, and Harm 
 
 
 
[W]hile the Court does not consider that an individual’s decision to enter 
into a contract of employment and to undertake responsibilities which he 
knows will have an impact on his freedom to manifest his religious belief 
is determinative of the question whether or not there been an interference 
with Article 9 rights, this is a matter to be weighed in the balance when 
assessing whether a fair balance was struck. 
 
Eweida and Others v United Kingdom1 
 
In a democratic society, I believe that it is necessary to seek to harmonise 
the principles of secularism, equality and liberty, not to weigh one against 
the other. 
 
Leyla Şahin v Turkey, Dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens2 
 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses a familiar idea that dominates the phenomenology and 
jurisprudence on law and religion, namely that there is an inherent tension between 
the right to freedom of religion and the demands of equal treatment, the rights of 
others, and various important collective interests. The overarching conclusion is that 
there should be some form of reconciliation or compromise, possibly through granting 
certain religious exemptions from general laws. However, there is ambiguity and 
discord with regard to the principles underlying that process of reconciliation. Is it 
liberty (which favours religious exemptions) or equality (which favours equivalent 
protection for religious and important non-religious claims) that should prevail? 
The following pages will closely examine liberty and equality-based theories of 
freedom of religion and will argue that the antagonism between the two is illusory. 
Liberty-based theories of freedom of religion are more plausible if taken to include a 
                                                        
1  Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, Application nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 
36516/10, 15 January 2013, §109. 
2 Leyla Şahin v Turkey, Application no. 44774/98, 10 November 2005, Dissenting opinion of Judge 
Tulkens, §4. 
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moral principle of equal respect, which this chapter will develop towards the end, at 
their core. If this is correct, what follows is that freedom of conscience and equal 
treatment cannot but be interpreted together, as mutually supportive, rather than as 
conflicting, norms.  
This chapter sets parts of the foundations of a normative theory of the right to 
freedom of religion that Chapter Three and Chapter Five will revisit and refine. 
Chapters Four, Six and Seven will then show how that approach could make better 
sense, or even improve, the current jurisprudence of the ECtHR. One of the core 
points is that, even if we disagree on the specific applications of the right to freedom 
of religion, the values of liberty and equality, interpreted in light of each other, help us 
to better understand what claims of accommodation of conscience mean and what 
makes them true or false. Different views about accommodation of conscience may 
represent common adherence to the values of liberty and equality, but different 
conceptions of what equal protection for freedom of conscience is. 
 
2.2.  Liberty and Equality-Based Theories of Freedom of Religion 
 
It is often argued that the reasons for variations in granting religious exemptions from 
general and neutral rules stem from the fact that legislatures and policy makers try to 
balance between two goals.3  One is the maintenance of state neutrality in public 
institutions and, sometimes, the public space, which is perceived as an essential 
entailment of equality between all fundamental beliefs.4 The other is ensuring the 
maximum possible freedom of religion or belief for everyone. Different national 
answers reflect different approaches on how to ‘balance’ between those two goals. 
This familiar ‘balancing’ formula is often used in constitutional theory to resolve 
conflicts between rights or between rights and collective goals.5 Time and again the 
ECtHR engages in context-sensitive ‘balancing’ involving the justification, necessity 
and proportionality of state limitations on freedom of religion or belief on the one 
hand, and the importance of the right for the individual or group on the other.6 Of 
course ‘balancing’, as both Habermas7 and Dworkin8 have argued, suggests in itself 
no principled basis for deciding how much we should protect human rights. The 
balancing metaphor seems to assume that courts can decide the extent of human rights 
protection through a form of cost-benefit analysis, just the way communities decide 
on various policy matters such as urban planning or the construction of high-speed 
trains. But this strategy is inappropriate to recognise and protect human rights. Most 
                                                        
3 C. Taylor, ‘Why we need a radical redefinition of secularism’, in E. Mendieta and J. Vanantwerpen 
(eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (Columbia University Press, 2011) 34-41. 
4  C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer and J. Vanantwerpen, ‘Introduction’, in C. Calhoun, M. 
Juergensmeyer and J. VanAntwerpen (eds.) Rethinking Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2011) 3-
31. 
5 R. Alexy, Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002) 47-48. 
6 S. Greer, ‘“Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: a contribution to the Habermas-
Alexy debate’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 412. 
7 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press, 1996) 256-259 
8 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford University Press, 1985) 72-104. 
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political decisions require a cost-benefit analysis in which disadvantages to some are 
weighed against the overall benefit to the community. However, some injuries to 
individuals are so grave that they cannot be justified by declaring that that is what the 
public wants. We recognise and protect rights precisely because we want to safeguard 
individuals from these grave harms. 
Balancing has therefore to be accompanied by principles, that is, by moral 
arguments that appeal to ideas about fairness and rights instead of consequences. But 
which are those principles, and why are they useful? For instance, are there any 
circumstances under which a ‘balancing’ analysis would for some reason be 
inappropriate? How can a fair state grant conscientious exemptions from general rules 
and, at the same time, claim that it treats everyone equally regardless of religion or 
belief? 
It is important to answer those questions, especially given that significant parts 
of the literature concentrate on the seemingly irresoluble tensions between freedom of 
religion and other rights. Accommodation of religion is allegedly in tension with 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression or freedom from discrimination,9 
with human rights in general,10 or even with law;11 and those tensions seem hard to 
reconcile.12 For instance, Zucca argues that ‘a religion that claims exclusive truth 
cannot possibly reach a compromise on issues that involve the denial of those very 
truths.’13 Rosenfeld contends that the constitutional treatment of religion challenges 
the foundations of the ‘Enlightenment project’, which is characterised by reason, 
secularism, division between the public and private spheres and ‘substantive equal 
treatment’ for competing conceptions of the good within the polity.14 However, as this 
chapter will later argue, this controversial distinction between faith and rationality 
does not say much about the scope or role of our moral right to freedom of religion or 
belief.15 Others claim that human rights sit uneasily with religion because religious 
groups ‘misuse’ human rights to make ‘self-interested’ claims.16 Finally, with regard 
to legal interpretation, it has been argued that courts should concentrate not on 
‘theoretical conflicts between comprehensive views’, but on ‘practical conflicts’ about 
                                                        
9 F. Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and church-state relations: pluralism vs. 
pluralism’ (2009) 30(6) Cardozo Law Review 2575, 2586. 
10 L. Zucca, ‘Prince or pariah? The place of freedom of religion in a system of international human 
rights’ (2013) EUI ReligioWest Working Paper (RSCAS 2013/26), at 10. This is the post-
Enlightenment position, which is allegedly adopted by the Council of Europe in a series of recent 
Recommendations on religious freedom. See R. Trigg, Equality, Freedom, and Religion (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 38. 
11 Zucca, ‘Prince or Pariah?’, 10. 
12 M. Evans, ‘Freedom of religion and the ECHR’ in P. Cane, C. Evans and Z. Robinson (eds.) Law 
and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge University Press 2008) at 314. See also 
L. Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment – the EU Law (European Commission, 
DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2006) 40. 
13 Zucca, ‘Law v. Religion’, 158. 
14 M. Rosenfeld, ‘Introduction: Can constitutionalism, secularism and religion be reconciled in an era 
of globalization and religious revival?’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2333, 2360-2361 
15 H. Rice, God and Goodness (Oxford University Press, 2003) 128-141. 
16 Zucca, ‘Law v. Religion’, 141. 
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‘how to behave under certain circumstances.’17 But the distinction between theoretical 
and practical conflicts bypasses that ‘practical’ conflicts cannot be resolved in ways 
distinct from moral arguments about the value of the right to freedom of religion and 
its normative justification, that is, about what this right entails, what it is for and what 
assumptions about it fit with an attractive interpretation of the Convention as a whole. 
Meanwhile, we usually encounter conflict in two ideas, which seem to belong to 
the moral right to freedom of religion or belief. That is, a state may not burden 
freedom of religion, but must not discriminate in favour of any religion. It is precisely 
that uncertainty about the relationship between the right to freedom of religion or 
belief and the state duty of equal treatment that is exemplified in recent complaints 
before the ECtHR, which build on the idea that failure to accommodate the 
applicants’ conscience not only limits their right to freedom of religion, but also 
demonstrates state failure to treat them with equal respect to other citizens.18 A fusion 
of freedom of religion and equality emerges from the surge in individual applications 
with dual legal bases, namely both a complaint of a violation of the individual right to 
freedom of religion or belief and a complaint of a violation of the right to freedom 
from discrimination on grounds of religion. 19  Seeking to make sense of such 
developments, an emerging literature explores the increasing role of equality norms in 
the examination of freedom of religion claims by the ECtHR. Some scholars argue 
that framing freedom of religion claims as equality claims promises better chances of 
success before the courts. 20  For instance, Wintemute notes that the ‘very limited 
success’ of the ‘liberty’ approach, which is based on Article 9 ECHR, is a good 
reason to consider an alternative ‘equality approach’, which is based on indirect 
discrimination and engages Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR.21 The 
assumption is that robust anti-discrimination protection will lead to stronger 
protection of freedom of religion for majority and minority groups alike.22  Other 
scholars disagree. Leigh and Hambler argue, for instance, that an approach based on 
                                                        
17 Zucca, ‘Law v. Religion’, in L. Zucca and C. Ungureanu (eds.) Law, State and Religion in the New 
Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 137-159, 138. 
18 C. Odone, 'The new intolerance: will we regret pushing Christians out of public life?' The New 
Statesman, 14 January 2013, at <http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/01/new-intolerance-will-we-
regret-pushing-christians-out-public-life>. Also ‘A new intolerance is nudging faith aside’, The 
Telegraph, 15 January 2013, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/9803272/A-
new-intolerance-is-nudging-faith-aside.html>. 
19 Eweida v United Kingdom is an example among many. Chapter Five will discuss cases on religious 
discrimination in further detail. 
20 Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, 168-199; K. Alidadi, 
‘Reasonable accommodation for religion and belief: Adding value to Art. 9 ECHR and the EU’s anti-
discrimination approach in employment?’ (2012) 37(6) European Law Review 693-715; G. Caceres, 
‘Reasonable accommodation as a tool to manage religious diversity in the workplace: What about the 
“transposability” of an American concept into the French secular context?’, in K. Alidadi, M. Foblets 
and J. Vrielink (eds.), A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation in the European 
Workplace (Ashgate, 2012) 283-316; E. Bribosia, J. Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable 
accommodation for religious minorities: A promising concept for European antidiscrimination law?’ 
(2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law 137. 
21 Wintemute, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs’, 226. 
22 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of freedom of religion or belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 
33, 38-9; C. Evans, ‘Time for a treaty? The legal sufficiency of the declaration on the elimination of all 
forms of intolerance and discrimination’ (2007) Bringham Young University Law Review 617-638. 
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individual conscience, rather than on freedom from discrimination, protects the 
interests of individual believers much more satisfactorily.23 Especially with regard to 
Ladele v United Kingdom,24 a case involving a registrar who was dismissed because 
of her refusal to register same-sex civil partnerships based on her conscience, an 
approach based on liberty of conscience also fits the principle that public bodies 
should not be allowed to ‘pick and choose’ which ‘human rights they prefer by 
prioritising one stream of equality law (sexual orientation) over another (religion or 
belief) rather than to hold the two in balance.’25 
Not all authors engaged in these debates mean precisely the same thing when 
they invoke notions such as equality between believers and non-believers, freedom of 
conscience or reasonable accommodation. While perhaps no concept can capture all 
those different understandings of what the right to freedom of religion entails in 
European human rights law, two distinct substantive theories of religious freedom, 
liberty and equality-based, come close. In the following pages I will attempt to 
explain why. But first there are two points that have to be made. First, it is noteworthy 
that liberty and equality-based theories of the right to freedom of religion generate 
different political implications.26 Second, to a significant extent their distinction draws 
influence from the American constitutional jurisprudence,27 where the relationship 
between the free exercise, non-establishment, and due process clauses of the US 
constitution has proved puzzling.28 However, the different construction of the ECHR, 
which neither includes a non-establishment clause, nor expressly singles out religion 
for special constitutional attention, requires caution.29 
The idea that there are two distinct and antagonistic accounts of the right to 
freedom of religion derives from the perennial rivalry between liberty and equality in 
political philosophy. The political roots of the antagonism emerge more clearly in 
arguments that hold that the question in cases of accommodation of religion is 
whether equality should ‘trump’ freedom.30 For instance, Trigg argues that equality is 
just one priority among others and that freedom of religion is a basic right ‘that cannot 
simply be discarded because it competes with other priorities.’ 31  He criticises 
Recommendation 1804 of the Council of Europe for pursuing a secular agenda that 
                                                        
23 I. Leigh and A. Hambler, ‘Religious symbols, conscience, and the rights of others’ (2014) 3(1) 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2. 
24 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (cited above). 
25 Leigh and Hambler, ‘Religious symbols, conscience, and the rights of others’, 24. 
26 See e.g. C. Laborde, ‘Equal Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Religious Freedom’ (2014) 20(1) Legal 
Theory 52-77; Wintemute, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs’, 225-228.  
27 Indicative of that influence is that most analyses discuss the American jurisprudence as paradigms of 
the rivalry between liberty and equality jurisprudence. See e.g. Laborde, ‘Equal Liberty, 
Nonestablishment, and Religious Freedom’. 
28 K. Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness (Princeton University 
Press, 2008) 3-13; N. Feldman, ‘From Liberty to equality: The transformation of the Establishment 
Clause’ (2002) 90(3) California Law Review 673. 
29 As the American constitution does in its Free Exercise clause. 
30 Trigg, Equality, Freedom, and Religion, 35-40. 
31 ibid 38. 
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disregards religious objections to homosexual practices and abortion. 32 
Recommendation 1804 urges contracting states to gradually remove from legislation 
‘elements likely to be discriminatory from the angle of democratic religious 
pluralism’, 33  which, according to Trigg, means that ‘religious principles must be 
abandoned in favour of the removal of some form of discrimination, but not, it 
appears, of discrimination against religion.’ He concludes that ‘in the pursuit of 
equality, it seems, some beliefs are still more equal than others.’34  
For reasons that will be further analysed in Chapter Three, I think that the claim 
that the ECtHR and the Council of Europe treat religion and equality as 
comprehensive views and that they ultimately take sides in a debate between 
fundamental values whenever they valorise equality as a principle, or as bedrock of 
particular social policies, misunderstands the role and function of human rights. Still, 
the antagonism between liberty-based and equality-based approaches of freedom of 
religion and its enduring impact in human rights theory deserves to be closely 
examined. Schematically, liberty-based theories of religion hold that the government 
should not unduly interfere with individual conscience and that freedom of religion 
requires ‘special’ protection by the state. By contrast, equality-based theories maintain 
that freedom of religion is a fundamental right that should enjoy equivalent, rather 
than ‘special’, protection to other rights and freedoms. Importantly, equality-based 
theories do not preclude religious exceptions to general and neutral rules. Rather, their 
main political difference from liberty-based approaches is that such exemptions 
should not be granted preferentially to religious reasons, but that those should be 
treated on a par with other important reasons for action, such as philosophical beliefs, 
family commitments, or even health predicaments. Finally, although the two theories 
are predominantly portrayed in competition, this is not always the case. Some argue 
that liberty-based complement equality-based theories, which, more specifically, 
means that in some areas, such as marriage, religious groups have to enjoy ‘special’ 
protection (which favours a liberty-based approach) whereas in other areas, such as 
economic distribution, religious and non-religious groups have to be treated 
analogously (which favours an equality-based approach).35  
I do not suggest that the foregoing brief description of liberty and equality-
based approaches fully captures the two theories, or that a theory of the moral right to 
freedom of conscience necessarily has to side with either of them. The only aim of the 
following pages is to shed light to the relationship between the two because, I think, 
that that investigation will be useful for one of the main research questions of this 
thesis, namely the relationship between the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
the values of liberty and equality. 
 
                                                        
32  Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1804 (2007) on State, religion, 
secularity and human rights, adopted by the Assembly on 29 June 2007 (27th Sitting). 
33 ibid 24(2). 
34 Trigg, Equality, Freedom, and Religion, 38. 
35  L. Zucca, ‘A Marriage Made in Heaven? The Relationship between Religious Pluralism and 
Secularism’, in F. Requejo and C. Ungureanu (eds.) Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in 
Europe: Secularism and Post-secularism (Routledge, 2014) 146-160, 148. 
Chapter 2 | Freedom of Religion, Equality, and Harm 
 42 
2.3.  Liberty-Based Theories of Freedom of Religion 
 
2.3.1.  Religion or belief? 
 
Before starting our examination of liberty-based accounts of freedom of religion, it is 
important to delve deeper into the existing European human rights landscape. This is 
important because amongst all the plausible accounts of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief we have to adopt those that are consistent with our common legal 
practice. A first important question is whether religious and non-religious beliefs 
enjoy equivalent protection under the ECHR. As its title suggests, Article 9 of the 
Convention protects freedom of religion or belief. And, in fact, the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR does not favour theistic over non-theistic beliefs as to the level of 
protection that they enjoy under the Convention. Rather, any belief that attains a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance falls within the 
protective scope of the article. In Campbell and Cossans v United Kingdom,36 the 
ECtHR held that philosophical opposition to corporal punishment of children involves 
‘a weighty and substantial aspect of human behaviour’ and as such it reaches the 
required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the 
protection of the Convention.37 Another example is the Church of Scientology, which 
the ECtHR has recognised to fall within the protective scope of Article 938 without 
engaging in debates about the nature of religion that have concerned other national 
courts. 39  By the same token, the ECtHR has held that pacifism falls within the 
protective scope of Article 9 40  and so are atheism, 41  the Druids, 42  the Raëlian 
Movement,43 the Osho Movement44 and the Divine Light Zentrum.45 All these non-
theistic beliefs are protected on a par with more traditional religions such as Islam,46 
Judaism,47 Buddhism,48 Hinduism49 and various denominations of Christianity.50  
Meanwhile, the ECtHR – and the European Commission of Human Rights 
before that – have also avoided the controversial territory of defining what constitutes 
religion or belief for the purposes of Article 9 and they rarely hold that something 
                                                        
36 ibid 
37 ibid §§16-17. 
38  X and Church of Scientology v Sweden, Application no. 7805/77, 1978, §70. Also Church of 
Scientology Moscow v Russia, Application no. 18147/02, 5 April 2007. 
39 R v Hodkin, UK Court of Appeal, December 2013. See also the reversal in R v Hodkin, UK Supreme 
Court 2014.  
40 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom, Application no. 7050/75 (1978); Le Cour Grandmaison and Fritz v 
France, Application nos. 11567/85 and 11568/85 (1987). 
41 Angeleni v Sweden, Application no. 10491/83 (1986). 
42 A.R.M. Chappell v United Kingdom, Application no 12587/86 (1987). 
43 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, 13 July 2012. 
44 Leela Förderkreis E.V. and Others v Germany, Application no. 58911/00, 6 November 2008. 
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46 Karaduman v Turkey, Application no. 16278/90 (1993). 
47 D. v France, Application no. 10180/82 (1983). 
48 X. v the United Kingdom, Application no. 5442/72 (1974). 
49 ISKCON and Others v United Kingdom, Application no. 20490/92, 8 March 1994. 
50 See e.g. Knudsen v Norway, Application no. 11045/84 (1985). 
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alleged to be a religion or belief is not.51 Only a handful of exceptions to that practice 
exist. An example is X v Germany,52 where the Commission found that the applicant’s 
aversion to being buried in a cemetery dominated by Christian symbols fell outside 
the scope of Article 9 as his wish did not contain a ‘coherent view of fundamental 
problems.’53 A very basic level of intellectual or moral coherence is probably the only 
requirement for a religion or belief to qualify for protection under the Convention. 
That generous approach is also congenial to the practice of UN bodies. For 
instance, in General Comment No. 22, the UN Human Rights Committee adopts an 
analogously wide interpretation of the right, which includes freedom to choose a 
religion or belief, and ‘the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another 
or to adopt atheistic views, as well as to retain one’s religion or belief.’54 Furthermore, 
similar flexibility emerges in the practice of various national European courts, 
including the UK courts. In March 2015, the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(‘EAT’) held in General Municipal and Boilermakers Union v Henderson55 that left-
wing democratic socialism is a protected belief under Section 10 of the UK Equality 
Act 2010 (Religion or belief). The appellant had suffered direct discrimination and 
harassment in virtue of his socialist political beliefs. The EAT found a violation of the 
Equality Act 2010 on the basis that ‘the law does not accord special protection for one 
category of belief’56 and that ‘philosophical beliefs may be just as fundamental or 
integral to a person’s individuality and daily life as are religious beliefs.’ 57  This 
approach is unsurprising, given previous cases from the UK courts, such as Grainger 
v Nicholson,58 where the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a belief in man-made 
climate change – and the moral imperatives arising from it – was protected under the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. Also protected is the 
belief that public service broadcasting promotes cultural interchange and social 
cohesion.59 
Meanwhile, the Convention offers absolute protection to the right to believe, or 
change one’s beliefs. 60  However, freedom of manifestation ‘through worship, 
teaching, practice and observance’ 61  is subject to restrictions provided that they 
                                                        
51  On definitions of religion see, among others, B. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton 
University Press, 2013) 26-54 and its review in M. McConnell, ‘Why Protect Religious Freedom?’ 
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July 1993. ICCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. 
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pursue a legitimate aim and that they are necessary in a democratic society. 62 
Although there is strong consensus that the protective scope of the right to freedom of 
manifestation includes certain seminal activities such as, for example, the organisation 
and registration of religious communities and the building of places of worship,63 
significant disagreement remains about other, more unusual, practices. Commonly 
cited examples include practices that are not supported by dominant interpretations of 
religious dogmas or by the majority of a group.64 Different theological interpretations 
impose different requirements with regard, for instance, to the wearing of religious 
clothing or symbols.65 Many Muslim women choose to leave their face and head 
uncovered. Not all Christian nurses refuse to assist in abortions, and certainly not all 
Jewish men wear the yarmulke. Many Muslim men would refuse to shake hands with 
a woman, while others would not even consider it prohibited. Similar examples exist 
for countless forms of behaviour incited by religious or non-religious forms of 
conscience. Of course the binary distinction between belief and practice glosses over 
the profound interconnections between the two,66 and the criticism that the ECtHR 
has attracted for employing the distinction to privilege protection of beliefs over 
practices is familiar. For instance, Peroni argues that the ECtHR ‘valorises’ 
autonomous and private forms of religiosity over more habitual and public forms.67 
But note that that line of criticism does not come from a theological or a taxonomic 
perspective. Rather, it is associated, tacitly or explicitly, with a normative analysis of 
the moral right to freedom of religion which, as Peroni argues, connects the binary 
distinction between belief and practice with the reproduction of ‘inegalitarian 
relations’ between religions that are based on private and religions based on public 
forms of manifestation.68 I will return precisely to that relationship between religion 
and equal treatment later in this chapter. 
It is notable, however, that whether a particular practice is compulsory, or even 
central, to a particular belief system often plays little role in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. In Leyla Sahin v Turkey, a case about a student who was disciplined and 
eventually suspended from university because she was wearing a headscarf, the 
ECtHR readily accepted the individual argument that wearing a headscarf is a 
protected form of religious manifestation.69 In Eweida, the ECtHR accepted that the 
fact that wearing a visible cross at work was motivated by the applicant’s Christian 
faith was sufficient to count as a protected form of manifestation of her religion under 
                                                        
62 On the application of the limitations included in Article 9§2 ECHR see C. Evans, Freedom of 
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Article 9 ECHR.70 Moreover, the majority reminded that the manifestation of religion 
or belief is not limited to acts that are ‘intimately linked’ to religion or belief.71 
Rather, the existence of ‘a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the 
underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case… [and] there is no 
requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfillment of a duty 
mandated by the religion in question.’72 In addition, the ECtHR consistently favours a 
broad interpretation of the ‘close and direct nexus’ requirement.73 As Lady Hale has 
argued, that approach is ‘undoubtedly good news for members of the Church of 
England and indeed of the Church of Ireland, which impose so few mandatory 
requirements.’74 
Another point is that the criteria of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance are fairly ambiguous and their application is unclear at times. As above-
mentioned, the ECtHR has been criticised for not adopting a formal definition of what 
constitutes religion or belief and for simply ignoring the issue ‘by dealing with 
controversial cases on different grounds’. 75  According to Evans, the hands-off 
approach of the ECtHR only magnifies ‘the conceptual confusion in this area’.76 For 
instance, in X v Austria,77 a case where the applicant challenged his conviction for 
neo-Nazi activities based on his rights under Article 9 ECHR, the Commission did not 
consider whether Nazism constitutes a belief capable of manifestation.78 Rather, it 
moved directly to a discussion under Article 9(2) regarding the justifiability of the 
restriction, which implied that Nazism is a protected and capable of manifestation 
belief. In Hazar and Açik, a case based on a complaint about an unjustifiable 
limitation of the right to freedom of manifestation of Communist beliefs, the 
Commission followed a similar approach.79  
Different approaches to definition of religion bring to the fore the familiar 
distinction between objective and subjective (or functional80) approaches. Objective 
approaches mainly pay attention to whether a particular practice is compulsory, or at 
least integral to a belief system, in order to decide whether its manifestation is 
protected under the right to freedom of religion or belief. Objective approaches, 
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however, suffer from significant shortcomings. Focusing on religion, a plethora of 
theological interpretations and disembodied practices81 makes it difficult to ascertain 
which forms of manifestation are mandatory and to what extent.82 And, importantly, 
theological disputes raise ‘the question of the kind of authority the court will accept as 
giving a proper and accurate account of what is essential to the religion.’83 Those 
authorities are often elderly and male, which exacerbates the danger that entrusting 
the level of human rights protection to their judgment may constitute ‘a form of 
empowerment of conservative interpreters of the particular religious tradition and an 
undermining of more modern (and possibly more liberal) versions.’84 By contrast, 
subjective approaches aim to tackle those very difficulties. According to subjective 
accounts of religion, it should just be established that ‘the relevant person or group 
regards his or her behaviour as conforming to a religious prescription, regardless of 
the lack of support of the practice by other believers.’ 85  This is not to suggest, 
however, that a subjective approach guarantees unlimited protection to all actions 
inspired by religion or belief. This is another issue that this chapter will revisit 
towards the end. 
Nonetheless, the practice of the ECtHR shows that the distinction between the 
two approaches is not as clear-cut as it is often supposed. The discussion so far 
suggests that the ECtHR adopts neither an objective, nor a subjective approach to 
freedom of manifestation of religion or belief. Rather, it follows a hybrid approach 
that involves application of certain objective criteria, viz. seriousness, cogency, 
coherence and importance, but at the same time is sufficiently subjective in its 
application so as to leave ample scope for protection of a plurality of religious and 
non-religious beliefs. I think that an important ingredient in this hybrid approach is 
the insistence of the ECtHR that national authorities should steer clear from 
determining the value or validity of religious beliefs, and from choosing which are 
more eligible for protection. 86  The jurisprudence of the ECtHR repeatedly and 
consistently highlights that having convictions of duty that are equally imperative to 
religion does not require a theistic religion. That principle connotes a particular moral 
theory of freedom of religion based on our personal responsibility to define value in 
our lives, which is equally shared by believers and atheists. The next chapters will 
elaborate on that theory; the analysis has to return now to the examination of liberty-
based accounts of freedom of religion or belief. 
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2.3.2.  Uniqueness of religion 
 
Already in 1651, Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, describes modern man as an anxious 
Prometheus, whose heart, instead of liver, is everyday pecked out ‘by fear of death, 
poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep’.87 
Belief in God emerges as solace, assistance and source of explanation in Hobbes’s 
thought – all at the same time. The God of monotheism arises out of the need of 
modern man to approach and obey a single omnipotent deity ‘in the hope of getting 
him to do our bidding in the struggle with nature.’88  Hobbes’s humanistic – and 
interestingly strategic – reconstruction is just one example of a theory aiming to show 
that religion plays a distinctive role in our lives; that it satisfies basic psychological 
needs, such as existential uncertainty, and gives meaning to collective identities and 
social goals.89 Hegel, in his 1829 lectures on the ‘proofs’ of the existence of God,90 
writes that religion is an elevation of thought ‘into the kingdom of thought’ that 
involves faith, feeling, intuition, imagination and, above all, ‘pure spirit’.91  Other 
theorists from cognitive anthropology and neuropsychology argue that the way our 
minds work entails belief in some form of religion.92 According to Barrett, belief in 
God may well be inevitable given ‘the sorts of minds we are born with in the sort of 
world we are born into’.93 Trigg notes that ‘religion, or at least the impulses that help 
to produce the characteristic features of so-called religious belief, is a basic 
component of humanity’.94 The building blocks of religion – our impulses to believe 
in disembodied minds, supernatural agency, and teleology to explain natural 
phenomena – cannot be removed. 95  Behavioural studies actually confirm that 
religious beliefs, activities and affiliations affect a wide range of behavioural patterns, 
including banalities such as financial decisions.96 
But what does the distinctive psychology of religion and emotion mean for law? 
Does, for instance, our ability to think and act ‘religiously’ draw on religion’s 
distinctive psychological, emotional and anthropological dimensions?97 There is some 
skepticism about that. For instance, Arnal and McCutcheon argue that far from being 
‘natural’ or ‘universal’, thinking and acting religiously is a specific category of 
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reasoning which is political in its origins and effects; a ‘by-product’ of modern 
secularism.98 Perhaps more famously, almost a century ago Freud wrote that religion 
is best seen as an obsessional neurosis, arising from ‘emotions and conflicts that 
originate early in childhood and lie deep beneath the rational, normal surface of the 
personality.’ 99  It is religion, according to Freud, that arises in response to deep 
emotional conflicts or weaknesses – not the other way round. He also believed that 
once psychoanalysis resolved such issues, religion would naturally disappear from the 
human scene.100 
In any event, even if we disagree about the religious, political, social or 
psychological origins of religious reasoning, it seems that we need another, 
independent, argument to demonstrate that religious claims are unique, apart from 
distinctive, and should therefore be singled out for stronger (or ‘special’ 101 ) 
constitutional protection compared to other important yet non-religious commitments. 
Such arguments often assume an empirical tone. There is no comparison, it is argued, 
between the need to wear a cross and the urge to wear a designer’s bag, no matter how 
much someone might want to wear the latter. But, in this simple form, the jump from 
distinctiveness to uniqueness of religion is misleading. Equivalent protection of 
religious and non-religious forms of conscience does not entail that religion is 
comparable with any other conviction or impulse, ‘however frivolous’.102 Although, 
as Chapters Three and Five will discuss in further detail, a coherent egalitarian 
interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or belief requires more than seeking 
comparators, there exist analogous obligations in categoricity and importance to 
religion, such as health. As much as certain religions require the wearing of symbols, 
certain health predicaments or disabilities require the wearing of special clothing or 
protective equipment that involve adjustments to our public life to accommodate.103 
The idea that religion, apart from distinctive, is constitutionally unique has also 
been supported by the claim that individuals suffer special damage whenever their 
right to freedom of religion is limited. Religion is unique because if religious liberty is 
denied individuals suffer a special and egregious kind of damage, which makes it 
wrong for the community to cause despite any potential beneficial effects for 
others.104 This type of argument is particularly attractive to those who feel special 
deprivation whenever religious freedom is limited. It is, however, a difficult argument 
to pursue. First, there are many people, perhaps the majority in many European 
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countries where religiosity is falling,105 that do not exercise their political liberties ‘in 
more than a minimal way’.106 They would not have counted their loss of freedom of 
religion as something particularly important. Thus, if we want to argue in favour of a 
right to certain liberties, we must find another ground. That would be to argue, on 
grounds of political morality, that it is wrong to deprive individuals from certain 
liberties, for some reason, apart from direct psychological damage and 
notwithstanding that the community as a whole might be better off by doing so.107 But 
this interpretation of rights underlies the justification of various political liberties, not 
just the right to freedom of religion.  
Moreover, it has been argued that there are no secular commitments comparable 
to religious obligations and that ‘religious freedom is a matter less of rights rather 
than of duties… it is a matter of rights derived from duties.’108 Religious followers 
answer to divine commands, outside of their control,109 which take precedence over 
other secular commitments because their violation puts them at risk of eternal 
damnation.110 The distinction between religious and secular obligations rests on the 
idea that religious people owe ‘dual allegiance’ to both divine and ‘subordinate’ 
earthly authorities111 in juxtaposition to non-religious people who face no such tragic 
dilemmas between compliance with man’s or with God’s law.112  
The argument from religious obligations has a metaphysical essence113 and rests 
upon a number of – predominantly Christian114 – assumptions about jurisdictional 
dualism involving the spiritual and the temporal.115 Singling out religious obligations 
also requires difficult theological distinctions between religions that involve divine 
commands and religions that do not, such as, for instance, Scientology. 116  It is 
unlikely that human rights laws can be crafted to reflect such distinctions given the 
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plurality and fluidity of theological interpretations. Moreover, at the moment we lack 
psychological evidence of higher intensity of religious commitments for religious 
people in comparison to important secular commitments for both religious and non-
religious people. On the contrary, certain secular commitments seem capable of being 
equally compelling. Many people are prepared to do everything, even to sacrifice their 
lives, to secure their family’s wellbeing. Secular needs may be so intractable that little 
space is left for other courses of action. An individual whose disability is not 
accommodated is prevented from accessing her employment as much as someone 
who is left without any room for compliance with her religious duties. Again, I am not 
suggesting that the availability (or unavailability) of those comparable cases shows 
anything morally important about the scope of our right to freedom of religion. What 
they suggest however is that religious obligations, albeit distinctive, are not unique to 
our life experience so as to justify qua religious special treatment from legislatures 
and courts. 
Another point is that religion should enjoy special protection because of its 
important role in our society. Durkheim has famously argued that religion is a source 
of stability and cohesion, where shared beliefs create collective conscience and a 
cohesive moral community.117 Ceremonies and rituals are important tools of social 
identification and cohesion. That social role has been particularly valuable politically: 
religious homogeneity is believed to foster a homogeneous cultural community that 
leads to political stability and loyalty. For a long time those were considered essential 
conditions of a well-functioning state and were linked to the construction of cohesive 
constitutional identities. As Sajó and Uitz note, until the nineteenth century ‘the 
(unitary) Christian religion was the fundamental power that provided coherence in 
public life insider the state.’118 Historically, with the emancipation of the individual it 
was first the nation-state that was to grant such religious and cultural coherence, 
whereas after 1945 it was common moral values that could offer such unity.119 But 
post-UDHR developments, along with increasing heterogeneity in modern Europe, 
have undermined the claim that religion still forms the basis for social coherence.120  
Even so, religious groups and associations remain crucial for the development 
of our identities. According to Raz, the existence of religious communities is a public 
good without which the right to freedom of religion makes little practical sense. More 
specifically, Raz argues that although religious toleration has been defended in the 
name of individual conscience, it actually serves communal peace.121 Religion is a 
social institution that encompasses a community and its practices, and the right to 
freedom of religious manifestation is practically ‘a right of communities to pursue 
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their style of life or aspects of it, as well as a right of individuals to belong to 
respected communities.’122  So while freedom of religion is usually understood as 
grounded on individual interests, the ability to serve that interest practically depends 
on the existence of ‘religious communities within which people pursued the freedom 
that the right guaranteed them’.123 
Despite their emphasis on the importance of the collective dimension of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief, liberal theories of rights are commonly criticised 
for embracing an individualistic conception of the person that under-emphasises the 
deep identity-constituting connections we experience with our gender, race and 
religion – among other elements.124 As Trigg argues, liberal theories of rights mainly 
protect individuals and their beliefs by treating communities, whether in the majority 
or in the minority, as mere collections of individuals.125 Yet, he contends that the 
thrust of a liberal stress on individual human rights is to ignore the role of such 
institutions.126 Furthermore, communitarian theorists, who share the argument that our 
individual identities are shaped hand-in-hand with cultural communities and 
associations, support a similar line of criticism. By virtue of their importance for the 
development of our identities, in communitarian theories religious communities seem 
to have some sort of independent claim to continue to exist. Both Taylor and Sandel 
discuss the importance of communities and cultural attachments – our ‘encumbrances’ 
in Sandel’s famous expression – for our development. 127  According to Sandel, 
religious freedom addresses ‘the problem of encumbered selves, claimed by duties 
they cannot renounce, even in the face of civil obligations that may conflict.’128 
Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is also grounded on the importance of culture 
in determining the context of our choices129 through creating narratives about how to 
live our lives and enabling us to be part of those narratives by freely adopting roles we 
consider worthwhile.130 But multiculturalism can only emphasise the importance of 
the availability (and, potentially, selectability) of a variety of roles and stories, not of 
membership in a culture. As Waldron argues, meaningful options may come to us as 
‘items or fragments from a variety of cultural sources’ and communitarian arguments 
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show that people need cultural materials and not that they need is a certain 
‘multicultural’ type of political structure.131 
In any event, robust protection of the collective dimension of the right to 
freedom of religion does not entail that religious groups and associations ought to 
enjoy stronger protection compared to other secular groups and association. Neither 
clichéd critiques of liberalism for conceptually suffering from ‘an extremely thin and 
reductive notion of the nature of culture’,132 nor the communitarian arguments briefly 
discussed above endorse the unique importance of religious groups amongst the 
plurality of cultural and social associations. Whether their ‘special’ constitutional 
protection is normatively required remains therefore unanswered based on those 
theories. Skepticism about ‘special’ constitutional protection of religious groups and 
associations should not be understood in tension with political progressiveness, either. 
Critical feminism has long ago argued that elevated protection of the rights of 
religious groups may ‘privilege conservative interpretations of culture over 
reformative and innovative ones’ as well as insulate religious communities from 
modernity and change,133 and ultimately prove harmful for vulnerable members, such 
as women.134 As Scolnicov argues, individual rights should be given priority when 
religious communities create separate cultures not supportive of individual 
autonomy.135 Finally, well-established case law from the ECtHR confirms that public 
authorities are under a ‘positive obligation’ to protect or defend individual members 
whose fundamental rights are jeopardised by a religious group. 136  However, for 
reasons that cannot be fully developed here, this is not to suggest that assimilation of 
illiberal religious communities into a dominant liberal one is uncomplicated, or indeed 
desirable.137 
 
2.3.3.  Choice v Identity 
 
For others, religion’s uniqueness and its ensuing ‘special’ protection, stems from the 
fact that it amounts to an ‘immutable’ characteristic of our identity. As Bedi argues, 
unless religion is an immutable characteristic then there is no basis to differentiate 
between a Jew and a Rotarian, or between a Sikh from a simple hat-wearer.138 But if 
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religion is not immutable, in the way that race, disability, or ethnic identity are, ‘there 
is no overriding reason to provide religious exemptions as a general rule’.139 Whether 
religion is a matter of choice or of identity is a central question to more general 
political debates on identity and discrimination.140 More specifically, it is often argued 
that gender, race and sexual orientation are ‘given’ or ‘naturalised’ forms of identity, 
whereas religion is not.141  This debate has proved influential in law and religion 
mainly because those who believe that religion is a matter of choice are not inclined 
to justify more favourable treatment of religion compared to other lifestyle choices. 
Exemptions from general laws when they conflict with deeply held religious beliefs 
cannot be considered on a different basis if religion is seen as an identity that people 
choose to assume, contrary to identities that people ‘discover’ about themselves.142 
According to Plant, there is a fundamental difference between religious identity, 
which is ‘self-chosen and self-assumed’ and other forms of identity which are ‘given 
matters of fact’ such as ethnic origin, gender and sexual orientation.143 But even if 
religion is an immutable characteristic of our identity, the scope of its immutability 
remains unclear. For instance, as Shiffrin argues, even though we disagree about 
whether religion constitutes a choice, are the ways that we select to manifest it, and 
the extent to which we follow its tenets, not choices themselves?144 
I think that the contrast between choice and identity (or between ‘given’ and 
‘naturalised’ identities,145 or between ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’146) is too stark. The 
normative aspects of identities, namely how we should treat people with particular 
identities and what types of claims we can make on grounds of our identities, are not 
matters of empirical enquiry into the type of our identity. Rather, the scope of the 
permissible manifestation of our identities – religious or secular, ‘given’ or 
‘naturalised’ – comes from a normative argument about what rights we have in a 
liberal state. For instance, a perfectionist liberal theory, such as Raz’s, would argue 
that the liberal ideal of autonomous life may be fulfilled through a series of choices 
between valuable choices from an adequate range of options.147 In the case of religion 
individual autonomy may be fulfilled through being able to live in accordance with 
divine laws cherishing one’s religious traditions and manifesting one’s beliefs – or 
being able to attach oneself to nothing divine. Individual autonomy does not rule out 
the possibility that some valuable choices will be sometimes unavailable since 
successive choices may leave other valuable options out.148 Non-perfectionist liberal 
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theories would argue that our common culture should be formed organically through 
securing personal independence for every citizen in order to make deep ethical 
choices independently and authentically.149 The common idea in both cases is that the 
selection should be mainly based on individual choices, not on the choices of others. 
Thus, although due to space constraints the present analysis cannot further 
discuss whether religion constitutes a choice or an immutable status, it is doubtful that 
the classification of religion, if at all possible, would make any difference to questions 
about the scope and role of the moral right to freedom of religion or belief. Religion is 
valuable for so many people that its free enjoyment should be a possibility for all who 
can (in principle) choose it. If choosing should be a possibility, it should not be 
effectively ruled out as an option by prohibitive costs.150 As Scanlon argues, people 
do not value choice only for instrumental reasons, e.g. because they think that a 
religion X suits their tastes better.151 They value choice also for reasons of symbolic 
value, that is, because having the government choose their conscience would be 
demeaning and would suggest that they are incompetent and dependent. This is not to 
suggest that instrumental and symbolic value reasons for valuing choice are mutually 
exclusive, or always easily distinguishable.152 It shows however that choice can be 
important in a plurality of ways and that its value is not always merely instrumental. 
As Chapter Five will discuss more thoroughly, discriminatory laws and policies 
impose prohibitive costs to people who wish to live according to the tenets of their 
religion, or far from any religious commands. The aim of my arguments in this thesis 
is to sketch an interpretation of the right to freedom of religion that encompasses 
protection of individuals and groups from discrimination on the basis of their spiritual 
affiliations in different settings, and also protection of people without any sort of such 
affiliations. But despite its phraseology nothing in this argument suggests that religion 
is always a choice.153 Many people treat the religious attachments of their ancestors or 
communities as a natural continuation of their own existence, without questioning the 
value of these religious or cultural traditions. That does not mean that they should not 
enjoy freedom of religion equally to others. The fact that religion is not always a 
choice does not have any implications for the claim that it should be one.154 
 
2.4.  Equality, Asymmetry, and Harm 
 
2.4.1.  A general right to conscientious objection: A bizarre asymmetry? 
 
Thus far, I have argued that the distinctiveness of religion and its nature as a choice or 
as an immutable status cannot by themselves determine the level of protection that the 
right to freedom of religion or belief ought to enjoy in a liberal democracy. 
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Difficulties, however, in justifying ‘special’ protection of religion compared to other 
non-religious forms of conscience are not necessarily fatal for liberty-based accounts 
of freedom of religion. For liberty-based theories of freedom of religion or belief can 
also be framed in more general terms so as to justify elevated protection to all forms 
of conscience, including religion. The idea has specific human rights implications. 
More precisely, it has been argued that the right to freedom of religion or belief 
should be interpreted to reflect (or more simply complement) a general political right 
to conscientious objection to general and neutral rules, which could then support 
accommodation of conscientious claims unless those are harmful.  
It would be useful to examine that general right to conscientious objection 
through the lens of a bizarre asymmetry. Churches and other public or private 
organisations ‘the ethos of which is based on religion or belief’155 are often allowed 
exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation. More specifically, the EU 
Employment Equality Directive specifically provides for exemptions from equal 
treatment provided that a protected characteristic constitutes ‘a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement’ and provided that the objective is legitimate 
and the requirement proportionate.156 However, parts of the literature have argued that 
religious organisations seldom ask for exemptions from other fields of law, such as 
torts or criminal law, and it seems unlikely that, even if they did, such exemptions 
would be granted.157 According to Sunstein, that creates an asymmetry between the 
application of torts or criminal law and the application of anti-discrimination laws.158 
Since no exemptions from laws prohibiting kidnapping or sexual assault are likely, 
regardless of the grounds of that request, are there any reasons why we should treat 
religious exemptions from legislation prohibiting sex discrimination in employment 
differently? 
Sunstein argues that any difficulties in resolving the asymmetry would 
demonstrate that there should be no barriers to the application of anti-discrimination 
legislation and that religious institutions have to yield to generally applicable laws.159 
Furthermore, according to McColgan, ‘there are very good reasons not to provide 
exemptions even and above concerns about the equality and other rights of outsiders’ 
(emphasis in the original).160 This objection apparently springs from the widely shared 
concern that certain religious groups are not particularly committed to the idea of 
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equality, particularly with regards to sex and sexual orientation,161 and disability.162 
More generally, as Raday notes, the conflict between equality rights and religion is 
common because most religions and traditional cultures ‘rely on norms and social 
practices formulated or interpreted in a patriarchal context’ which is incompatible 
with the grounds of individual rights.163 But does the fact that certain religious groups 
are not committed to the principle of equality automatically exempt them from the 
application of equality laws? 
The asymmetry has not been universally accepted.164 For instance, Barry argues 
that religious groups do sometimes ask for exemptions from civil and criminal laws, 
and their claims are then subjected to a ‘pincer movement.’165 The ‘pincer movement’ 
means that in most cases one of two things can be said: either that the end pursued by 
the law was sufficiently important to underwrite the conclusion that there should be 
no exemptions, or that the argument from exemptions was so powerful that it 
overthrows the case for enacting a legal prohibition in the first place.166 According to 
Barry, the only justifiable exceptions for religious groups concern legislation 
protecting from employment discrimination, in the sense that they should be able to 
hire in priesthood or similar positions people sharing their religious ethos.167 
Even though the asymmetry does not fully capture the theoretical and practical 
implications of conscientious exemptions, it alludes to an intuitively strong 
proposition. A moral right to freedom of religion or belief is often interpreted to 
encompass a presumption that people ought to be free to act on their conscience, but 
that that freedom may be outweighed when the public interest behind the enactment 
of certain laws is particularly strong, as it is, for example, in certain parts of criminal 
law. This is not of course a novel idea. Questions relating to religious exemptions 
from general laws have concerned the American constitutional jurisprudence at least 
since the 1960s, when the United States Supreme Court decided Sherbert v Verner, a 
case about a mill worker who quit her job because she had to work on Saturday.168 In 
Sherbert, the US Supreme Court scrutinised the law of South Carolina, which 
accommodated individuals who had to worship on Sunday, but not those who had to 
worship on Saturday or on Friday, and found a violation of the claimant’s 
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constitutional right to Free Exercise of her religion under the First Amendment of the 
US constitution.169  
Sherbert is best known for the strict scrutiny test it established, according to 
which general laws should not ‘substantially burden’ religion unless they are narrowly 
tailored and the government can demonstrate a ‘compelling interest’.170 Almost three 
decades later, the US Supreme Court decided Employment Division v Smith,171 a case 
that examined the constitutionality of general legislation regulating drug use, which 
burdened certain members of the Native American Church who wanted to ingest 
peyote as part of their religious ceremonies. The US Supreme Court found that the 
Sherbert test was too broad and that when general laws ‘incidentally’ burden the Free 
Exercise of religion, exemptions were not constitutionally required.172 In response to 
Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in order to 
reinstate the Sherbert test as a statutory right.173 The RFRA was ruled unconstitutional 
some years later in City of Boerne v Flores174 and its application is now limited to 
federal statutes.175 However, the Sherbert test, which supports religious exemptions 
unless the government has a ‘compelling interest’ to limit the right to freedom of 
religion, remains until today a constitutional point of reference for liberty-based 
theories. It is based on the idea that the right to freedom of religion or belief should 
enjoy ‘special’ constitutional protection in the sense that its limitation may be justified 
only by applying stricter standards compared to those applying to the justification of 
state interference with other rights and liberties. 
It would be useful to return to the asymmetry for a moment and discuss two 
possible ways that have been suggested to explain it.176 First, it might be argued that 
exemptions from civil and criminal laws are unlikely because those laws are not fit to 
encroach on the core of the right to freedom of religion. But that would be misleading. 
On the one hand, certain civil and criminal laws do encroach on religious freedom, as 
cases such as Employment v Smith, on the regulation of drugs, and Mann Singh v 
France,177 on the general requirement of bareheaded photographs on driving licenses, 
demonstrate. On the other, not all forms of anti-discrimination legislation strike at the 
heart of the right. There is limited scope for tension between freedom of religion and 
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freedom from discrimination on grounds of age or disability.178 By contrast, there is 
ample scope in cases where individuals or groups, based on their conscience, 
discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. 179  As Vickers notes, this happens 
because ‘certain religious groups… some (but not all) Christians, Jews and Muslims 
are hostile to homosexuality on religious grounds, believing it to be forbidden.’180 
A second way to resolve the asymmetry is to argue that torts and criminal law 
are supported by especially strong reasons – or, in the American constitutional 
formulation, by a ‘compelling interest’ – and that such reasons do not necessarily 
support anti-discrimination legislation. On that account, exemptions from criminal 
provisions prohibiting murder would be unjustifiable, regardless of the reasons 
supporting them, because they would risk subjecting people to extremely serious 
harms. The same could be said about provisions protecting against sexual assault, 
safeguarding bodily autonomy, or prohibiting cruelty to animals: given the 
seriousness of the harms protected by such laws there are strong reasons for states to 
extend their application to everyone without exception.  
That strategy, which uses harm to outline the boundaries of the right to freedom 
of manifestation of religion or belief, is also known as threshold strategy. Once 
particular practices reach a certain threshold, which is defined in terms of harm, they 
cannot be accommodated. In these cases, refusal to accommodate does not constitute 
an unjustifiable limitation of the right to freedom of religion or belief. In other words, 
liberty-based theories do not claim that restrictions on harmful religious practices 
constitute an unjustifiable limitation of individual rights, as if the right to freedom of 
religion mirrors religion as dogma. Rather, as Ahdar and Leigh argue, exemptions on 
grounds of religion have to be granted unless it would be repugnant to the peace and 
safety of the state.181 Of course peace and safety require more precise delineation. 
How urgent must the threat to peace and security be, and what sort of safety is 
pertinent? What type of evidence should be required to determine that a danger is 
grave enough to justify limitations on freedom of religion or belief? 
So, an emerging question is how to define harm. Although various conceptions 
of harm exist, there is a widely shared benchmark that focuses on the link between 
harm and the basic goods of agency, such as bodily integrity, individual autonomy, or, 
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more generally, what Nussbaum describes as ‘basic capabilities.’182 The practice of 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is a commonly cited example. According to the 
threshold strategy, FGM cannot be accommodated because it is extremely harmful for 
women. Note that no reference is made here to how central FGM, as a practice, might 
be for certain religious communities. A state committed to equal respect and concern 
for everyone could not include those practices within the protective scope of the right 
to freedom of religion or belief because an interpretation of the right that includes 
practices that threaten the basic human rights to life and bodily integrity runs counter 
to the very purpose of human rights. The right to freedom of religion or belief cannot 
include practices endangering life and bodily integrity because without those secure, 
any discussion about rights becomes redundant. The threshold strategy helps us 
therefore explain why our common legal practice includes laws that limit, for 
instance, parental rights in cases of refusal of lifesaving health treatment to children 
on religious grounds183 or corporal punishment.184 
The harm principle, as the limit to a hypothetical general right to conscientious 
objection to general laws, provides us with an attractively clear-cut standard. As Plant 
argues, ‘if a form of religious expression can be shown in a court to pose a threat or 
do potential or actual harm to others who also have the same rights to the same goods, 
then that is a good basis for constraining the forms of expression in question.’185 It has 
also been argued that placing emphasis on harm and the threat of harm could benefit 
public discourse about toleration of the various ways of religious manifestation, which 
is impossible when we focus on ‘identity, the normative requirements of identity and 
the authoritative articulation of these requirements by religious authorities.’ 186 
Wintemute contends that direct harm provides the strongest case for non-
accommodation of religion as it has the advantage of identifying cases ‘where the 
manifestation obviously causes no harm of any kind to others, and cases where the 
manifestation causes clear physical harm of a degree that precludes 
accommodation’.187 
Apart from clear, a threshold strategy based on harm could also be helpful to 
unravel the claim that limitations on manifestation of religion or belief constitute 
prima facie cases of indirect discrimination. The claim is that if accommodation of 
religion or belief does not cause ‘significant harm’ to others, or cost, disruption or 
inconvenience to the accommodating party, then non-accommodation is unjustifiable 
simply because a fair state ought not to force individuals to choose between their 
religion and employment or education.188 This is a particularly troubling claim, given 
that the historical influence of Christianity in Europe entails that apparently neutral 
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arrangements may often be less challenging to forms of Christianity than to other 
kinds of faith.189 As McCrea notes, ‘if any kind of distinctive collective values and 
arrangements are to be maintained by European states, such values will inevitably be 
more accommodating towards those religious traditions that have disproportionately 
contributed to their development.’190 Some groups, perhaps those more recent in the 
European landscape, could find it more difficult to overcome religious differences in 
the public sphere. Does the existence of such difficulties mean that arrangements 
reflecting a particular cultural heritage constitute prima facie cases of indirect 
discrimination as a result? A harm analysis helps us argue in these cases that the goals 
served by certain limitations on the right to manifest religion are capable of 
outweighing the claim of indirect discrimination. But does it go far enough? 
Meanwhile, the paradigm of harmful treatment is causing physical harm. That 
does not capture, however, cases involving environmental191 or aesthetic harms.192 It 
does not capture cases of indirect harm, either. Indirect harm might be caused in cases 
where individuals are allowed exemptions from anti-discrimination laws on grounds 
of their religion, as it happened in the Ladele case. On that account, indirect harm 
resembles the concept of ‘expressive harm’, which is another concept derived from 
constitutional theory. 193  Expressive harm is concerned with messages of racial, 
gender, or religious inferiority expressed by governmental actions194 and has played 
an important role in furthering the application of anti-discrimination law in the United 
States. 195  Broader and more flexible definitions of harm, however, have to be 
sophisticated enough to avoid interpretations that include distress or annoyance. As 
Nussbaum rightly notes, one of the most difficult conundrums of civil and political 
life is that people easily feel threatened by unfamiliar clothes, practices, or types of 
people.196 This is precisely where the importance of human rights lies: to protect 
lifestyles and expression even when the majority deems them offensive. 
It is true that ambiguities in the definition of harm may be overcome through 
broader and more complex accounts of the concept. However, the main question 
remains unanswered. If harm does outline the boundaries of a liberty-based general 
right to conscientious objection, does this mean that refusal to exempt non-harmful 
religious practices constitutes prima facie indirect discrimination on grounds of 
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religion? The asymmetry earlier discussed is again useful here. For it shows that the 
argument that torts and criminal law protect us from grave harms and, as a result, no 
exceptions can be justified is under-inclusive. Indeed, there are many cases where 
accommodating individual conscience would not be harmful at all, but exemptions are 
unlikely. Exemptions from state regulations of urban planning, car parking, and noise 
pollution do not necessarily involve ‘compelling interests’, or protection from harm. 
As Eisgruber and Sager argue, urban planning regulations illustrate that point quite 
well.197 These forms of regulation serve important government interests including 
public order and public health. But, arguably, they do not rise to the level of 
importance demanded by a constitutional test based on ‘compelling interest’ or 
harm. 198  Breaching intellectual property rules, inflicting emotional distress or 
engaging in low-level libel do not usually inflict great harm, but still, no exemptions 
are likely, regardless of the underlying reasons, from such offenses. Does this mean, 
following a transposition of the Sherbert test in discrimination law, that religious 
exemptions would be required as a matter of prohibition of indirect discrimination? 
This is not necessary. Rather, as the next chapter will further discuss, the question 
turns to the independent issue of the justifiability of the limitation in the first place. 
Harm would definitely play some role, but it cannot be the only factor, as instances of 
general laws that justifiably allow no exceptions, despite that those exceptions would 
cause no harm, demonstrate. 
It might be argued that examples from urban planning or car parking are 
irrelevant because they are not central to any coherent system of beliefs; that they are 
mere interests, rather than integral parts of conscience. But as above discussed, 
whether a particular form of manifestation is compulsory, or central indeed, to a 
specific religion or set of beliefs plays little role in the protection that that practice 
enjoys as a matter of human rights. Consider an example. In 2012, Kopimism, a group 
believing in the holiness of file sharing, kopy-acting and open Internet, was officially 
recognised in Sweden as a religion. Its founders applied for religious status in order to 
secure better protection for their beliefs.199 Intellectual property regulations, which do 
not necessarily protect us from grave harms, arguably limit the right to freedom of 
religion of the members of this group. Could we say that refusing to include an 
exemption from national IP regulations in order to accommodate Kopimism 
constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of religion? You may think that the 
example is far-reaching and that Kopimism is not in fact a religion. But as we saw 
above, if we adopt the hybrid approach to the definition of religion that the ECtHR 
follows, then any set of beliefs that reaches a certain level of coherence, seriousness, 
cogency and importance is protected under Article 9 ECHR. There is no reason why 
Kopimism would fail to meet those conditions any less than Mouvement Raëlien, 
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which believes in friendship with extraterrestrials and ‘geniocracy’,200 and is already 
protected as a religion by the ECtHR. This is not to suggest that general laws cannot 
constitute indirect religious discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. But what 
we have to figure out is under which circumstances they do so. An approach based on 
harm merely postpones the answer to that question. 
To recap, thus far I have argued that the harm principle does not in itself 
recommend any approach, permissive or restrictive, to religious exemptions, except in 
a form which is too strong to be accepted. Thus, harm is insufficient by itself to 
systemise issues arising from the relationship between freedom of religion and equal 
treatment. However, further examination of this relationship and of the justifiability of 
indirect discrimination has to be postponed until Chapters Three and Four. Now the 
analysis has to return to the antagonism between liberty and equality-based theories of 
freedom of religion that started this chapter. 
 
2.4.2.  Equal respect 
 
If we look closely at the formulation of individual complaints before the ECtHR, we 
can discern a shared, morally important, component. The applicants ask for 
accommodation of their conscience based on an idea that is conceptually distinct from 
the ‘specialness’ of religion and from liberty-based accounts in support of a wide-
ranging right to conscientious objection. The applicants in Eweida, Ladele and 
McFarlane, among others, challenge the disparate effects of generally applicable laws 
through emphasising that their religious commitments should be equally respected to 
other non-religious collective commitments, such as prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation. They do not claim ‘an entitlement to a particular 
amount of respect for their religious freedom’, which might exceed the minimum 
required to practise their religion.201  Instead, they are asking for equal respect to 
others, ‘either directly as the result of non-neutral rules, or indirectly because of the 
disproportionate effects of neutral rules.’202 So an interpretation of their complaints 
based on equal respect seems to fit the legal formulation of their claims better than 
interpretations based on the uniqueness of religion or on harm. The applicants 
compare their disadvantage to the treatment of members of other groups – regardless 
of whether those other groups are religious or whether they belong to the majority – 
and ask for equal access to specific benefits. 
I think that this interpretation of liberty-based theories is sound, and that it 
provides an adequate basis for judicial review of cases of refusal to accommodate 
manifestations of conscience. It is, moreover, in one sense, an egalitarian justification 
for accommodation. It holds that a theory of interpretation of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief has to capture a seminal idea, latent in virtually all complaints about 
lack of accommodation. That is, the applicants do not ground their complaints on 
respect for freedom of conscience in the abstract; they claim equal respect to others. 
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Their complaints demand that the government, through its rules and policies, offers 
equal protection to their conscience as it does to the conscience of others, and that no 
limitations are imposed just because the government or the majority believes that 
some people’s beliefs are less valuable than the beliefs of others.  
This implicit recognition dimension is embedded in a morality of rights based 
on human dignity.203 Dignity lies at the heart of our humanity and is philosophically 
based on two principles: first that each human life has intrinsic value, and second that 
everyone should be responsible to make the choices that make his or her life best.204 
Yet dignity does not carry only this philosophical sense of immeasurable worth.  It is 
also a matter of status as a member of a society ‘in good standing.’205 As a social and 
legal status dignity is normative, in the sense that it generates claims of recognition 
and treatment according to its two conditions, i.e. the political principles of liberty and 
equality. So, as status, dignity commands respect from others and from the state, 
which should treat everyone with equal respect and equal concern. Such treatment 
could be secured through a theory of justice based on certain moral and political 
principles, which culminate in various legal guarantees and institutional arrangements 
aiming to ensure everyone’s status as a full and equal member of a society.206 
But what does respect entail? Should a just state be able to fine-tune each one’s 
behaviour in order to shut interpersonal contempt out of public space? Could such 
extreme regulation of our expressive conduct be compatible with individual autonomy 
and human dignity? To discover what respect actually entails we might have to be 
mindful of two rather different ways in which persons may be the object of respect: it 
is the distinction between what Darwall calls recognition and appraisal respect.207 
Recognition respect consists in taking into consideration in one’s deliberations certain 
features of the object of respect. When we say, for example, that we owe respect to all 
humans, we mean recognition respect, i.e. that someone should seriously consider 
certain elementary principles stemming from humanity, such as human dignity, when 
deciding. Yet recognition respect does not by itself command any specific behavior 
towards the object of respect. Rather, it is our agreement on certain moral or legal 
principles stemming from a certain feature of the object of respect that connotes the 
appropriate behaviour. In that sense, recognition respect says nothing about how we 
should treat our fellow citizens, but stipulates that in our deliberations we should 
accommodate certain values stemming from humanity. It is these moral principles that 
will then guide our behaviour.  
Unlike recognition, appraisal respect is comparable to high esteem or 
admiration of someone either as a person or as someone engaged in some particular 
activity. It is best described as a positive appraisal of certain attributes of someone’s 
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character, or as admiration that the object of respect well deserves according to our 
views. Appraisal respect does not command any specific behaviour towards its object. 
It consists in the appraisal itself.208 This is not to suggest that respect only makes 
sense as a feeling. As Raz argues, respect is a matter of actions, it is not an emotion 
‘nor a belief, though it may be based on a belief and be accompanied (at least 
occasionally) by certain feelings.’209 Of course, as Leslie Green notes, there is nothing 
odd in speaking of respect as a feeling or attitude.210 Rather, respect through action 
means that ‘if we think of an object which is of value, we should think of it in ways 
consistent with its value.’211 A more complex philosophical issue is whether respect 
should be understood in terms of duty, rather than inclination, with regard to 
preservation of value. Although this question cannot be fully discussed here, if we 
agree that human dignity as status confers certain duties in our behaviour towards 
others, e.g. prohibition of torture or degrading treatment, then behaving inconsistently 
with those duties is disrespectful. If people are of value in themselves, respect for 
them does generate duties to behave in accordance with their value. Thus, for the 
purposes of our discussion, neither recognition nor appraisal respect should be 
understood as mere inclinations. The dimension of action that Raz introduces cuts 
across both those senses of respect. 
The argument that dignity as social status includes a duty to respect others 
should not be understood to engage the notion of appraisal respect.  It is implausible 
to expect people appraising others’ activities and qualities which, among others, 
include their religion or beliefs. It is implausible not only because such regulations 
would be practically hopeless, but also because they would nullify basic individual 
freedoms, such as freedom of thought and opinion, which are central to human 
dignity. Appraising someone’s attributes or character or accomplishments or lifestyle 
or attitude and so on is not something that could be enforced or would be desirable, at 
least not in a just democratic state committed to equal respect and concern for 
everyone. 
But through the recognition respect prism the results are different. Even if our 
estimation of certain people might vary, that should be independent of recognising 
them as people. Recall that we do not have to agree on the behavioural standards that 
recognition respect entails. The behaviour towards the object of respect will be 
determined from our prior (and independent) agreement on the moral duties stemming 
from everyone’s humanity. Thus, if we agree – as I believe we do – that there are 
certain values each of us carries by virtue of being human, i.e. the intrinsic value of 
every human life and the personal responsibility of each of us to lead his life which 
correspond to the political principles of equality and liberty respectively, then it 
follows that recognising someone as human entails certain behavioural standards that 
should echo those moral and political principles. In other words, if we agree that 
                                                        
208 Darwall, ‘Two kinds of respect’, 39. 
209 J. Raz, Value, Respect, And Attachment (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 138. 
210 L. Green, ‘Two worries about respect for persons’ (2010) 120 Ethics 212. 
211 Raz, Value, Respect, And Attachment, 161. 
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dignity lies at the heart of our humanity, we should behave towards others respecting 
the moral and political requirements of human dignity.  
For our present discussion that principle means that although certain people may 
dislike others on grounds of their religion or beliefs, in their deliberations they should 
weigh appropriately the moral duties stemming from human dignity and not kill their 
opponents or torture or subordinate or negate them their political rights or 
discriminate against them and so on. Note that that is irrespective of how much they 
may detest them and/or their beliefs. The distinction between the two kinds of respect 
tackles that very confusion: recognition respect does not mean that we might have to 
subscribe to lifestyles we dislike, or that we are barred from expressing contempt for 
the beliefs of others, or that protesting against certain practices is prohibited. Rather, it 
means that we should not question the full and equal social membership of certain 
people because we find them or their beliefs repellent. 
So, recognition respect is a plausible way to interpret mutual respect in a 
general social context, but it cannot be untangled from equality simply because it is 
normatively based on the principle that every life bears equal worth. It follows that if 
respect lies at the core of individual claims informed by liberty-based theories of 
religious freedom, those claims cannot be construed independent from equality either. 
The relationship between the right to freedom of religion and the values of liberty and 
equality is therefore more multifaceted than it is often assumed, and certainly not 
conflicting. That possibility alters some of the questions under examination. If the 
right to freedom of religion has to be interpreted in light of a recurrent appeal to equal 
respect, then the question that should concern us is not whether freedom of religion or 
belief should enjoy elevated protection but whether equal respect and concern for 
everyone could justify such an elevated protection – and under what circumstances. 
This point draws on a version of Dworkin’s argument about the relationship 
between liberty and equality.212 Dworkin has argued that governments should treat 
those whom they govern with equal respect and concern and has used this principle to 
unify the values of liberty and equality in the domain of political morality. He has 
argued that the best conception of liberty in a liberal democracy should be consistent 
with the principle that the state should treat everyone with equal respect and concern. 
This suggests that different conceptions of liberty have to be framed as interpretations 
of the value of equality, which is broadly captured by the principle of treating people 
with equal respect and concern. Of course my claim is less ambitious than his, but is 
analogous to it: whatever a liberty-based theory of freedom of religion claims, it has 
to be intelligible as a plausible interpretation of the principle that the state should treat 
its citizens as equals. It is misleading, both according to that principle and according 
to the previous pages, to construct liberty-based theories as though they are somehow 
independent, or even antagonistic, to the value of equality. 
 
 
 
                                                        
212 R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 327-351. 
Chapter 2 | Freedom of Religion, Equality, and Harm 
 66 
2.5.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined, and questioned, the familiar antagonism between liberty and 
equality-based theories of freedom of religion. Of all the plausible interpretations of 
liberty-based theories, I argued that an interpretation anchoring the right to freedom of 
religion to the idea of equal respect on behalf of the state, regardless of the religious 
or secular nature of our conscience, fits our shared legal practice under the ECHR and 
seems more promising to address challenges related to exemptions from general rules 
or practices. The next chapter will elaborate on this normative point and will knit it 
together with a more thorough analysis of the practice of the ECtHR in cases 
involving state limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief. Chapter Three 
will also flesh out the principles and political implications of consolidating the right to 
freedom of religion into a more general theory of rights. Whether those forthcoming 
theoretical and practical considerations have further implications for the normative 
relationship between the rights to freedom of religion and freedom from religious 
discrimination is a separate question whose examination has to be postponed until 
Chapters Four and Five of the thesis.  
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Theories of Rights: Reasons, Influence and Subordination 
 
 
 
If one religion only were allowed in England, the Government would very 
possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one 
another’s throats; but as there are such a multitude, they all live happy and 
in peace. 
 
Voltaire1 
 
 
Our civil rights have no dependence upon our religious opinions more than 
our opinions in physics or geometry. 
 
Thomas Jefferson2 
 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced an interpretation of liberty-based theories of freedom 
of religion that is central to the normative claim that the right embeds, rather than 
rivals, a specific conception of equality that corresponds to equal respect. This chapter 
will develop the relationship between freedom of religion and equal respect further. I 
will argue that a reason-blocking account of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
makes better moral sense of the practice of the ECtHR compared to interest-based 
views. Under a reason-blocking account, the right functions as a limit on the acceptable 
range of our collective decisions by blocking certain kinds of reason for official action. 
Thus, the justifiability of limitations on the right to freedom of religion does not 
depend on weighing the interests of believers against the interests of others or against 
considerations of the common good, but on whether the reasons that the right is 
supposed to block are really present in the particular political conflict. Impermissible 
reasons, moreover, are those that express contempt for certain members of the 
community through coercive interference with our equal personal responsibility to 
make deep ethical choices independently and authentically. 
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Part of the argument of this chapter springs from a crucial theoretical distinction 
between teleological interest-based and non-teleological reason-blocking accounts of 
rights. A systematic distinction between the two is notably absent from the existing 
European literature on law and religion, where most books either do not engage with 
theoretical questions of justification and conflicts of rights,3 or they indistinctly cluster 
interest-based and reason-blocking accounts under ‘liberal’ 4  or ‘deontological’ 5 
theories of rights. The much-criticised lack of a coherent substantive theory of freedom 
of religion in the ECHR is partly symptomatic of that very confusion over teleological 
and non-teleological accounts of rights, which have distinct political and moral 
implications for our understanding of the right to freedom of religion or belief. The 
first part of this chapter will examine interest-based and reason-blocking theories of 
freedom of religion or belief and will highlight their main differences. After that, the 
next section will focus on the reasons that an interpretation of freedom of religion 
based on ethical responsibility and authenticity excludes from political action. The last 
part will argue that a reason-blocking conception of the right advances a tidy and 
methodical account of the judicial resolution of conflicts between rights, and explains 
important parts of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR better than interest-based accounts 
of the right. 
 
3.2.  Interest-based and Reason-blocking Accounts of the Right to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief 
 
3.2.1. Interest-based accounts 
 
Why people have rights to specific liberties, such as religion and speech, in a liberal 
democracy? We should reject certain answers from the outset. It would be misguided, 
for instance, to argue that they have those rights because otherwise our community 
would fare worse in the long run. For the idea that individual rights may (or may not) 
conduce to overall utility is irrelevant to the defense of rights as such. When we claim 
that everyone has a right to fair trial, we mean among others that everyone should have 
access to a court and basic legal aid, even if that would not be in the general interest. If 
we want to defend individual rights in the sense in which we claim them, then we must 
discover something other than utility that imbues rights with their normative force. 
                                                        
3 F. Requejo and C. Ungureanu (eds.) Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe: Secularism 
and Post-secularism (Routledge, 2014) Part II; L. Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the 
European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford University Press, 2012); N. Doe, Law and Religion in 
Europe: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2011); R. Sandberg, Law and Religion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011); N. Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (Routledge, 
2007); P. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
4 J. Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 316-348; C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 18-32. 
5 R. Ahdar and I. Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford University Press, 2005) 59; T. 
Lewis, ‘What not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395, 402-405. 
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More generally, utilitarian theories cannot account for the popular idea discussed 
in Chapter Two, namely that the right to freedom of religion conflicts with the rights of 
others or with other collective goals. For utilitarian theories judge whether an action is 
morally right by virtue of its contribution to overall utility, viz. by the goodness or 
desirability of its consequences. Under a utilitarian calculation interests protected by 
rights count as much as other non-rights based interests, and their protection depends 
on which combination brings about the maximum overall satisfaction. Rights 
themselves enjoy no priority. It is therefore unsurprising that classical utilitarianism is 
considered an enemy of rights6 and that some of the most influential works on political 
philosophy have been composed as responses to utilitarianism.7  
Still, more sophisticated versions of utilitarianism, such as rule-utilitarianism, 
give relative priority to rights over other collective interests, that is, protection of rights 
proceeds unless they conflict with too many non-rights based aggregated preferences. 
At first blush, rule-utilitarianism does not seem to run counter to Article 9(2) ECHR, 
according to which  
 
[F]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.8  
 
The reason is that the Convention and the ECtHR seem to justify certain limitations on 
the right to freedom of religious manifestation for reasons based on non-rights based 
aggregated preferences, such as life in a community that safeguards a dominant 
morality. In fact, the idea that a political majority has a right to shape and collectively 
sustain a particular moral culture has played some role in cases involving limitations 
on religiously offensive forms of art, and Chapter Six will discuss those in further 
detail.9 Moreover, the ECtHR often employs proportionality in forms congenial to rule-
utilitarianism through the frequently applied principle that ‘collective goals may 
restrict individual rights, but only if it is absolutely necessary for the promotion of a 
collective goal.’ 10  Again, on that account of proportionality, rights enjoy relative 
priority over non-rights based aggregated preferences because it is only in the absence 
of other alternatives that a government may justifiably limit rights in virtue of 
conflicting collective interests.11 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in 
detail the ‘least restrictive’ doctrine that the ECtHR often follows, but a recent example 
comes from S.A.S. v France,12 where the majority concluded that a blanket ban on full-
face covers from all public places was a justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of 
                                                        
6 W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2002) 10-53. 
7 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 22-27. 
8 Article 9§2 ECHR. 
9 Otto-Preminger v Austria, Application no. 13470/97, 20 September 1994. 
10  G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 101. 
11 ibid 
12 S.A.S. v France, Application no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber). 
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religion given that full-face covers are ‘fundamentally’ incompatible ‘with the ground 
rules of social communication and more broadly the requirements of “living together”’ 
in French society.13 
Despite appearances, however, rule-utilitarianism provides an unsatisfactory 
account of the grounds and political role of human rights. Consider an example. Under 
rule-utilitarian accounts of rights, nothing could prevent criminalisation of blasphemy, 
given that in a number of European countries the majority despises artworks ridiculing 
religion so much that their criminalisation seems to be the only way to protect public 
morals and freedom from offense.14 Yet the Council of Europe has repeatedly held the 
opposite. In 2006, it adopted Resolution 1510 on freedom of expression and respect for 
religious beliefs, which stressed that freedom of expression covers ideas that may 
shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector of the population.15 In 2008, the Venice 
Commission issued a Report on the relationship between freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion,16 which found that criminal sanctions against religious insults 
require ‘incitement to hatred as an essential component’ and are unjustified in cases of 
blasphemous speech insulting religious feelings. 17  In Recommendation 1805, the 
Council of Europe18 urged its member states to amend national legislation in order to 
ensure that limitations on religiously offensive expression are enacted only in cases of 
incitement to violence.’ 19  Those initiatives mirror more general developments in 
international human rights law. From 1999 to 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted 
a series of controversial non-binding Resolutions condemning ‘defamation of 
religions.’ 20  But in July 2011 the UN Human Rights Committee released General 
Comment 34 on freedom of expression and opinion, which for the first time stressed 
that ‘prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, 
including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the International Covenant on Civil 
                                                        
13 ibid §122 and §153. 
14 On the distinctive characteristics of offense to religious feelings see M. Pinto, ‘What are offences to 
feelings really about? A new regulative principle for the multicultural era’ (2010) 30(4) OJLS 695; R. C. 
Post, ‘Cultural heterogeneity and law: pornography, blasphemy and the First Amendment’ (1988) 76 
California Law Review 297; J. Feinberg, Offense To Others: The Moral Limits Of The Criminal Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1984) 192-198; P. Jones, ‘Blasphemy, offensiveness and Law’ (1980) 10 
British Journal of Political Science 129, 135-139. 
15 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 1510: Freedom of expression and respect for 
religious beliefs, 28 June 2006 (19th Sitting), at <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/ 
documents/adoptedtext/ta06/eres1510.htm.Sess>. 
16  European Commission for Democracy through Law (‘Venice Commission’), The relationship 
between freedom of expression and freedom of religion: the issue of regulation and prosecution of 
blasphemy, religious insult and incitement to religious hatred, Study no. 406/2006 (2008).  
17 ibid. See also Venice Commission, Blasphemy, Insult And Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic 
Society (Council of Europe Publishing, 2010) 27. 
18 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Recommendation 1805: Blasphemy, religious insults and 
hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion, 29 June 2007 (27th Sitting), at 
<http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/erec1805.htm>.  
19 ibid §15. 
20 See e.g. United Nations General Assembly, Combating Defamation of Religions, 10th Session, Agenda 
Item no. 1, 12 May 2009, §§78-83, at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/10session/ 
A.HRC.10.L.11.pdf>. See also F. Stjernfelt, ‘Pressure on press freedom: The current religious war on 
freedom of expression’, in A. Kierulf and H. Ronning (eds.) Freedom of Speech Abridged? Cultural, 
Legal & Philosophical Challenges (Nordicom, 2009) 130-132. 
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and Political Rights’ 21  save for cases of incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence. According to the General Comment 34, restrictive measures discriminating 
against certain religious groups, or against religion in general or aiming to prevent or 
punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine are 
impermissible.22  
The idea, therefore, that human rights enjoy only relative priority over other 
collective interests fails to fit a strong European constitutional and statutory tradition, 
which makes moral sense only through the principle that the government should not be 
free to restrict human rights in order to promote other non-rights based aggregated 
preferences, even if the majority would be better off as a result. I think that that 
principle explains most parts of our human rights legal landscape and determines the 
morally justifiable use of community force. Non-utilitarian theories of rights may be 
broadly clustered around interest-based (called also immunity theories23) and reason-
blocking theories of rights.24 We have to examine them thoroughly to determine which 
explains the right to freedom of religion or belief more successfully. 
As their name suggests, interest-based theories of rights protect fundamental 
individual interests. In their most typical form, interest-based theories protect 
individual interests that are important enough to generate duties on others. More 
specifically, according to Raz’s formulation, X has a right if and only if ‘an aspect of 
X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to 
be under a duty.’25 As Tasioulas notes, an interest-based theory of rights suggests that 
there are some fundamental interests that are shared by all individuals in virtue of their 
humanity and which should be protected before other interests are taken into account.26 
Yet not all interests are sufficient to ground rights. To ground a right, the interest 
should both be important and justify through sound arguments that a certain right 
exists in virtue of that interest. But even in case an interest fulfills those necessary 
requirements that is not sufficient. Something more is required. That is, a right exists as 
long as there are no conflicting considerations that override the interest grounding the 
right. A general right is then a pro tanto right, which means that all things being equal, 
it grounds for the existence of a particular right in the circumstances to which it 
applies.27 If it exists, a right is then a reason for holding other persons under a duty.  
More importantly, having a pro tanto right means that if, under certain circumstances, 
                                                        
21 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression, Geneva, 102nd Session, 11-29 July 2011, §48, at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies 
/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf>. Also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, §2. 
22 ibid. For further insights on UN General Comment 34 see M. O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of expression: 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment 34’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 627-654. 
23 J. Waldron, ‘Pildes on Dworkin’s theory of rights’ (2000) 29(1) Journal of Legal Studies 301, 301. 
24 R. Dworkin, ‘Rights as trumps’, in J. Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights; J. Waldron, ‘Pildes on 
Dworkin’s theory of rights’ (2000) 29(1) Journal of Legal Studies 301; Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation for the European Convention on Human Rights, Chapter 5. 
25 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986) 166. 
26 J. Tasioulas, ‘On the foundations of human rights’, in R. Cruft, S. M. Liao and M. Renzo (eds.) 
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 45-70. 
27 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 184. 
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there are conflicting pro tanto considerations whose importance is so strong that they 
override the interest justifying the right, then in those very circumstances one does not 
have the right – although he may enjoy it in the rest of the cases. Importantly, the fact 
that most people feel that they ought to respect others (i.e. serve their interests) by 
avoiding lies, offensive speech, or loud music while travelling on the Tube does not 
mean that they are under a duty (which would imply a right) to behave in those way. 
Having good reasons to behave in a certain way does not entail that someone is under a 
duty to behave in a certain way. Feeling that we ought to turn our iPod’s volume down 
while on a bus or that we ought to be punctual in our appointments or that we ought 
not to lie to our friends does not mean that we could not behave the other way. We 
might then be rude or untrustworthy or bad friends, but we are free to do so.28 
So, as a pro tanto right, the right to freedom of religion or belief provides 
weighty reasons for others not to interfere with the liberty of the right-holder in certain 
ways. But pro tanto means that the weight of those reasons can be outweighed by other 
legitimate (and weightier) reasons in the circumstances. If that happens one can act 
unjustifiably insofar as the right in question is concerned, yet justifiably all things 
considered, i.e. on the balance of reasons. Nevertheless, when pro tanto rights are 
justifiably restricted they leave duties to apologise, and possible make amends because 
one has acted against a pro tanto reason.29  
Thus, one of the essential components of an interest-based account of rights is 
the determination of the interests grounding the right. This is challenging, however, in 
cases involving the right to freedom of religion or belief. As Chapter One discussed, 
there is widespread disagreement concerning the interest grounding the right, with 
some theorists locating it on the unique importance of religion for human psychology 
and existential uncertainty, and others on its immutable status for our identities. But we 
discussed that none of those interests can fully capture the importance and complexity 
of the right. Others, including Raz, argue that the right to freedom of religion is 
grounded on the important individual interest to belong to religious communities, 
whose preservation serves toleration and communal peace. But that argument fails to 
capture that many religious individuals do not identify with any religious communities, 
whereas it also leaves unexplained the need to protect non-religious forms of 
conscience that lack a group dimension. Communitarian arguments, according to 
which the right to freedom of religion protects our important interest to belong to 
collective structures to form and develop our identities, seem to suffer from similar 
limitations. 
It is possible to overcome those difficulties if we accept, as Tasioulas argues, that 
human rights are grounded on a plurality of interests.30 But still, under an interest-
                                                        
28 On the distinction between having a right to X and claiming that X is the ‘right’ thing to do see R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 184-205. Αlso J. Waldron, ‘A right to do wrong’ 
(1981) 92 Ethics 21. 
29 G. Letsas, ‘The scope of balancing of rights: Diagnostic or constitutive?’, in E. Brems and J. Gerards 
(eds.) Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining 
the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 38-64. 
30 J. Tasioulas, ‘Justice, equality and rights’, in R. Crisp (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2012) 768-793. 
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based account of rights we have to engage in some sort of weighing of different 
interests in cases of tension. That weighing procedure is often associated with the idea 
that human rights, and freedom of religion or belief in particular, must be decided by 
striking the right ‘balance’ between individual interests and the interests of the 
community as a whole. But ‘balancing’, as the previous chapter briefly discussed, 
simply restates the problem. In fact, it is even more confusing than mere restatement, 
given that the existing legal provisions have already balanced individual interests 
against the interests of the community as a whole and ‘the idea of a further balance, 
between their separate interests and the results of the first balance, is itself 
mysterious.’31  
‘Balancing’ is often defended because of its alleged sensitivity, as a technique, to 
the distinctive facts of each case, which is key to ensure ‘pragmatic’ accommodations 
of religion.32 For instance, Stychin argues that ‘only a factual analysis’ can resolve the 
competition between different interests in cases of religious accommodation, involving 
values such as ‘civility, solidarity and tolerance.’33 In Ladele, Stychin argues that the 
Islington Council should accommodate the applicant only if her accommodation was 
‘in fact’ possible.34 But a contextual ‘pragmatic’ analysis fails to explain which ‘facts’ 
really matter and overlooks questions about the legitimacy and political implications of 
values such as civility and solidarity, despite resorting to those in its proposed 
‘balancing’ exercise. Perhaps more importantly, ‘pragmatic’ balancing emphasises that 
a specific legislation is unjustifiable because it offends the individual interest to 
manifest one’s religion, which is so important that it should not be left to a utilitarian 
calculation, but should take priority instead. Hence, the analysis appeals to the 
consequences of the legislation in question as distinct from the reasons of the 
legislators or the grounds for enacting it.  
However, we need a theory that will reveal not only which individual interest is 
offended, but also why this particular interest is fundamental. Many important interests 
we share may be compromised for reasons of collective welfare. People in some 
economic sectors prosper while others do not because of political decisions backed up 
by the claim that the community will be better off overall. Why, if at all, are the 
interests compromised by legislation that limits freedom of manifestation of religion or 
belief different? We cannot claim that they are more fundamental because people care 
more about these interests or because they suffer more when those interests are 
overridden by claims of general welfare. It is far from clear that people care more 
about religious interests compared to other important interests, such as their financial 
welfare or their children’s happiness, and in any case even a classic utilitarian analysis 
                                                        
31 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford University Press, 1985) 73. 
32 B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity, 2001) 50-54. 
33 C. Stychin, ‘Faith in the future: sexuality, religion and the public sphere’ (2009) 29(4) OJLS 729. Also 
J Webber, ‘Understanding the religion in freedom of religion’, in P. Cane, C. Evans and Z. Robinson 
(eds.) Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 26. 
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into account respect for ‘sexual citizenship’ see D. Bell and J. Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics 
and Beyond (Polity, 2000) 148; N. Bamforth, ‘Same-sex partnerships: Some comparative constitutional 
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would take into account suffering or strong preference in its calculations. If the 
interests are nevertheless overridden, why do they deserve the protection human rights 
offer? 
To be clear, some interpretations of ‘balancing’ confuse teleological interest-
based theories of rights with utilitarianism. Interest-based theories of rights are not 
committed to maximisation of interest satisfaction however.35 According to Raz, the 
conditions of when an interest grounds a right depend on an inquiry that should focus 
on whether the claim relates to an objective interest of well-being, that is, to an interest 
that furthers individual autonomy and as such imposes duties on others, including the 
government.36 If we embrace the mild form of perfectionism that Raz defends, that 
formulation is more promising compared to ‘pragmatic’ balancing. It requires 
balancing through a form of cost-benefit analysis distinct from utilitarianism in the 
sense that from the objective standpoint of ‘the importance of difference interests for 
our wellbeing’ costs and benefits are ‘moralised notions’ that do not commit interest-
based theories to maximisation of satisfaction of our interests.37 
Consider, for instance, Pichon and Sajous v France.38 In June 1995, three women 
entered the only pharmacy in Salleboeuf, a small town in southwestern France, to buy 
contraceptives prescribed to each of them by their doctors. The pharmacy’s owners 
refused to serve them based on their religious beliefs. The customers filed a complaint 
against the pharmacists arguing before the French courts that religious principles were 
not legitimate reasons to refuse selling prescribed contraceptives and that the two 
pharmacists were thus in violation of the Consumer Code.39 The French courts agreed 
with the complainants and held that whereas there was legislation in place authorising 
doctors, midwives and nurses to refuse to take part in proceedings leading to 
termination of pregnancy,40 the provision did not include any exceptions for other 
professions. 
The pharmacists complained before the ECtHR that their conviction constitutes 
an unjustifiable limitation of their right to freedom of religious manifestation in 
violation of Article 9 ECHR. However, the majority of the ECtHR dismissed their 
complaint and held that  
 
‘[a]s long as the sale of contraceptives is legal and occurs on medical prescription 
nowhere other than in a pharmacy, the applicants cannot give precedence to their 
religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for their refusal to sell 
products, since they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the 
professional sphere.’41 
 
                                                        
35 J. Waldron, ‘Rights in conflict’ (1989) 99(3) Ethics 503. 
36 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 193-216. 
37 Letsas, ‘Rescuing proportionality’, 329. 
38 Pichon and Sajous v France, Application no. 49853/99, 2 October 2001 (inadmissible). 
39 According to Article L 122-1 of the French Consumer Code, it is prohibited to refuse to sell a product 
for no legitimate reason. 
40 Article L 602-8 of the French Public Health Code. 
41 ibid 
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Importantly, the ECtHR in Pichon and Sajous did not balance the interest of the 
pharmacists in refraining from selling contraceptives (which is one dimension of their 
right to freedom of religion) against the interests of others to have access to prescribed 
medication or against the collective general interest in public health. There was no 
argument, for instance, about whether women would be harmed if they had to take a 
short drive to the next village to buy their prescribed contraceptives. An interest-based 
theory of freedom of religion would require the proportionality test to answer whether 
the individual interest to live in accordance with one’s religion (translated, in the 
instant case, in the refusal to sell contraceptives) is important enough to impose a duty 
on the government to exempt religious pharmacists from the general provisions of the 
Consumer Code. It is, however, at this exact point that we need a theory explaining 
why those interests are fundamental. Raz’s suggestion that important interests are those 
related to an objective interest of well-being, that is, to an interest that furthers 
individual autonomy, provides limited guidance with regard to why interests associated 
with conscience, such as the pharmacists’ interests in Pichon and Sajous, are often 
considered more important compared to other interests so as to lead individual 
applicants, and parts of political and human rights theory, to insist on ‘special’ 
protection of conscience through exemptions from general and neutral laws. 
Shortcomings in the application of interest-based theories to the right of freedom 
of religion or belief furnish the additional criticism that they are reductivist.42 For 
instance, Laborde takes the ‘Equal Liberty’ theory of Eisgruber and Sager as a 
paradigm of an egalitarian theory of freedom of religion and criticises it for reducing 
freedom of religion to the protection of certain individual interests, which the authors 
label as ‘deep’ or ‘serious’ without, however, explaining why they are so.43 Eisgruber 
and Sager then analogise religion with other ‘comparably serious’ interests, such as 
various medical predicaments, 44  and argue that religion should enjoy equivalent 
protection to those. However, as Laborde rightly notes, a strategy seeking coherence 
between equally ‘deep’ interests is problematic because we lack guidance as to what 
depth requires. And if we water down the ‘depth criterion’, as Eisgruber and Sager do 
when they replace ‘deep’ interests with ‘nontrivial’ or ‘comparably important’ 
interests, then their approach turns question-begging because whereas the point of 
hypothetical analogies is ‘to inquire whether deep, serious, moral commitments are 
sufficiently similar to religion’ in order to ground a claim for accommodation, the 
theory merely assumes importance making the whole analogy strategy redundant.45 
However, this is not to suggest, as Laborde seems to imply, that equality-based 
theories of freedom of religion are implausible as a result. For equality-based theories 
of freedom of religion or belief are not necessarily interest-based. Rather, as the next 
part of this chapter will argue, equality-based theories of freedom of religion make 
better sense through reason-blocking theories of rights. 
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Finally, another difficulty comes from one of the central assumptions of interest-
based theories of rights, namely that limitations on our rights run counter to certain 
important interests. But this is not always the case. For an unjustifiable restriction of a 
pro tanto right loss or setback to the right-holder’s interests is not necessary. If 
someone enters my flat without my permission, and without any chance of myself 
finding out, my right to respect for private life remains infringed despite that I suffered 
no loss or setback to my interests. Again, this is not to suggest that interest-based 
theories of rights aim to maximise satisfaction of our interests. However, I think that 
reason-blocking theories better capture the intuition that the point of rights is not to 
protect our various interests, no matter how fundamental those are, but to protect us 
from preferences that deny our equal status as autonomous persons. They flow from 
the non-teleological idea that in a liberal democracy it is illegitimate for religious 
beliefs to limit individual choices no matter how many people uphold such beliefs. 
This restraint springs from our ‘special moral relation to fellow members of our society 
– a collectivity that can coerce each of its members, but only if it claims to act in the 
name of all of them.’46 Our defense against an oppressive majority ‘is an appeal to the 
form of moral equality that accords each person a limited sovereignty over the core of 
his personal and expressive life.’47 As Nagel argues, this sovereignty is ‘in itself, and 
not just for its consequences, the most distinctive value expressed by a morality of 
human rights.’48  
 
3.2.2.  Reason-blocking accounts 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a general moral defense of reason-
blocking theories of rights. Even so, in the remainder of this chapter, I wish to argue 
that difficulties with interest-based accounts of freedom of religion could be overcome 
by resorting to reason-blocking theories of rights. As the following pages will 
demonstrate, reason-blocking accounts of rights capture better than their rival morally 
significant parts of the practice of the ECtHR in cases of freedom of religion. But 
which are the differences between interest-based and reason-blocking accounts of 
rights? Reason-blocking accounts understand rights as constraints on the kinds of 
reasons that a government may legitimately act upon, 49  rather than as ways to 
immunise particular interests for their own sake. The reason-blocking label suggests 
that rights exclude certain sorts of reasons for official action.50 From the perspective of 
correlative duties, under an interest-based account of rights duties are framed as duties 
not to limit or interfere with an important interest. But under a reason-blocking 
account, duties are framed as duties not to interfere with the interest for certain 
reasons. The language of interests remains under both accounts, but it would be a 
                                                        
46 T. Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008 (New York and 
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mistake to argue that, as a result, the aim of rights under a reason-blocking account is 
to protect certain important interests (grounding the rights in question) regardless of 
the reasons that justify a given form of state interference.51 
To be clear, with respect to the right to freedom of religion or belief, a reason-
blocking account does not mean that the right is not grounded on important individual 
interests, such as the interest in making deep ethical choices independently and 
authentically. However, the political implications of the two accounts of rights are 
different. A reason-blocking model does not advocate balancing rights against public 
goods, general utility or other interests in the way that an interest-based model would 
suggest. Rather, our rights are safeguards against constraints that are based on 
collective preferences that we know, from our general knowledge of the society, that 
are likely to contain large components of illegitimate preferences that the political 
process cannot track and eliminate.52  
The difference between the two theories becomes clearer with reference to 
limitations of rights. Limitations on rights are sensible under interest-based theories. 
Recall the formulation discussed above. Limitations on rights could take place in either 
of two possibilities: either an individual interest is not important enough to generate 
duties or conflicting considerations are so important that they can outweigh the interest 
grounding the right. Perfectionist political theories would also add that a right might 
have to be restricted for the promotion of valuable public goods, such as those that 
contribute to the ideal of personal autonomy.53 Under interest-based theories of rights a 
limitation would therefore be proportionate ‘either because the freedom that is 
restricted in a particular case is not conducive to the promotion of an important interest 
or because promotion of the interest must be balanced against the promotion of other 
interests or public goods.’54 
However, under reason-blocking theories, limitations on rights work differently. 
Individuals do not have a right to freedom of religion or belief because certain interests 
require ‘special’ protection against majorities or because they are immune to 
considerations of the common good. Rather, individuals have a right to an egalitarian 
scheme of rights which does not justify limitations on their freedom of religion for 
certain reasons, or according to Leader, for certain commitments.55 As Dworkin puts it, 
the government ‘must impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an 
argument that the citizen could not accept without abandoning his sense of his equal 
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worth.’56 Thus, reason-blocking accounts of rights focus on a particular way in which a 
fair democracy must treat its members, rather than on how fully certain fundamental 
interests are satisfied. Of course, when the interpretation of a limitation on rights shows 
that the impermissible reasons that rights are supposed to exclude are not really 
present, then the limitation in question may be justified all things considered. But when 
impermissible reasons are present, our right to freedom of religion gets activated and 
blocks the enforcement of those limitations. Under a reason-blocking account of rights, 
courts do not focus their investigation about the justifiability of a limitation on 
‘pragmatic’ balancing, but on whether there are impermissible reasons underlying the 
state interference in question. 
Before further discussion about which type of reasons are excluded by human 
rights, a final important point has to be added. Reason-blocking accounts of rights are 
sometimes misinterpreted as theories about the motivation of the acting agent. The 
resulting objection is that certain actions violate rights irrespective of the motivation of 
the agent. Consider an example. Some limitations on the right to freedom of religion, 
such as limitations on the right to change one’s religion, may be in place not because 
the state treats some people as less worthy than others but, by contrast, because it 
equally cares about everyone’s salvation from sin. But even though the reason behind 
the limitation is not impermissible, that is, it does not fail to recognise everyone’s 
equal worth, the limitation still constitutes an unjustifiable restriction on the individual 
right to freedom of religion. It follows that the reasons behind limitations on rights play 
little role in determining what the morally justifiable use of community force would be. 
The objection, however, is misleading. As Letsas argues, the problem of that type of 
objection is that it misunderstands the use of the word ‘reason’. A reason-blocking 
theory of rights uses the concept of reason not in the motivating, but in the normative 
sense. By reason we mean reasons for action by virtue of the value of equal respect and 
concern and the status of individuals as beings with inherent dignity, not the 
underlying motivation of that particular action.57 
 
3.3.  Reasons, Influence and Subordination 
 
What kind of reasons should be excluded from motivating governmental action? Can 
we identify ex ante areas of political concern where the wrong sets of reasons are likely 
to be present in order to set up rights as safeguards in those areas? And if we can, is 
freedom of religion or belief one of those areas? The history of religious persecution in 
Europe, most notably from the late Middle Ages to early Reformation,58  and the 
reasons why the right to freedom of religion evolved into ‘a feature of liberal 
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modernity’59 and a sine qua non of international human rights law,60 reflect the concern 
that the moralistic preferences of the majority are likely to interfere with our personal 
responsibility to define value in our lives.61 But this kind of concern is not raised only 
due to the historically vicious conflicts between different religions. It is also due to 
what Hegel describes as ‘the conflict between faith and reason’ that arises as soon as 
‘thought touches on religious convictions and practices.’62 And it is also due to the 
‘new religious wars’ between believers and nonbelievers63  about, for instance, the 
permeability of religion in public schools or the wearing of symbols on the streets that 
currently divide several European nations. The aim of a coherent theory of 
interpretation of the moral right to freedom of religion or belief should be to address all 
these heated controversies of confidence, faith and allegiance. I think that the best way 
is through an account of the right that blocks certain impermissible moral preferences 
about how others should live – which the political process cannot discriminate and 
eliminate – from any model of distribution of resources. It is important to further 
explain this hypothesis, first through the lens of morality. 
The previous chapter ended with an examination of the principles stemming from 
human dignity as status. Now, a reason-blocking account of freedom of religion 
requires us to turn back to human dignity to examine some of its ethical implications. 
Human dignity hinges on self-respect, which entails that everyone should be personally 
responsible to define value in his own life and live in the way and style he wants. This 
personal responsibility to define value is two-fold. We should be responsible both in 
the virtue sense and accept relational responsibility whenever we have to.64 We cannot 
treat an action or decision as our personal choice unless we regard our own judgment 
responsible for it. Of course it is a more complex question how far human dignity 
requires that we accept moral responsibility for our actions,65 but the focus, at this 
point, is on our personal independence in making certain deep ethical choices and on 
the important role this independence plays in enabling us to live well with self-respect. 
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Understood this way, our personal substantive responsibility to define value is 
perfectly compatible with someone’s decision to live his life in conformity with the 
values of his family or religion.66 Self-respect only requires that those choices are 
personal and authentic, rather than imposed out of fear or out of state coercion.67  
But what does authenticity mean? Bernard Williams captures authenticity as ‘the 
idea that some things are in some sense really you, or express what you are, and others 
aren’t.’68 This definition is congenial to how we describe someone authentic in our 
common parlance as someone who acts according to desires, motives or beliefs that are 
not only hers, but also express who she really is. Apart from philosophically intriguing, 
authenticity is a distinctive ideal exerting such influence on recent intellectual 
developments that Taylor has described our times as the ‘age of authenticity.’69 But 
authenticity is also connected to dignity, and more specifically to the demands of 
dignity in our relations with others.70 It is connected to how we exercise our personal 
responsibility for the governance of our own lives. 
Personal responsibility to define value does not deny the effects that a particular 
ethical environment could have in the available choices. It does not mean that we 
should be free from influence or persuasion, either.71 An ethical culture includes a wide 
range of values, which enable different life choices. Meanwhile, our collective 
decisions shape our common culture. Our personalities are influenced and, at least in 
part, formed by the choices of others and by popular choices in our culture. This cross-
fertilisation is an integral aspect of our social experience: we learn from each other and 
we define ourselves through our ability to socially identify with various groups, 
choices and lifestyles.72 The expectations of our friends and their entertainment choices 
influence the music we listen, the clothes we wear, the sports we play and the way we 
express our emotional attachments to them. Who knows how many choices we would 
not have made, had our friends not have made a start. Certain lifestyles also become 
less attractive and less feasible in a shifting environment. No one can foresee whether 
working as a movie translator or as a postman will be possible in the future. Some of 
us that possess no great physical strength cannot become stars in American rugby, and 
the existing tax system makes collecting classic roadsters tricky. That might prevent 
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some people from living the life they would rather live. But even if they may have less 
ability, compared to other people, to design the life they prefer, their design can still be 
fully authentic; just the life that they would like to live and not one that someone else 
has reserved for them. According to Dworkin, authenticity is ‘narrowly relational’ in 
the sense that it is not compromised by limitations of nature or of circumstance.73 
Someone does not live authentically, regardless of the plurality of choices he might be 
capable of enjoying, if others prevent him from accessing otherwise available options 
simply because they consider those options unworthy. 
Authenticity is thus different from certain interpretations of autonomy. It is often 
argued that safeguarding autonomy depends on the openness and selectability of a 
range of valuable choices.74 But if this is the only requirement, then our autonomy is 
not violated when a government manipulates the community’s culture so as to 
eradicate or make less attractive certain disapproved choices of lifestyle, provided that 
an adequate range of choices remains selectable so that everyone can exercise her 
power of choice.75 However, authenticity, as defined by dignity, is concerned both with 
the character and with the fact of obstacles to choice. Living well does not just mean 
ability to design a life, but being able to design it in response to a personal and 
independent judgment of ethical value. 76  Taking into account the character of the 
obstacles to our choices, apart from the existence of the obstacles themselves, stems 
from the principle that authenticity is damaged whenever someone is made to accept 
someone else’s judgment in place of her own about the values or goals that her life 
should pursue.77 
I think that the main advantage of a reason-blocking account of rights is that it 
captures that very idea, namely that our ethical environment has to be formed 
organically through individual choices one by one, rather than by collective action. For 
a reason-blocking account is based on a conception of the limits on the kinds of reason 
that a state may justifiably invoke to justify its coercive action. Thus, if the aim of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief is to prohibit subordination of our personal ethical 
responsibility to the moralistic preferences of the majority, it is important to distinguish 
instances where our social culture may influence our individual choices from instances 
of subordination. Recall that reason-blocking theories of rights are based on the non-
teleological idea of a special moral relation to the fellow members of our society who 
the society as a collectivity can coerce ‘only if it claims to act in the name of all of 
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them.’78 As Dworkin puts it, coercive state measures may be adopted as long as they 
are justified on distributive or impersonal grounds of justice and not on how others 
should live (personally judgmental grounds).79 Redistributive taxation, environmental 
regulations, human rights legislation, among several other sources of obligation, may 
have an impact on our common culture that affects our sense of how we can and 
should live. Despite their strong impact though, they can be justified entirely apart 
from any assumption that that impact will be ethically beneficial, viz. that people will 
lead better as well as fairer lives in a culture so transformed. Those (coercive) policies 
are therefore compatible with our personal responsibility to decide for ourselves the 
ethical values that our lives should reflect.80 
Subordination is relatively easy to identify when states enforce moral norms 
through criminal law or through other forms of overt interference sanctioning those 
deviating from the norm. When a government decides that the state should express 
religious values and uses its coercive power to criminalise blasphemy or, in the 
diametrically opposite case, when a state prohibits the expression of any attachment to 
religious values through criminalising different forms of religious manifestation in 
public,81 our right to freedom of religion is violated. We claim that our right is violated 
not because those limitations prevent us from full enjoyment of important interests, but 
because the right protects our personal responsibility from exactly those forms of 
subordination. A government cannot justifiably restrict our freedom of conscience 
when the justification behind the restriction assumes the superiority or popularity of 
any ethical values that are controversial in the community. 82  Censorship of 
blasphemous art83 or journalism,84 restrictions on the expression of offensive views85 
or mandated religious oaths in a state’s courts or parliament86 constitute unjustifiable 
limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief because they depend, directly or 
indirectly, on a choice about the values that a good life has to reflect. Legal 
prohibitions on same-sex intercourse is another common example of a constraint on 
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our liberty, which is motivated by a desire to protect some conceptions of living well 
and blot out others.87 It violates our right to respect for private life for exactly the same 
reasons.  
A reason-blocking account of the right to freedom of religion or belief shows 
more clearly why in a liberal democracy it is illegitimate for state officials to try and 
control how others should live through deliberately shaping an ethical culture more 
suited to the moral preferences of the majority.88 We can tell which limitations on the 
right to freedom of religion or belief are unjustifiable not based on the idea that 
religion is more ‘special’ than other foundational ethical convictions, but based on an 
interpretation of the limitations in question in order to ensure that their justification 
does not lie on grounds of personal morality. Note, moreover, that it makes no 
difference that a large majority, and not a small powerful minority, might hope for the 
coercive establishment of a religious or an areligious culture. Freedom of religion or 
belief, morally justified on personal responsibility to define value in our lives, is as 
much frustrated by allowing a majority of citizens to impose their values on everyone 
through legislation as it would be by allowing some minority to do that. Freedom from 
subordination forbids any manipulation of my culture ‘that is both collective and 
deliberate – that deploys the collective power and treasure of the community as a 
whole and that aims to affect the ethical choices and values of its members.’89 Whether 
or not it would benefit the manipulators – i.e. the purpose of this manipulation – makes 
no difference. And, indeed, dignity requires that we have to reject manipulation even if 
it reflects our own values because our dignity is as much violated from trying to 
impose them to others as it is if we have them manipulated by others. 
To be clear, there is no violation of our personal ethical responsibility when 
limitations on our freedom of conscience do not rely on personal morality. A state 
relies on political morality, rather than on personal morality, when it enacts 
environmental protection legislation, when it imposes taxes, or lowers the motorway 
speed limit. Those laws significantly influence the way we live. Low speed limits may 
impose a small burden on some people because they will need more time to reach their 
destinations and no burden to others who commute by train or drive slowly anyway. 
Still, Jenson, a professional racing driver and avid sports car enthusiast, will be 
substantially affected by that traffic policy. His circumstance is really unfortunate but, 
without more, we have no good reason to claim that speed limit regulations deny his 
responsibility to define value by himself. Environmental regulations, tax laws and 
speed limits do not aim to usurp our personal responsibility to identify a successful life. 
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to freedom of religion or belief that captures the distinction between influence and subordination. 
89 Dworkin, Is Democracy possible here?, 76. 
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Rather, those laws inevitably share burdens among all life plans. 90  They form the 
background against which we may make our ethical choices and our own responsibility 
for making them is not diminished by the existence of that background. 
Finally, a reason-blocking account of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
constitutes a more principled response to the argument that a political majority should 
enjoy a right to maintain the value culture that it deems best given its moral 
convictions. Consider cases of blasphemous art, such as Wingrove v United Kingdom91 
and Otto-Preminger v Austria.92 In all those cases the respondent states have argued 
before the ECtHR that banning blasphemous artworks was essential to secure the right 
of their Christian majorities to enjoy their religion without being offended in their 
beliefs. In I.A.,93  the Turkish government argued that its domestic legislation that 
criminalised blasphemy against the Prophet is compatible with the Convention, given 
that the country’s majority follows Islam. Those are just some examples of cases which 
are directly or indirectly based on the argument that bans on freedom of expression are 
justified because the majority of a state prefers to live and educate their children in an 
environment that protects religious principles that they deem sacred. Since the majority 
can secure its aesthetic culture, so the argument goes, through urban planning 
regulations and its cultural traditions and history through museums or national days, 
why not have the same power with regard to its religious culture? An analysis based on 
ethical responsibility helps us answer that museums and urban planning regulations are 
different because they do not touch on personal morality; they do not coerce citizens to 
adopt one opinion about what counts as a good life over another. Recall that the 
argument is not grounded on the uniqueness of religion compared to other foundational 
ethical convictions, or on its immutability for our identities. It lies on the moral 
principle that there are some kinds of preferences that a state committed to equal 
respect and concern may not coercively pursue. 
It is true that in all these cases, the right to freedom of religion or belief can be 
presented as a right protecting an interest – an important interest in making our ethical 
choices independently and authentically. But that does not make the underlying view 
of the right to freedom of religion an interest-based view. Rather, the analysis depends 
on whether our understanding of the right is that a certain interest, understood in itself, 
is to be insulated from any compromise or derogation in the name of the general good, 
or whether ‘our understanding is that the interest in question is just an individual 
interest in not being at the mercy of certain sorts of reasons and considerations.’94 A 
reason-blocking theory understands the right to freedom of religion in the second way. 
It is therefore a mistake to suppose that common references to interests show, by 
themselves, that the aim is to protect the interest in question, regardless of the 
motivation or justification behind an interference with the interest. 
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Of course, no substantive account of the right to freedom of religion can 
categorically resolve all the important questions of political morality about how far, for 
instance, a government committed to equal respect and equal concern can influence 
(but not subordinate) its citizens. But the principles set out above remain the skeleton. 
A government does not violate its duty to treat its citizens with equal respect and 
concern when its policies aim to influence them in order to strengthen their sense of 
personal responsibility. Through compulsory education or the display of a range of 
important and profound responses to that personal responsibility, e.g. policies 
promoting respect for diversity or for family, a state does not violate our personal 
responsibility. Indeed, the distinction between subordination and those other types of 
morally permissible influence requires difficult boundary judgments that may 
sometimes prove controversial. Even though we may disagree on the particulars, we 
have to try and draw them as well as we can. Dignity requires that even if we decide to 
conform to the lifestyles or expectations of others, we must do that out of conviction 
and not out of fear of sanctions. For instance, many religions include sacred texts and 
authorities that are responsible to report which actions are morally permissible. In a 
liberal democracy those who subject themselves to the ethical authority of religious 
sources do so voluntarily, so even if some of their life choices end up being limited, 
their authenticity is not compromised. On the contrary, a theocracy introducing an 
ethical regime that coercively subjects the fate of all citizens to religious authority 
flouts authenticity. 95  The analysis will return to a more specific discussion of the 
distinction between influence and subordination in Chapters Six and Seven, which 
discuss religious symbols and blasphemous speech regulations respectively. 
 
3.4.  A Reason-Blocking Interpretation of the Right to Freedom of Religion in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
 
The following section will argue that a reason-blocking interpretation of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief, based on the more abstract principle of ethical 
responsibility, makes better moral sense of the relevant practice of the ECtHR 
compared to interest-based accounts of rights. The ECtHR often uses language that 
seems congenial to interest-based theories of rights. Indeed, in the examination of 
complaints under Article 9 ECHR, the Court often focuses on the various interests 
underlying the right and on the need to strike the right ‘balance’ between those and the 
rights of others or other important collective interests (i.e. public order or public 
health). However, an interest-based approach does not capture a significant number of 
cases where interests play limited or no role and no ‘balancing’ takes place, without 
any clear reasons for that. This is because, I will argue, the ECtHR excludes certain 
sorts of reason for official action and does not let those (excluded) reasons back in its 
‘balancing’ analysis. The examination of the complaints pays attention to whether 
reasons that human rights are supposed to exclude, such as those that deploy the 
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collective power of a community in order to affect the ethical choices and values of its 
members, are present in a particular political conflict between freedom of religion and 
other individual rights or collective interests. 
 
3.4.1.  Proselytism cases 
 
The etymological origins of proselytism are not linked to religion. In Greek, the word 
proselytise derives from the prefix προς (toward) and the verb έρχομαι (come) and its 
meaning is ‘to attract others as new comers’, that is, to convert others to a different 
viewpoint, religious or not. It is the use of proselytism in the New Testament and other 
writings of the Early Christianity period, as well as the practice of the Christian 
missionaries of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, 96  that dressed the word with 
predominantly religious connotations such as the attempt to convince others, often 
coercively, to adopt new religious beliefs and affiliations. The genealogy of that 
conception of proselytism cannot be further examined here, but it suffices to note that 
the prevalence of an interpretation of proselytism as coercion into abandoning one’s 
religious beliefs explains the survival of criminal bans on proselytism in several 
countries until today.97 Likewise, it explains the provisions of Greek legislation that 
gave rise to a series of interesting cases on prohibition of proselytism before the 
ECtHR. Proselytism cases are particularly interesting because the distinction between 
proper and improper forms of proselytism that the ECtHR has introduced hinges on the 
distinction between influence and subordination that we discussed earlier. 
On 2 March 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Kokkinakis, a married couple of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses from Crete, called at the house of a woman to evangelise their religious 
beliefs.98 They were unlucky in that the woman who opened the door was the wife of 
an Orthodox Church cantor. She accused them for ‘improper’ proselytism, which was a 
criminal offense under Greek law, and the couple was arrested and convicted by the 
Greek courts. In due course they filed a complaint to the ECtHR claiming that their 
conviction violated their right to freedom of religious manifestation through teaching, 
secured under Article 9(1) ECHR. 
The ECtHR stressed the vitality of religious freedom, not only for the identities 
of believers and non-believers, but also for pluralism.99 Furthermore, since Article 9(1) 
stipulates that teaching is a way to manifest one’s religion, the ECtHR held that 
without the right to ‘convince one’s neighbor’ through teaching, the right to ‘change 
one’s religion’ would become a dead letter.100 With regards to the compatibility of 
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proselytism with freedom of religion, the majority distinguished between proper and 
improper proselytism. Proper proselytism amounts to ‘true evangelism’, which was 
defined as ‘a responsibility’ for every Christian, 101  whereas improper proselytism 
includes ‘improper pressure on people in distress or in need’, violence and 
brainwashing.102 According to the ECtHR, improper proselytism is incompatible with 
the principle of respect for individual freedom of conscience. The failure of the Greek 
courts to specifically indicate the improper means that Mr. Kokkinakis used to 
proselytise led the majority to the conclusion that the limitation in question was not 
necessary in a democratic society and in violation of Article 9 ECHR. 
The separate opinions of the case are particularly interesting because they furnish 
two completely different understandings of the interests grounding the right to freedom 
of religion. On the one hand, Judge Martens argued that states should abstain from 
entering the conflict between those whose faith urges them to evangelise and win as 
many adherents as possible, and those who wish to maintain their faith without 
disturbance. According to his concurring opinion, human dignity requires that 
individuals are the authors of their lives and pursue what they think best for 
themselves. States should not interfere with individual choices of conscience because 
intervention would possibly amount to selection and partiality, and would thus be 
illegitimate. Criminalisation of proselytism violates the Convention because the State 
effectively prefers the religion of the proselytised and defies its obligation to remain 
impartial in religious matters.   
On the other hand, Judge Valticos argued that whereas individuals should be free 
to manifest their religion, ‘systematic attempts at conversion’ amount to ‘attacking’ the 
beliefs of others. In his dissenting opinion, he held that proselytism falls outside the 
ambit of the right to freedom of religious manifestation because, by definition,103 it 
implies a malevolent intention to use all means possible, even deception or 
brainwashing, in order to win adherents for one’s faith. On that account, proselytism is 
an intrusion, ‘a rape of the beliefs of others’ unworthy of ECHR protection.104 
The distinction between influence and subordination and its importance for the 
justification of limitations on the right to freedom of religion emerges more clearly in 
Larissis v Greece.105 The applicants were officers in the Greek Air Force and members 
of the Pentecostal Church. They applied to the ECtHR after having been convicted by 
the Greek courts for improper proselytism of their inferior airmen. The ECtHR held 
that the subordinate relationship between the proselytisers and the proselytised played 
an important role because ‘the hierarchical structures which are a feature of life in the 
armed forces…[make] it difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an 
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individual of superior rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him.’ The 
ECtHR focused on the hierarchical and claustrophobic military context of the case, 
which under certain circumstances could render even a simple exchange of ideas into 
harassment against low-rank servicemen. As a result religious conversations could give 
rise to forms of improper proselytism. In that context, the ECtHR held that states ‘may 
be justified to take measures to protect the rights and freedoms of subordinate members 
of the armed forces.’106 However, ‘not every discussion on religion or other sensitive 
matters between individuals of unequal rank would fall into this category’. That matter 
had to be judged ad hoc.107 
Although the distinction between proper and improper forms of proselytism is 
not entirely clear, the fact that improper forms of proselytism violate the Convention 
regardless of the importance or the pervasiveness of the interests potentially supporting 
them, demonstrates that the ECtHR is alert to the need to channel the kinds of reasons 
that the government can act on in different domains. Neither Kokkinakis nor Larissis 
engaged in ‘balancing’ in order to conclude that limitations on the right to freedom of 
religion may be justified insofar as they do not interfere with the equal right to make 
choices and enjoy one’s conscience free from subordination. Ethical independence 
makes good moral sense of the main principle underlying the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR on proselytism, namely that freedom from subordination to the religious 
preferences of others is an integral part of the right to freedom of religion. Coercive or 
violent forms of proselytism rob individuals from their abstract right to ethical 
independence and their restriction is therefore morally justified. Moreover if, as the 
ECtHR claims, the right to freedom of religion is indeed important to secure fair 
democracy and toleration, then restrictions on improper proselytism are not only 
compatible with, but also required by these values. That holds regardless of the 
religious preferences of the majority of the respondent state in question which, in the 
cases discussed, quite tellingly did not play any role for the ECtHR. 
 
3.4.2.  Cases on regulation of conduct outside employment 
 
The distinction between influence and subordination also emerges in ECHR cases 
involving employers wishing to regulate out-of-work conduct. In Smith and Grady,108 
the ECtHR held that a ban on gays and lesbians in the armed forces violates the 
Convention. According to the Court, the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel 
were associated with ‘stereotypical expressions of hostility’ to homosexuals and 
represent a ‘predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a 
homosexual minority’. 109  Those negative attitudes could not therefore justify 
interference with the right of the applicants to respect for private life any more than 
‘similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour.’ 110 
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According to a reason-blocking account, the right to private life blocks exactly that sort 
of preferences. The ECtHR applied a similarly strict scrutiny of the employer’s 
interests in Schüth v Germany,111 where it found that the dismissal of a church organist 
for fathering an extra-marital child violated his right to respect for private life. 
According to the Court, having a right to respect for private life means that – despite 
the requirements of the Catholic Church’s Code of Canon Law – the applicant’s 
signature on the contract ‘cannot be interpreted as a personal unequivocal undertaking 
to live a life of abstinence in the event of separation or divorce.’112 Rather, the right to 
respect for private life requires the implementation of strong safeguards, including 
judicial scrutiny, in order to ensure that the interests of the Church do not generate 
duties exceeding the expected loyalty on behalf of the employees to the applicable 
religious principles and that the employer does not take advantage of its ‘predominant 
position’ in that sector of activity.113  
Furthermore, in Pay v UK,114 the ECtHR held that involvement with consensual 
sadomasochistic sexual practices might justify dismissal of an employee only when 
‘public knowledge’ of those sexual activities could impair individual ability to carry 
out his job duties. In the case under examination the dismissed employee was a 
probation officer involved in the treatment of sex offenders. The nature of his work, 
along with his failure to curb ‘those aspects of his private life most likely to enter into 
the public domain’,115 led the Court to hold that his dismissal was compatible with the 
Convention. In Redfearn v UK,116 the ECtHR found a violation of the individual right 
to freedom of association in case of an applicant who was dismissed from his 
employment in Bradford City Council because of his membership of the British 
National Party. Again, the ECtHR held that the right to freedom of association entails 
that states have to take positive measures to protect employees from dismissal on 
grounds of political opinion, including on grounds of membership of associations 
‘whose views offend, shock or disturb.’117 That does not mean that employees may not 
be dismissed for reasons related to their political activities,118 but the offensiveness of 
those political activities cannot justify dismissal by itself.119  
Nevertheless, the ECtHR found no violation of the right to private life in 
Fernandez Martinez v Spain,120 a case about a married priest who was dismissed from 
his job as a teacher of Catholic religion and ethics in a public secondary school because 
of publicly advocating celibacy. In a nine to eight split decision, the Grand Chamber 
dismissed the complaint but held that ‘a mere allegation by a religious community that 
there is an actual or potential threat to its autonomy is not sufficient to render any 
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interference with its members’ rights to respect for their private or family life.’121 
Rather, the national secular authorities must thoroughly investigate the reasons behind 
the interference in question, even if, as the dissenting opinion stressed, the dismissal 
decision is itself religious in nature.122 It is important that in all the above-discussed 
cases on dismissal because of out-of-work conduct the ECtHR consistently maintains 
that the role of human rights is to protect individuals from subordination to the moral, 
political, or religious preferences of the employers in question, and has strictly 
scrutinised those preferences to exclude from the balancing test those that are based on 
personal, rather than impersonal, moral grounds. 
Cases on out-of-work conduct seem to involve distinct issues from cases, such as 
Eweida v UK,123 where the applicants, based on their right to freedom of religion 
among others, ask for specific exemptions from general rules that would enable them 
to behave in particular ways while on the job. But the moral question is similar, with 
the exception that it is more probable that the interests of the employers in regulating 
on-the-job behaviour stretch beyond personal morality in comparison with cases on 
out-of-work conduct. In fact, European legislation separating one’s working life from 
one’s non-work life is an important guarantor of autonomy for employees. 124  Of 
course, the difficulty to fence our political or religious identities off the workplace 
often results in claims of accommodation, which may be more common on behalf of 
those belonging to minority groups that have had less impact on particular national 
cultures. Again, the distinction between subordination and other types of morally 
permissible influence requires difficult boundary judgments. But the principles so far 
discussed provide a good explanation of the practice of the ECtHR, which places great 
weight on some interests of the employers, such as the proper delivery of one’s job 
duties in Pay, and no weight on others, such as the offensiveness of far-right political 
positions in Redfearn or the stereotypical fears about recruiting homosexual personnel 
in the army in Smith and Grady, despite the fact that those interests might be religious 
in nature (as in Schüth). The advantages of this interpretation become especially clear 
when compared to an interest-based approach that leads to ‘balancing’ between the 
right to respect for private life of the employees in question and the right to freedom of 
religion or belief of the employers. 
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3.4.3.  Group registration cases 
 
Finally, a reason-blocking theory of freedom of religion or belief can morally explain 
the approach of the ECtHR in cases of state interference with the legal registration 
rights of religious groups.125 It is important that in those cases, the ECtHR integrates a 
moral principle of fair distribution of burdens and benefits into its interpretation of the 
right to freedom of religion. But before starting our discussion of those cases, I have to 
add an important clarification. I shall assume without argument that if some religious 
groups are to be treated differently from others, this cannot be in virtue of their 
doctrinal content. If any difference in the treatment of atheists, Christians, Jews, 
Muslims and so on can be justified, this will have to arise only from some feature of 
their practice or mode of organisation that puts them into a different relationship with 
the egalitarian principles laid down so far. 
According to Article 9 ECHR, freedom of religion includes both an individual 
and a collective dimension,126 which the ECtHR systematically links with the right to 
freedom of association.127 The main underlying principle in group registration cases is 
that religious entities ought to be protected in their right to associate freely without 
undue interference from the state. 128  According to the ECtHR, free association is 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society. States are bound by a duty of 
neutrality, understood as impartiality, which is incompatible with any attempts to 
assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs. Moreover, autonomy of religious 
communities is especially important as an aspect of the right to freedom of association. 
That is because the right to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of 
mutual interest is central to the right to freedom of association. Thus, a refusal by the 
domestic authorities to grant legal status to a religious group amounts to interference 
with the individual right to freedom of association. Given that freedom of religion 
encompasses an important collective aspect, state refusal to recognise a religious group 
constitutes interference with the right of freedom of religion as well. 
In Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria, the Grand Chamber found unanimously that 
participation in the life of religious communities is a form of religious manifestation 
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fully protected by the Convention.129 Furthermore, religious communities ‘traditionally 
and universally’ exist in the form of organised structures; therefore, their personality 
and legal rights are very important to their followers.130 Hasan and Chaush arose after 
the emergence of democracy in Bulgaria, when some Muslim believers and activists 
sought to replace the established leadership of their religion in the country because 
they believed that it had collaborated with the communist regime. In response to those 
allegations, the new Bulgarian government, through the Directorate of Religious 
Denominations, discharged the elected leadership of the Muslim community and 
registered a new religious leader in his place.  
The ECtHR held that the intervention to the internal structures of the religious 
group violated the right to freedom of religious manifestation. According to the Grand 
Chamber, where the organisation of religious communities is at issue, Article 9 should 
be interpreted in light of Article 11 ECHR, which protects freedom of assembly and 
safeguards associative life from unjustifiable State interference. That reading of 
freedom of religion entails that the right encompasses the expectation that religious 
communities will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State 
intervention. Autonomous existence of religious communities is ‘indispensable for 
pluralism in a democratic society’ and is thus an issue at the epicentre of the protection 
of religious freedom.131 Thus, strong protection of freedom of religion depends on 
autonomy of religious groups, which is closely linked to the effective enjoyment of the 
right to religious manifestation enjoyed by their followers. State neutrality in the 
exercise of their powers vis-à-vis religious groups 132  entails that, but for very 
exceptional cases, states have no discretion to determine whether religious beliefs or 
the means used to manifest them are legitimate.  
In two later cases sharing similar factual background, a unanimous Chamber of 
the ECtHR offered further insights on the specific implications of the duty of state 
neutrality in religious group leadership cases. In Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim 
Community v Bulgaria133 and in Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church v 
Bulgaria,134 the ECtHR found that compelling a divided religious community to have a 
single leadership against the will of one of the two rival leaderships constituted a 
violation of its followers’ freedom of religion. Although ‘neutral mediation’ between 
groups of believers would not in principle amount to state interference with the right to 
religious manifestation, the authorities should be particularly cautious in this sensitive 
area.135 For instance, they should not take measures to bring all religious groups under 
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a unified leadership, even when tensions between groups could lead to tensions 
between believers.136 For what is at stake is the preservation of pluralism and the right 
function of democracy, one of the principal characteristics of which is the possibility it 
offers for resolving problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even 
when they are irksome.137 Accordingly, the role of the authorities in a situation of 
conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the ‘cause of tension by 
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.’138 
The ECtHR has elaborated on the value of autonomy of religious groups in 
another group of cases on the right of minority religious groups to legal recognition. 
Notwithstanding the factual diversity, most of these cases have arisen from complaints 
about state failure to extend legal recognition on equal terms. In Metropolitan Church 
of Bessarabia v Moldova, the applicants claimed that the refusal of the Moldovan 
authorities to register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia infringed their right to 
freedom of religion, since only recognised religions could be practiced legally.139 At a 
later time similar complaints against Moldova reached the ECtHR in Biserica Adevărat 
Ortodoxă Din Moldova (True Orthodox Church) v Moldova.140 In both cases, although 
the Court acknowledged the existence of certain historical particularities that guided 
the state’s negative decisions, it upheld the applicants’ claim that Moldovan authorities 
have unjustifiably interfered with their collective right to religious freedom given that 
Article 9 must be interpreted in light of Article 11.141 According to the Court, securing 
autonomy of religious groups is key to protect the right to freedom of religion. Despite 
the distinctive socio-historical context of these cases, state authorities remain bound by 
a duty of impartiality and they should ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other without eliminating pluralism.142 It is important to note that both cases against 
Moldova involve minority religious groups which for historical reasons are in tension 
with majority groups. But no matter how wounding local history has been, majoritarian 
interests in denying legal registration to certain groups cannot ground legitimate 
                                                        
136 Serif v Greece, Application no. 38178/97, 14 December 1999, §52. 
137 That principle has been developed in freedom of association cases, with particular reference to the 
importance of the autonomy of political parties in ensuring a proper functioning democracy. Only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such parties’ freedom of association. See 
e.g. United Communist Part of Turkey and Others v Turkey, Application no. 133/1996/752/951, 30 
January 1998 (Grand Chamber), §§42-43; Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v 
Romania, Application no. 46626/99, 3 February 2005, §27; Tsonev v Bulgaria, Application no 
45963/99, 13 April 2006, §48; Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova (No. 2), Application no. 
25196/04, 2 February 2010, §24. Such compelling reasons have included safeguarding constitutional 
democracy and protecting the electoral system of a country. See e.g. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) 
and Others v Turkey, Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13 February 2003 
(Grand Chamber), §100; Gorzelik and Others v Poland, Application no. 44158/98 17 February 2004 
(Grand Chamber), §§88-106. 
138 ibid, §53. Also Serif, §49 and §§52-53; Hasan and Chaush, §78; Supreme Holy Council v Bulgaria, 
§96. 
139 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, Application no. 45701/99, 13 December 
2001. Also J. Montgomery, ‘Life can be difficult of you are Bessarabian Orthodox’ (2003) 151 Law & 
Justice 137. 
140  Biserica Adevărat Ortodoxă Din Moldova (True Orthodox Church) and Others v Moldova, 
Application no. 952/03, 27 February 2007. 
141 ibid §34. 
142 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, §116.  
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reasons for limitations on human rights. It is indicative that those interests have not 
played any role in the justification of the limitations in question by the ECtHR. 
Moreover, in 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v 
Georgia,143 the ECtHR extended the (negative) state duty to refrain from interventions 
in the internal affairs of groups and associations by holding that state authorities may 
also have to undertake positive measures to ensure respect for religious freedom.144 In 
the complaint under examination, 97 members of a Jehovah's Witnesses group were 
subjected to serious physical assaults, including beatings with crosses, belts and sticks, 
and having their religious literature confiscated and burned, by a group of Orthodox 
extremists. The applicants claimed that police officers were aware of the attack but 
failed to intervene whilst it was taking place. It took several years for criminal 
proceedings to be brought against the assaulters, notwithstanding that their identities 
were allegedly known. The ECtHR held that the Georgian authorities failed to take the 
necessary measures to respect the right to freedom of religion of the members of the 
attacked minority group.145 However, the Court clarified that those positive duties to 
safeguard religious harmony cannot be extended ‘to diminish the role of a faith or a 
church with which the population of a specific country had historically and culturally 
been associated.’146 It means that the state, in its relations with religions, must not draw 
distinctions and treat differentially for the wrong reasons.  
Furthermore, in a series of unanimous judgments the ECtHR has established that 
the duty of neutrality requires that if a state sets up a framework for conferring legal 
personality on religious groups to which a specific status is linked, all religious groups 
which so wish must have a fair opportunity to apply for this status and the criteria 
established must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In Moscow Branch of the 
Salvation Army147 and in Church of Scientology Moscow,148 the Russian authorities 
refused to register the applicant religious groups, in the first case because national 
courts classified the Salvation Army as a paramilitary group, and in the second because 
the group failed to submit the complete set of documents required for registration. 
Similarly, in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia, the state authorities refused to 
register the applicant religious community to prevent it from breaching the rights of 
others, harming its members, damaging their health and jeopardising the well-being of 
children. 149 The ECtHR found a violation of Article 9 in respect of the members of the 
religious groups in all three cases. The ECtHR stressed that the state’s power to protect 
its institutions and citizens from dangerous associations must be used sparingly, as 
‘exceptions to the rule of freedom of association are to be construed strictly and only 
                                                        
143 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 4 Others v Georgia, Application 
no. 71156/01, 3 May 2007. 
144 In Gldani Congregation the ECtHR for the first time infused a positive state obligation into Article 9 
ECHR. See I. Leigh, ‘New trends in religious liberty and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 
12(3) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 266, 267. 
145 96 Members of the Gldani Congregation, §134. 
146 ibid §132. Also Refah Partisi v Turkey, §91. 
147 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia, Application no. 72881/01, 5 October 2006. 
148 Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia, Application no. 18147/02, 5 April 2007. 
149 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia, Application no. 302/02, 10 June 2010. 
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convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom.’ 150 Any 
interference must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and the notion of necessity 
does not have the flexibility of expressions such as ‘useful’ or ‘desirable.’ 151 
Furthermore, in Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas v Austria, the ECtHR held 
that an unreasonably long waiting time for legal registration of a religious community 
is unjustifiable in cases of groups with long-standing international presence which are 
also established in the country in question. 152  In the instant case, the Austrian 
authorities conferred legal recognition on Jehovah's Witnesses 20 years after the 
original application of the group. Because of that excessive delay the state authorities 
were found in violation of prohibition of religious discrimination, secured under 
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR, because the members of the group 
had been treated disadvantageously in comparison with other religious communities.  
Evans argues that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on cases of religious 
registration is consistent because those cases are less challenging compared to cases 
touching on public morals, 153  since they only involve minorities seeking equal 
treatment to traditional religious groups.154 But I think that an interpretation of the right 
to freedom of religion based on ethical responsibility makes better moral sense of the 
practice of the ECtHR. The principle that the government should not distribute the 
benefits of legal recognition unequally just because the majority considers certain 
people less worthy of concern due to their membership in a religious group is a 
profound dimension of the more general right to equal respect for our personal ethical 
responsibility. As this chapter discussed, the right blocks certain reasons as grounds for 
coercive official action; majoritarian preferences that some people should enjoy less 
because of their religious affiliation are the quintessence of that type of impermissible 
reasons. That interpretation explains why in registration rights cases the ECtHR does 
not engage in any meaningful balancing of interests: the Court refrains from balancing 
not because of some kind of normative confusion, but precisely because letting those 
impermissible interests into the balancing test would be inappropriate. 
 
 
                                                        
150 Salvation Army v Russia, §62. Also Church of Scientology v Russia, §75; Jehovah’s Witnesses v 
Russia, §§170-175. 
151 ibid 
152 Religionsgemeinschaft Der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v Austria, Application no. 40825/98, 31 July 
2008, §98. Also Association Les Temoins de Jehovah v France, Application no. 8916/05, 30 June 2011 
(only in French). 
153 C. Evans, ‘Individual and group religious freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in 
the intellectual architecture’ (2011) 26(1) Journal of Law and Religion 321, 338. 
154 It is noteworthy that the ECtHR has been criticised for offering stronger protection to traditional 
religious groups compared to minorities. See C. Evans, ‘Religious freedom in European Human Rights 
Law: The search for a guiding conception’, in M. W. Janis and C. Evans (eds.) Religion and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 385-401. Also M. Evans, ‘Believing in 
communities, European style’, in N. Ghanea (ed.) The Challenge of Religious Discrimination at the 
Dawn of the New Millennium (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004); P. Danchin, ‘Islam in the secular 
nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 32(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 
663; I. Leigh, ‘Balancing religious autonomy and other human rights under the European Convention’ 
(2012) 1(1) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 109. 
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3.5.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter elaborated on the relationship between the right to freedom of religion and 
the value of equality by defending a particular conception of this value, which I 
described as equal respect for our personal responsibility to make ethical choices 
authentically, and by describing how this value justifies the socio-historical importance 
as well as the legal practice surrounding the right. The chapter also developed a reason-
blocking theory of the right to freedom of religion, as a more compatible with and a 
more convincing account of our equal entitlement to ethical responsibility. Moreover, I 
distinguished that account from interest-based theories of the right to freedom of 
religion and argued that a reason-blocking interpretation is more suitable to explain 
important parts of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, such as cases where the Court 
blocks impermissible reasons for limitations on our rights without, or instead of, 
‘balancing’ between conflicting interests.  
The normative account of the right to freedom of religion that this and the 
previous chapter have been discussing places significant emphasis on equality of 
respect, which it infuses into the core of the right. Given the significance of equality of 
respect, it is important to enrich our normative theory of the scope of the right to 
freedom of religion (and its relationship with other rights) with an account of the 
relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination. 
The next chapter (Chapter Four) will focus on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and will 
discuss certain important doctrinal reasons why we have to carefully examine the 
normative connections between the two rights. After that, Chapter Five will explore 
those normative connections in further detail, and will argue that the notion of equal 
respect that the present chapter has been discussing has specific implications for the 
relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination. 
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4 
 
Freedom from Religious Discrimination in the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 
 
 
Where a substantive Article of the Convention or its Protocols has been relied 
on both on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 and a separate breach 
has been found of the substantive Article, it is not generally necessary for the 
Court to consider the case under Article 14 also, though the position is 
otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in 
question is a fundamental aspect of the case […] In the circumstances of the 
present case the Court considers that the inequality of treatment, of which the 
applicant claimed to be a victim, has been sufficiently taken into account in 
the above assessment that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive 
Convention provision. 
 
Jakóbski v Poland1 
 
 
Once we stop giving preference to a State religion, and accord equal respect 
and protection to all religions and beliefs, all sorts of difficult questions begin 
to arise. 
 
Lady Hale2 
 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
What is the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious 
discrimination? The previous chapters defended a reason-blocking account of the right to 
freedom of religion that interprets it in light of equal respect for our ethical responsibility. 
Does that interpretation have any implications for the relationship between freedom of 
religion and freedom from religious discrimination? Recall the contradictions encountered 
in Chapter Two. It is often argued that general rules that burden the exercise of religion 
not only violate the right to freedom of religion, but also wrongfully discriminate against 
                                                        
1 Jakóbski v Poland, Application no. 18429/06, 7 December 2010. 
2 Baroness Hale of Richmond, ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief’, Annual Human Rights Lecture for the Law 
Society of Ireland, 13 June 2014, at <http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140613.pdf> 2. 
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members of certain groups through subjecting them to disadvantageous treatment on 
grounds of their religion. States may not burden the exercise of religion, but at the same 
time they must not discriminate in favour of any religion. Those are important issues 
(doctrinally and normatively) that a theory of interpretation for the right to religious 
freedom must examine, not least because equality and discrimination are closely 
connected. As Bielefeldt has noted, ‘in practical terms’ equality means non-
discrimination,3 whereas according to Guest conceptions of discrimination ‘as used in 
political, particularly liberal, contexts mirror conceptions of equality.’ 4  There is an 
additional, more practical point. This enquiry can cast light upon the main question that 
national authorities have to answer in cases involving religious discrimination, namely 
under which circumstances general rules or practices inflict indirect (or, under other 
views, direct) discrimination whenever people suffer disadvantageous treatment on 
grounds of their religion. 
This and the next chapter focus on the relationship between freedom of religion and 
freedom from religious discrimination. They take different perspectives though. This 
chapter focuses on doctrinal questions, organises the relevant typologies, and highlights 
just some important issues relating to direct and indirect discrimination. It also tracks the 
implementation of the provisions protecting from religious discrimination through a 
parallel examination of Articles 9 and 14 (read in conjunction with Article 9) of the 
Convention. Through the analysis I will argue that the ECtHR, in its relevant 
jurisprudence, makes no principled distinction in the application of the two relevant 
provisions to the extent that the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom 
from religious discrimination ends up being doctrinally confusing. In order to untangle 
that doctrinal confusion I will argue that a normative enquiry into the moral wrong of 
religious discrimination is essential. This normative discussion will take place in Chapter 
Five. 
 
4.2.  General Features of Discrimination 
 
4.2.1.  Legal protection 
 
The doctrinal bases of prohibition of religious discrimination lie in Article 14 and in 
Protocol 12 of the Convention. This chapter will focus on Article 14, not least because the 
moment I am writing these lines there is only one complaint of religious discrimination 
under Protocol 12,5 which came into force in 2005 and binds only the 18 (out of 47) 
member states of the Council of Europe (which have ratified it). Article 14 provides that 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
                                                        
3 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Misperceptions of freedom of religion or belief’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 33, 51. 
4 S. Guest, ‘Introduction’, in S. Guest and A. Milne (eds.), Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom 
and Justice (Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985) 7. 
5 Savez Crkava “Riječ Života” and Others v. Croatia, Application no. 7798/08, 9 December 2010. The 
moment I am writing these lines only four cases have been decided by the ECtHR under Protocol 12 ECHR. 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.6 
 
Prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms secured in the 
Convention bears three main characteristics. First, the list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination is non-exhaustive.7 Second, cases falling under Article 14 ECHR often 
track a distinction between ‘suspect’ and ‘non-suspect’ grounds of differential treatment. 
At least to some extent, the strictness of judicial scrutiny depends on that distinction.8 
Third, the provision prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination.9 With regard to 
indirect discrimination, the protective scope of Article 14 covers both disparate impact 
discrimination and a (limited10) state duty to accommodate individual claims under certain 
specific circumstances.11 According to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, a difference in 
treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR if there is no 
objective and reasonable justification to support it. More specifically, discrimination is 
inflicted if the difference in treatment does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate 
aim sought to be realised.12 
With regards to religious discrimination, an important clarification has to be added 
here. As already discussed in Chapter Two, the ECtHR has adopted a wide interpretation 
                                                        
6 Article 14, European Convention on Human Rights. 
7  O. De Schutter, The Prohibition of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law (European 
Commission: Directorate-General for Justice, 2011) 14. The same holds for Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR, 
which extends protection from discrimination to the enjoyment of every right introduced by a particular law 
or policy, contrary to Article 14 ECHR which extends protection from discrimination only to the rights 
secured under the Convention. 
8 J. Gerards, ‘The discrimination grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2013) 13(1) Human Rights Law Review 99-124; C. O’Cinneide, ‘Equality: A Constitutional Principle?’ UK 
Constitutional Law Association blog, 14 September 2011, at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/09/14/ 
colm-ocinneide-equality-a-constitutional-principle/>. It has been argued that a hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds features in EU discrimination law. See C. O’Cinneide, ‘The uncertain foundations of contemporary 
anti-discrimination law’ (2011) 11(7) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 7-28, at 18-21. 
Also E. Howard, ‘The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU law’ (2006) 13(4) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 445-470. 
9 J. Gerards,‘The application of Article 14 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights’, in Chopin and 
Niessen (eds.) The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse Europe (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 3; R. Wintemute, ‘Within the ambit: How big is the ‘‘gap’’ in Article 14 
European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Review 366; N. Bamforth, 
M. Malik and C. O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) 233-
340. 
10 What kind of state duties flow from that limited duty of ‘reasonable’ accommodation remains however 
obscure given that in the European literature reasonable accommodation of religious claims has been mainly 
discussed with reference to the employment context; see e.g. M. Gibson, ‘The God “dilution”? Religion, 
discrimination and the case for reasonable accommodation’ (2013) 72(3) Cambridge Law Journal 578-616; 
S. O. Chaib, ‘Religious accommodation in the workplace: Improving the legal reasoning of the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in K. Alidadi, M. Foblets and J. Vrielink (eds.) A Test of Faith? Religious 
Diversity and Accommodation in the European Workplace (Ashgate, 2012) 33-59; K. Alidadi, ‘Reasonable 
accommodation for religion and belief: Adding value to Article 9 ECHR and the EU’s anti-discrimination 
approach in employment?’ (2012) 37(6) European Law Review 693, 702-705; L. Vickers, Religious 
Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Hart Publishing, 2008) 220-225. 
11 C. Ferguson, ‘Running ahead of Strasbourg: Indirect discrimination and Article 14 ECHR’ (2008) 13 
Judicial Review 71-77. 
12 Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany, Application no. 13580/88, 18 July 1994, §24. 
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of the right to freedom of religion that covers ‘freedom to hold or not to hold religious 
beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion.’ 13  I will accept without further 
argument that this wide interpretation of the right to freedom of religion informs the 
content of the right to freedom from religious discrimination as well. 
In European discrimination law it is typically argued that Article 14 ECHR has no 
independent existence because it may be invoked only in conjunction with other 
substantive provisions of the Convention or of its Protocols. 14  Thus, its role is to 
supplement other substantive provisions by fixing the requirement that they should be 
implemented without discrimination.15 Nevertheless, its application is autonomous in the 
sense that it does not presuppose breach of any other right of the Convention. 16  A 
violation of the article may be found even if, considered independently from that clause, 
the substantive right involved is not violated. The only requirement is that the complaint 
about discrimination falls ‘within the ambit’ of one or more other rights secured under the 
Convention.17 Hence, unless an alleged discrimination occurs in the enjoyment or exercise 
of a right protected under the Convention, Article 14 will be inapplicable.18  
That feature of Article 14 has raised concerns about a significant number of 
discrimination cases such as, for instance, those relating to access to employment, which 
could be considered to fall outside the scope of Article 14 because the Convention does 
not secure a right to work.19 Nevertheless, the ECtHR has proved quite generous in its 
interpretation of the ambit of rights, allowing Article 14 to ‘bite’20 even in cases of social 
and economic rights that are not included in the Convention.21 Regarding employment 
discrimination for instance, as Sidabras and Džiautas v Lithuania has established,22 when 
extreme measures prohibiting specific individuals from accessing employment are 
imposed, the Court may find an interference with the right to respect for private life.23 
                                                        
13 Buscarini and Others v San Marino, Application no. 24645/94, 18 February 1999. 
14 E.B. v France, Application no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008, §47; Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application 
no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, §89. Also De Schutter, The Prohibition of Discrimination under European 
Human Rights Law, 33. 
15 See L. Wildhaber, ‘Protection against discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights – 
a second-class guarantee’ (2002) Baltic Yearbook of International Law 5. 
16 Vallianatos v Greece, Application nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013 (Grand Chamber) §72. 
17 See e.g. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, Application nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 
9474/81, 28 May 1985, §71. Also Haas v the Netherlands, Application no. 36983/97, 13 January 2004, §41. 
18 Unless we embrace a broader interpretation of the ‘within the ambit’ criterion in order to include not only 
opportunities but also the grounds on which a decision to deny an opportunity is made; that strategy would 
include every case where, for instance, a job opportunity is refused on grounds of someone’s religion 
regardless of the fact that the Convention does not include a right to work. See Wintemute, ‘Within the 
ambit’, 371. 
19 Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace, 114-116. 
20 O’Connell, ‘Cinderella comes to the ball: Article 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR’, 
215. 
21 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011,) 146-147. 
22 Sidabras and Džiautas, Application nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, 27 July 2004, §48. 
23 Secured under Article 8 of the Convention. Different elements of the right to work, including the right to 
seek employment and protection from unfair dismissal, are protected under Articles 6 and 8 ECHR; see R. 
O’Connell, ‘The Right to Work in the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 2 European Human 
Rights Law Review 176-190. Also V. Mantouvalou, ‘Work and private life: Sidabras and Dziautas v 
Lithuania’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 573-585. 
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The present analysis will focus on wrongful discrimination understood as involving 
disadvantageous treatment (rather than mere difference in treatment) on grounds of some 
particular and protected characteristic that someone bears, or is believed to bear. That 
definition of discrimination is broad, but focusing on disadvantage is an important first 
step to delimit it.24 The problem with an interpretation of discrimination focusing on 
difference in treatment may be elucidated with a famous example. In Brown v Board of 
Education,25  a landmark United States Supreme Court case establishing that separate 
schools for black and white students violate the equality and due process clauses of the 
United States constitution, the problem was not that black students have been treated 
differently from white students. Differential treatment is ‘symmetrical’ in the sense that if 
blacks have been treated differently from whites, then whites must also have been treated 
differently from blacks.26  But if the basis of the wrong of discrimination were mere 
difference, then both blacks and whites would have been victims of discrimination, which 
is of course implausible because it suggests that the policies in question discriminated 
against everyone. That conclusion would also contradict the track record of racial 
segregation in the American south at the time of the judgment. The distinction between 
difference, disadvantage, and harm requires further refinement, which has to be postponed 
until the next chapter. For our present purposes though it suffices to note that 
disadvantageous treatment is not tantamount to harmful treatment. 
 
4.2.2.  Direct discrimination 
 
Although the same terms about discrimination may dress up with different meanings and 
practices in different legal systems, it may be argued that in European human rights law a 
complaint about discrimination should normally fall under either of two broad categories. 
The first is direct discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when the members of a 
socially salient group, understood as a group that is important to the ‘structure of social 
interactions’ of its members across a wide range of social contexts, 27  are treated 
disadvantageously based on one or more protected characteristics (such as gender, race, 
ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation and disability, among others) without an 
objective and reasonable justification.28  In the ECtHR’s terminology there must be a 
‘difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar situations’ that 
is based ‘on an identifiable characteristic.’29 Common to all forms of discrimination is 
that the objective and reasonable justification criterion usually translates in two different 
                                                        
24 The ECtHR often uses differential treatment in its definition of discrimination. Nonetheless, as the next 
chapter will discuss, differential treatment means nothing more than disadvantageous treatment of 
individuals or groups sharing protected characteristics such as religion, sexual orientation, or race. 
25 Oliver Brown et al. v Board of Education of Topeka et al., 347 U.S. 483, 17 May 1954. 
26 A. Altman, ‘Discrimination’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/discrimination>. 
27 Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? (Oxford University Press, 2014) 30-36. 
28 Apart from direct discrimination, a complaint about discrimination could be about indirect discrimination, 
which we will examine in the following section. 
29 Carson and Others v United Kingdom, Application no. 42184/05, 16 March 2010, §61; D.H. and Others v 
the Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, §175; Burden v United Kingdom, 
Application no. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, §60. 
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scenarios: either the difference in treatment does not pursue a legitimate aim, such as, for 
example, protection of public safety or protection of the rights of others, or the difference 
in treatment is disproportionate to the legitimate aim sought (and hence, according to the 
ECtHR’s usual terms, the measure is not necessary in a democratic society). The 
examination of discrimination complaints requires therefore a two-tiered analysis, 
focusing first on the aim pursued, and second on the relationship between the impugned 
difference in treatment (or the lack thereof) and the realisation of that aim.30 
Direct discrimination is often identifiable by its explicitness and intention,31 but it is 
usually its across-the-board exclusionary effects that clearly distinguish it from indirect 
forms of discrimination. More precisely, direct discrimination usually entails that a rule or 
practice expressly or implicitly refers to one group and everyone who is excluded by that 
specific rule belongs to that group, whereas no one of those excluded by that specific rule 
belongs to another group (e.g. a rule reading ‘Women need not apply’ that excludes all 
women and no men is directly discriminatory).32 An example of direct discrimination 
arises in Luczak v Poland.33 A French farmer who lives and farms in Poland has been 
refused access into a social security regime for farmers because he was not Polish. The 
ECtHR held that the applicant was in a comparable situation to Polish farmers as he was a 
permanent resident in Poland and a taxpayer whose contribution actually supported the 
social security regime that he was not entitled to access. According to the Court, given the 
circumstances of the case, the applicant has been subjected to direct discrimination based 
on his ethnic origin. 34  The rule was directly discriminatory as it excluded in effect 
everyone not Polish.35  
Another typical instance of direct discrimination took place in 2002 in a Romanian 
bar. The bartender refused to serve a number of Roma customers pointing a sign reading 
‘We do not serve Roma.’36 The domestic courts found that the complainants suffered 
direct discrimination as the bar’s policy explicitly and intentionally had picked Roma for 
less favourable treatment.37 Similarly, in the European Roma Rights Centre case, the UK 
House of Lords held that the fact that the UK immigration officers at Prague airport 
treated Roma with such caution that their visa applications were 400 times more likely to 
be rejected compared to non-Roma people constituted discrimination. 38  According to 
Lady Hale, instead of succumbing to the danger of stereotyping and assuming that all 
Roma people present false information in their applications, prohibition of discrimination 
requires that ‘each person is treated as an individual and not assumed to be like other 
                                                        
30 R. O’Connell, ‘Cinderella comes to the ball: Article 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR’ 
(2009) 29(2) Legal Studies 211-229. 
31 Altman, ‘Discrimination’. 
32 R. Wintemute, ‘Smug marrieds?’, New Law Journal, 25 October 2013, at <http://newlawjournal.co.uk/ 
nlj/content/smug-marrieds> 22. 
33 Luczak v Poland, Application no. 77782/01, 27 November 2007. 
34 ibid 
35  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European Non-Discrimination Law 
(Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union 2011) 24. 
36 D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell (eds.) Non-Discrimination Law ( Hart Publishing, 2007) 185. 
37 ibid 
38 R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 
AC 1. 
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members of the group.’39 By the same token, Fredman rightly notes that central to the 
legal prohibition of direct discrimination is a ‘recognition’ dimension, that is to address 
‘stigma, stereotyping, and humiliation because of a protected characteristic.’40 
Focusing on the across-the-board exclusionary effects of directly discriminatory 
policies is helpful in cases where direct discrimination is implicit, rather than explicit.41 
For instance, as Altman notes about the pre-Brown segregation period in the American 
south, states used to implement literacy tests in order to exclude African-Americans from 
the franchise and ‘because African-Americans were denied adequate educational 
opportunities and… the tests were applied in a racially-biased manner, virtually all of the 
persons disqualified by the tests were African-Americans, and, in any given jurisdiction, 
the vast majority of African-American adults seeking to vote were disqualified.’ 42 
Arguably the literacy tests that culminated in the exclusion of all African-Americans 
constituted direct racial discrimination, despite the fact that they made no explicit 
reference to race.  
Even when direct discrimination is implicit, it has been argued that it is always 
intentional in the sense that the reason why certain rules are formulated in specific ways is 
to achieve the exclusion of specific groups of people such as, in our previous example, 
African-Americans. 43  However, that argument is disputable given that ‘unconscious’ 
stereotyping and inadvertent discrimination underlie significant areas of our social 
practices without people actually ‘intending’ to exclude others.44 Due to space constraints 
this analysis will not engage in the lively debate about conscious and unconscious 
discrimination. It is noteworthy though that, as Wax has argued, the intentional-
unintentional distinction is quite distinct from the conscious-unconscious distinction.45 
Intentions may well be unconscious when, for instance, someone engages in direct 
discrimination without being aware that he treats other people less favourably based on 
their group membership. Whether or not someone wrongfully disadvantages others on the 
basis of characteristics bearing significant demeaning potential (such as race, gender or 
sexual orientation) is independent of his intentions. Rather, someone may wrongfully 
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discriminate without intending to do so, whereas he may also fail to refrain from 
discrimination despite his intentions. 46  I shall therefore accept that intentional direct 
discrimination can be unconscious and leave a more detailed discussion of the issue aside 
for now. 
 
4.2.3.  Indirect discrimination 
 
Second, an individual or group may suffer indirect discrimination. As Barnard and 
Hepple note, ‘in direct discrimination, similar situations are treated differently; in indirect 
discrimination different situations are treated in the same way but with a significant 
disparate impact on the protected group.’ 47  Under a common definition used by the 
ECtHR, indirect racial or sex discrimination occurs ‘when someone applies unjustifiable 
standards which people of one sex or race find it harder to comply with than people of 
another, to the detriment of someone who is a member of the former sex or race.’48 
According to Altman, indirect discrimination is different to direct discrimination in that 
the purpose of the discriminators is not to disadvantage persons for being members of a 
certain social group.49 Rather, indirect discrimination involves acts or policies that have 
the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging the members of a particular group. 
Defining indirect discrimination on the basis of its disproportionately adverse effects on 
the members of a group and not on the aim of the policy in question is congenial to the 
case law of the ECtHR. For instance, in Shanaghan v United Kingdom,50 a case about lack 
of adequate investigation after an alleged unlawful killing by state agents, the Court held 
that ‘where a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a 
particular group, it is not excluded that this may be considered as discriminatory 
notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group’.51 
Nevertheless, how can we distinguish a policy that has disproportionately adverse 
effects on the members of a group and is indirectly discriminatory from a policy that is 
not? There is probably no certain answer to that question. Analogously to its case law on 
direct discrimination, the ECtHR has held that a policy with disproportionate adverse 
effects may constitute indirect discrimination if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if 
there is no reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the 
(legitimate) aim sought.52 By the same token, the UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) 
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49 Altman, ‘Discrimination’. 
50 Shanaghan v United Kingdom, Application no. 37715/97, 4 May 2001. 
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has held that a violation of prohibition of discrimination53 can result from the effects of a 
rule that is facially neutral or does not intend to discriminate. According to the HRC, 
‘such indirect discrimination can only be said to be based on the grounds enumerated in 
Article 26 of the Covenant if the detrimental effects of a rule or decision exclusively or 
disproportionately affect persons having a particular race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Furthermore, rules or decisions with such an impact do not amount to discrimination if 
they are based on objective and reasonable grounds.’54 All those approaches to indirect 
discrimination have a common characteristic, which is the unjustifiable ‘disproportionate 
disadvantage’ imposed on members of certain socially salient groups.55  
The role and necessity of the ‘disproportionateness condition’ in indirect 
discrimination, given that ‘disproportionateness’ is not necessary to establish direct 
discrimination, have both been debated.56 Moreover, the type of policies that may ground 
wrongful indirect discrimination remains contestable too. For instance, De Schutter has 
argued that indirect discrimination comes in three different forms. First, there are cases 
where facially neutral regulations of practices prove particularly burdensome to the 
members of a certain group without any objective and reasonable justification for that. 
Second, ‘disparate impact’ discrimination includes cases where a general measure affects 
a disproportionately high number of members of a particular category without (again) 
objective and reasonable justification. Third, indirect discrimination may involve cases 
about measures or practices that fail to treat differently specific individuals or groups 
through, most usually, exceptions to their general application. Failure to provide 
accommodation as a form of discrimination is linked to Canadian law; and a number of 
American and European scholars have likewise argued that there is no significant 
difference between failure to provide accommodation and (indirect) discrimination.57 It is 
that third sub-category of indirect discrimination (i.e. failure to accommodate) that people 
with special claims due to their religion or beliefs often put forward in their applications 
to the ECtHR. Indirect discrimination as failure to accommodate is therefore not grounded 
on general measures as such, which may still be perfectly justified, but on the failure to 
show special consideration for the specific situations of those to whom the general 
measure is applied.58 
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Part of discrimination theory has also argued that indirect discrimination confuses 
the wrongfulness of discrimination with its effects on certain social groups. The 
wrongfulness (that is how the critique goes) does not lie in the effects but in the 
unfairness or injustice that generates them. More specifically, focusing on the effects of 
unlawful discrimination can blur the picture as those effects could be brought about by 
other causes as well.59 Whether direct and indirect discrimination are just the two sides of 
the same coin or ‘two subcategories of one and the same concept’60 is a valuable question 
that deserves separate examination; it will partly be revisited in the next chapter. Note that 
this part of the chapter highlights just some issues that will prove useful in the course of 
the analysis. 
 
4.2.4.  Structural discrimination 
 
It is often argued that some of the most egregious and pervasive forms of discrimination 
are structural. Structural discrimination cuts across the distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination, in the sense that there can be both direct and indirect structural 
discrimination. Generally, structural discrimination occurs when social structures 
governing major sectors of life, such as family, property, political power, civic 
responsibility and so on, embed and perpetuate disadvantage against members of certain 
socially salient groups. 61  As Altman notes, although such rules are often directly 
discriminatory, as the intentional product of collective or individual agents, ‘the idea of 
structural discrimination is an effort to capture a wrong distinct from direct 
discrimination.’ 62  That is, the effect of systematically subordinating certain minority 
groups through rules that produce – or, more often, reproduce – unjust and 
disproportionately disadvantageous outcomes for the members of certain salient social 
groups, such as women, homosexuals, or religious minorities. From an empirical 
perspective, the roots of structural discrimination usually lie in the systematic perpetration 
of direct discrimination against certain groups in the past, which has left its historical 
stamp in the form of rules or practices that perpetuate, consciously or unconsciously for 
the current perpetrators,63 exclusion and disadvantage against the same groups.64 Thus, 
although direct discrimination is always part of the story, conceptually most of the times 
structural discrimination is indirect. In Europe, as Timmer has argued, since legally 
mandated overt discrimination has largely disappeared, ‘exposing and contesting the 
patterns that lead to structural discrimination’ is particularly important.65 It requires a 
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critical ‘anti-stereotyping’ approach from the ECtHR that will treat state justifications for 
disadvantageous treatment based on culture or tradition as suspect.66  
It is unclear however why justifications specifically from culture or tradition should 
be treated as suspect. Is structural discrimination always related to culture or tradition? 
The intuition behind the anti-stereotyping approach seems congenial to what I have 
argued thus far. As we discussed in Chapter Three, the political function of our rights is 
reason-blocking in the sense that rights exclude certain reasons, such as the moralistic 
preferences of the majority about which life is best. However, that happens regardless of 
whether those moralistic preferences are dressed up as traditions or culture or something 
else. Moreover, the fact that certain rules produce disproportionately disadvantageous 
effects for the members of certain socially salient groups, such as women or religious 
minorities, does not necessarily mean that structural discrimination is at play. Rather, that 
pattern should also be unjust in itself, viz. it has to violate ‘sound principles of distributive 
justice’, which poses substantive moral questions distinct from the disproportionate 
outcome condition. 67  Perhaps now it starts to become clearer why we need a moral 
account of discrimination in order to further illustrate its connection with equality and the 
right to freedom of religion but, before that, we have to return to our doctrinal 
investigation of the practice of the ECtHR in complaints about discrimination. 
 
4.2.5.  Legal effects of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination 
 
The legal effects of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination are crucial 
for certain legal orders, such as the United Kingdom, where domestic equality legislation 
prescribes that direct discrimination is always unjustifiable, 68  whereas indirect 
discrimination may be justified provided that through treating others disadvantageously 
an agent pursues a legitimate aim and that the disadvantage in question is proportionate to 
the aim sought.69 By contrast, it might be argued that the legal effects of the distinction 
are less critical in the context of the ECHR because both direct and indirect discrimination 
may be justified under Article 14 of the Convention, provided that there is an objective 
and reasonable justification.  
Even so, it is arguably harder to justify a directly discriminatory policy (e.g. ‘no 
women applicants’) compared to an indirectly discriminatory one.70 Moreover, although 
the ECtHR has moved beyond the prohibition of direct discrimination under Article 14 
ECHR, it has been argued that its case law on indirect discrimination remains relatively 
under-developed.71 Even so, the Court has recognised that failure to treat differently may 
constitute discrimination under certain circumstances.72 Nevertheless, it has been argued 
that the Court has been slower to recognise that disproportionate adverse effects on the 
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members of particular socially salient groups might constitute indirect discrimination and 
has remained attached to the notion that wrongful discrimination must be intentional or at 
least sufficiently explicit. The ECtHR has recently made some progress in evidentiary 
issues of discrimination, following developments in the United Nations and the Council of 
Europe. More precisely, it has recognised the difficulties of proving to be a victim of 
discrimination and has therefore agreed to facilitate such proof, at least where the national 
authorities have failed to adequately investigate instances of alleged discrimination.73 
With regard to positive measures aiming to correct inequalities, the EU Racial 
Equality and Employment Equality Directives refer to positive measures in order to 
ensure ‘full equality’ in practice. 74  Such measures prescribe differential treatment on 
grounds of race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, in 
order to remedy past inequalities or to compensate for existing inequalities. They 
substitute a requirement of substantive equality for a requirement of formal equality.75 
The ECtHR, apart from certain remarks regarding the design of the electoral system in 
order to ensure fair representation of all ethnic groups,76 or about the organisation of 
education in order to account for the specific needs of Roma children,77 does not include 
at the moment any cases on the compatibility of positive measures with Article 14. It is 
likely, however, that positive measures are compatible with the Convention provided that 
the difference in treatment is proportionate to the aim sought. An indication is that failure 
to correct inequalities through differential treatment may itself give rise to a breach of 
Article 14 ECHR, as the provision ‘does not prohibit Contracting Parties from treating 
groups differently in order to correct “factual” inequalities between them.’78 By the same 
token, the Preamble to Protocol 12 ECHR establishes that ‘the principle of non-
discrimination does not prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to promote 
full and effective equality, provided that there is an objective and reasonable justification 
for those measures.’79 
The distinction is also important because it elucidates an alleged hierarchy within 
discrimination, according to which direct discrimination ‘trumps’ indirect discrimination 
given that it is capable of causing greater harms.80 This hierarchy practically entails that 
whenever freedom from direct discrimination conflicts with freedom from indirect 
discrimination, prohibition of direct discrimination has to prevail. Recall, for instance, the 
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Ladele case, which was briefly discussed in Chapter Two and involves an applicant 
dismissed from her job as a registrar of births, deaths and marriages because she insisted 
on refusing to be designated as a registrar of same-sex civil partnerships based on her 
religion. 81  A number of scholars have interpreted the case as a conflict between different 
grounds of discrimination, i.e. between religious and sexual orientation discrimination, 
whose resolution hints at an implicitly existing – or emerging – hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds.82 However, another way to examine the case is as a conflict 
between direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (realised through the 
applicant’s refusal to register) and indirect religious discrimination, given that the anti-
discrimination policy in question disadvantages the applicant compared to other non-
religious colleagues. If we examine the case through the direct/indirect discrimination 
hierarchy, then equality legislation should prevail not because sexual orientation trumps 
religion, but because the greater harm of potential direct discrimination trumps the less 
harm of indirect discrimination.83 
 
4.2.6.  A hierarchy of grounds? 
 
Whether disadvantageous treatment will ultimately be justifiable depends heavily on the 
nature of the criterion of difference. On that account, if disadvantageous treatment is 
based on a suspect ground, then ‘very weighty’ reasons will be required to justify the 
difference in treatment. Also, regarding the margin of appreciation that is often granted to 
the respondent states, the ECtHR has held that where a difference in treatment is based on 
a suspect ground, the margin of appreciation ‘is narrow and in such situations the 
principle of proportionality does not merely require that the measure chosen is in general 
suited for realising the aim sought but it must also be shown that it was necessary in the 
circumstances.’84 Thus, in those cases the difference in treatment should be both suitable 
to realise the legitimate aim, and necessary.85 
A systematic typology of the ‘suspect’ and ‘non-suspect’ grounds of differential 
treatment is hindered by the shifting boundary between the two categories both over time 
and according to the subject matter under consideration. More precisely, as De Schutter 
notes, ‘since the 1980s sex and sexual orientation have been treated differently to how 
they were in the 1960s; the view on birth out of wedlock has also changed since the late 
1970s; in the 1990s, nationality lost the appearance of legitimacy it once they may have 
seemed to have; and transsexualism may now be considered a suspect ground’86 after 
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Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom87 and Grant v United Kingdom,88 where the ECtHR 
held that the refusal to recognise the new gender identity of a transsexual amounts to a 
violation of the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, there is little doubt 
that EU law will have an important impact over that evolution. 
The subject matter under consideration also plays a significant role. For instance, in 
areas relating to economic and social policies of the contracting states, the ECtHR allows 
a broad margin of appreciation, and normally finds a violation only where the differences 
in treatment are manifestly unreasonable, as for instance in Carson v United Kingdom89 
and Stec v United Kingdom.90 Those cases illustrate the broad margin of appreciation that 
is left to the states in areas that relate to taxation or macro-economic policies, and the 
willingness of the ECtHR to allow for differential treatment where ‘factual differences’ 
have to be taken into account. Property is another example of a non-suspect protected 
ground that is included in the text of Article 14 ECHR but where the Court usually allows 
a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities as it is related to taxation and social 
security.91 On the contrary, although not mentioned in Article 14 ECHR, birth out of 
wedlock is considered in principle a suspect ground that requires particularly weighty 
reasons to justify differential treatment. 92  All in all, the relatively fluid boundaries 
between suspect and non-suspect grounds of discrimination have led part of the legal 
scholarship to argue for a more coherent approach to anti-discrimination, based on clearly 
delineated variations of the strictness of scrutiny.93 Even so certain grounds of differential 
treatment such as race and ethnic origin,94 sex,95 and sexual orientation96 always require 
particularly strong justifications from the state. 
After a series of ambiguous cases,97 the ECtHR has recently confirmed that religion 
is another suspect ground of differential treatment. In Hoffmann v Austria, the Austrian 
Supreme Court denied parental rights to a mother who was a Jehovah’s Witness, based on 
the assumption that her children would be at risk of becoming social outcasts were they 
educated according to the applicant’s religious convictions. Their well-being could also 
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be endangered because their mother would not consent to blood transfusions. 98  The 
ECtHR found a violation of prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion and 
held that ‘a distinction based essential on a difference in religion alone is not 
acceptable.’99 That expression of strict judicial scrutiny could indicate that religion was a 
suspect ground of discrimination. Ten years later, in Palau-Martinez v France,100 a case 
with almost identical factual background to Hoffmann, the Court’s judgment was much 
more ambiguous though. The ECtHR found a violation of prohibition of religious 
discrimination, but instead of its strict approach in Hoffmann, it held that ‘the Contracting 
States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent 
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment.’101 Applying its 
routine test based on the legitimacy of the reasons for differentiating on the basis of 
religion and on the proportionality between the difference and the legitimate aim sought, 
the ECtHR seems to be placing religion not on the same level as grounds such as race, 
gender and sexual orientation. Nonetheless, more recently, in Vojnity v Hungary,102 the 
Court unanimously and clearly held that religion constitutes a ‘suspect ground’ of 
differential treatment that requires strict scrutiny and no more than a limited margin of 
appreciation for the respondent states. More specifically, after a divorce the applicant’s 
son was placed with his mother and the applicant was granted access rights. Subsequently, 
the domestic courts removed the applicant’s access rights altogether because his religious 
convictions ‘triggered anxiety and fear in the boy and endangered his development’ and 
they made the applicant ‘incapable of bringing up his child.’103  The ECtHR found a 
violation of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion read in conjunction with 
the applicant’s right to private and family life.104 It returned to its judgment in Hoffmann 
and added that  
 
[I]n the light of the importance of the rights enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention 
in guaranteeing the individual’s self-fulfilment, such a treatment will only be 
compatible with the Convention if only very weighty reasons exist. The Court has 
applied a similar approach in the context of differences in treatment on the basis of 
sex… birth status… sexual orientation… and nationality.105 
 
It is noteworthy though that even in cases where disadvantageous treatment is based 
on a suspect ground of discrimination, heightened scrutiny is not necessarily fatal to the 
impugned differentiation. The presumption that no objective and reasonable justification 
will support the difference in treatment remains rebuttable. It would require, however, 
‘very weighty’ reasons. In general terms, the ECtHR has classified as ‘very weighty 
reasons’ those that can come close to simply annulling the special guarantee afforded to 
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groups defined by their sex, their sexuality, their birth, or their nationality.106 For instance, 
the ECtHR has accepted that protection of the family constitutes such a ‘weighty reason’ 
that can justify differential treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples, 
provided that such difference in treatment is necessary for the protection of family.107 
There is a last point – not directly relevant to suspect grounds – that has not been 
addressed so far. Some of the cases that will be discussed later in this chapter involve 
applicants who belong to religious minorities. It might be argued that had those 
individuals been followers of majority groups (religious or non-religious) they would not 
have to incur any cost for their choices. They would not have to choose, for instance, 
between professional and religious commitments, and they would have had their dietary 
preferences accommodated. There is a subtle distinction in discrimination complaints 
between particular laws or policies that pursue impermissible ends (e.g. burdening 
minority religious groups) and laws or policies that employs disproportionate means to 
achieve a permissible end. The distinction, however, will not be further analysed in this 
chapter, not least because the ECtHR uses the same proportionality test both when the 
wrongness of the government’s action lies in the ends and when it lies in the means 
selected. And from a philosophical point of view, as Letsas argues, it is of little practical 
significance whether the action in question is best described as ‘wrongful in its ends 
rather than disproportionate in its means… what matters is that courts carry our this 
investigation as a fundamental part of their task of upholding rights.’108 
 
4.3.  Religious Discrimination Under the ECHR 
 
Turning to religious discrimination in more detail, it is notable that the ECtHR does not 
pay much attention to the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, or to the 
fact that religion is a suspect ground of differential treatment requiring heightened judicial 
scrutiny. It has been suggested that one of the reasons is that some of the relevant cases, 
which will be shortly discussed, are concerned with the recognition of new legal concepts 
‘which may have distracted the Court’s attention from the question of suspectness of the 
ground in question.’109 However, are there any normatively deeper reasons than mere 
distraction? As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, complaints of religious 
discrimination concern the conditions under which general rules inflict wrongful direct or 
indirect discrimination on individuals or groups that, but for their religion, would not have 
to suffer disadvantageous treatment. 110  Complaints of religious discrimination can be 
doctrinally puzzling because they are commonly framed either as complaints under 
Article 9 ECHR, or as more typical discrimination complaints engaging Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 9, or, most often, they take both forms, i.e. in applications 
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combining both Article 9 and Article 14 (read in conjunction with Article 9) 
complaints. 111  The following section will demonstrate that in cases of religious 
discrimination the ECtHR interprets the Convention in a way that amalgamates freedom 
of religion and freedom from religious discrimination by employing Articles 9 and 14 
without a discernible pattern. Moreover, in various cases the ECtHR dilutes the 
discrimination analysis in its examination of the Article 9 complaint, whereas in other 
factually similar cases it does not do so. 
 
4.3.1.  Cases examining Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR 
 
4.3.1.1.  Conscientious objection to military service 
 
In 1988, Iakovos Thlimmenos, a Jehovah’s Witness, came second among sixty candidates 
in public exams for the appointment of twelve chartered accountants in Greece. 
Nevertheless, eight months later, the Executive Board of the Greek Institute of Chartered 
Accountants refused to appoint him on the ground that he had been convicted of 
insubordination for refusing to wear military uniform based on his religious 
convictions.112 Notably, Mr. Thlimmenos had already served his conviction, which was 
four years imprisonment. After unsuccessful proceedings before national courts, the 
applicant complained to the ECtHR that the refusal of the Greek authorities to appoint 
him as a chartered accountant violates his right not to be discriminated in the enjoyment 
of his right to freedom of religion, as secured by Article 14 read in conjunction with 
Article 9 ECHR. 113  The Greek government argued that the law in question was not 
discriminatory since all persons convicted of a serious crime were excluded from the 
profession of chartered accountants, regardless of their religion. Furthermore, the 
legislation pursued a legitimate aim, whereas it was also impossible to make case-by-case 
distinctions between different criminal offences. So even if the law in question constituted 
indirect discrimination on grounds of religion, failure to distinguish between the applicant 
and other persons convicted for a serious crime was justified.114 
The ECtHR emphasised that the applicant’s argument was that he suffered 
discrimination because ‘he was treated like any other person convicted of a serious crime 
although his own conviction resulted from the very exercise of this freedom.’115 Although 
typical cases of discrimination involve instances where states treat differently persons in 
analogous situations without an objective and reasonable justification,116 in Thlimmenos, 
                                                        
111 C. Evans, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 128-181. 
112 Thlimmenos v Greece, §8. At the time, only members of the Greek Institute of Chartered Accountants 
could provide chartered accountants’ services in Greece. 
113 Thlimmenos, §§34-38. The applicant also complained of a violation of his rights under Article 6§1 and 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention. The Court found a violation of Article 6§1 and declared 
inadmissible his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the ground that it had not been submitted 
within the six-month time-limit provided by the Convention. Our present discussion will focus on his claim 
under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. 
114 ibid §37. 
115 ibid §42. 
116 ibid §44. 
Chapter 4 | Freedom from Religious Discrimination in the ECHR 
 114 
the ECtHR held for the first time that this is not the only ‘facet’ of discrimination.117 
Rather, the right not to be discriminated against is also violated ‘when States without an 
objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.’118 Although a state may have legitimate reasons to exclude some 
offenders from the profession of chartered accountant,119 a conviction for refusing on 
religious grounds to wear the military uniform could not be justified by any ‘dishonesty or 
moral turpitude’ that is likely to affect the ability to exercise the particular profession.120 
Furthermore, although the ECtHR did not question the government’s argument that 
persons who do not serve their military duties may have to be punished, the applicant had 
already served a prison sentence for his refusal and further sanctions were therefore 
disproportionate.121 Hence, there was no objective and reasonable justification for not 
treating the applicant differently from other people who have been convicted of a serious 
crime.122 By failing to introduce appropriate exceptions to the general rule, the Greek 
legislation was unanimously found in violation of the right to freedom from religious 
discrimination, secured under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR.123  
The ECtHR affirmed those principles in Lang v Austria,124 Löffelmann v Austria,125 
and Gütl v Austria,126 which assume a similar factual background. The applicants, two 
Jehovah’s Witness deacons127 and one preacher,128 complained that the fact that they were 
not exempt from military service, at the time when members of recognised religious 
groups assuming comparable functions (preachers and deacons) were exempt from 
military or alternative civilian service, amounted to religious discrimination.129 At the 
time, Jehovah’s Witnesses were registered, but not recognised as a religious society in 
Austria.130 The Austrian government denied that membership of a recognised religious 
group was only one of the criteria applying in exemptions from military service. The 
applicants did not fulfill other relevant conditions, since they had not completed a course 
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of theological studies at university or a comparable level of education.131 However, the 
ECtHR found the argument unconvincing, given that domestic courts based their 
judgments on the fact that the applicants have not been members to a recognised religious 
society (and not on the rest of the relevant conditions about religious exemptions from 
compulsory military or civilian service).132 
The question was whether the difference in treatment between the applicants, who 
did not belong to a recognised religious group, and other similarly situated individuals, 
who belonged to recognised religious groups, had been based on an objective and 
reasonable justification.133 The ECtHR held that given the importance of the privileges 
enjoyed by recognised religious communities under Austrian law,134 the state duty to 
remain neutral under Article 9 should be interpreted to include a further duty to establish a 
fair and non-discriminatory framework for conferring legal personality. 135  In Lang, 
Löffelmann, and Gütl, the ECtHR connected the refusal to grant exemptions from military 
service with previous cases that denounced the arbitrary criteria applying to registration of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria. 136  It was finally held that the applicants have been 
unjustifiably discriminated on grounds of religion because of the discriminatory criteria 
applying to the legal recognition of their religious communities.137 
It is noteworthy that the ECtHR has distinguished Lang, Löffelmann, and Gütl from 
Koppi v Austria, 138  another case on exemptions from military service. The main 
difference was that the applicant in Koppi was member of a religious community which 
has been registered but had not yet applied for recognition as a religious society under 
Austrian law. 139  The ECtHR clarified that differences in treatment between religious 
groups, which may result in different legal status and privileges, are compatible with 
prohibition of religious discrimination provided that all religious groups have had a fair 
opportunity to obtain legal recognition and that the relevant criteria apply in a non-
discriminatory manner.140 In Koppi, since the religious community of the applicant was 
registered but had not applied for legal recognition, the ECtHR unanimously held that the 
applicant has not been in an analogous situation to members of recognised religious 
societies.141 
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4.3.1.2.  Slaughterhouses 
 
In Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France,142 the applicant association alleged a violation of 
Article 9 ECHR because the French authorities did not grant it permission to launch its 
own slaughterhouses to perform ritual slaughter according to the ultra-orthodox religious 
prescriptions of its members.143 The organisation also complained about a violation of 
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 because only the Jewish Consistorial 
Association of Paris (‘ACIP’), to which the large majority of Jews in France belong, had 
received the approval in question.144 The members of the organisation, since they were 
refused state approval to launch their own slaughterhouses, had to either slaughter 
illegally or to import supplies of ‘glatt’ meat from Belgium.145 
The majority of the ECtHR agreed that having access to meat from animals 
slaughtered in accordance with religious prescriptions is an essential aspect of the Jewish 
tradition and falls within the protective scope of Article 9 ECHR.146 Nonetheless, the 
majority found no violation of the right to freedom of religion. The French system of 
authorisations for ritual slaughtering pursued the legitimate interest of safeguarding public 
health. Moreover, the limitation was not disproportionate as the applicant association 
could obtain ‘glatt’ meat from Belgium147 or, alternatively, they could reach an agreement 
with the ACIP under which the applicant organisation could perform ritual slaughter 
under the approval already granted to the ACIP.148  With regard to the complaint of 
religious discrimination, given that the limitation had a limited effect on the association’s 
freedom of religious manifestation, the difference in treatment found limited in scope.149 
By contrast, the dissenting opinion applied stricter scrutiny – in accordance with the 
earlier discussed principle that religion is a ‘suspect’ ground of differential treatment – 
requiring very weighty reasons to justify the difference in treatment between the two 
Jewish associations. The dissenting judges held that it is not necessary to ascertain 
whether the application for approval made by the applicant constitutes a form of religious 
manifestation.150 Granting permission to one religious body does not ‘absolve the State 
authorities from the obligation to give careful consideration to any later application made 
by other religious bodies professing the same religion.’ 151  This is a case involving 
disagreement in a religious community about what kind of meat could qualify as ‘glatt’ 
according to the orthodox Jewish tradition. In cases of tension and disagreement the role 
of public authorities is not to ‘eliminate pluralism’,152 but to take all necessary measures 
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to ensure toleration between different groups.153 According to the dissenting opinion, this 
is why it would be ‘inappropriate’ to push the applicant organisation to reach an 
agreement with the much larger ACIP, which could not act as an ‘arbiter’ on the question 
of what qualifies as ‘glatt’ meat.154 More importantly, the possibility of having access to 
‘glatt’ meat by other means is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the scope of the act 
or omission on the right to freedom of religion.155 Rather, according to the dissenting 
opinion, the main problem in Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek is the discrimination of which 
the applicant association complained. The applicant association was in an analogous156 
position to the already exempted ACIP and there was no objective and reasonable 
justification for treating them differently. 157  The argument of the majority that the 
interference was of limited effect is irrelevant, as it is not for the Court to substitute its 
assessment of the seriousness of the interference for that of the persons concerned, 
because ‘the essential object of Article 9 of the Convention is to protect individuals’ most 
private convictions.’158 All in all, as the dissenting judges put it 
 
[w]ithholding approval from the applicant association, while granting such 
approval to the ACIP and thereby conferring on the latter the exclusive right to 
authorise ritual slaughterers, amounted to a failure to secure religious pluralism or 
to ensure a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the mean employed 
and the aim to be achieved.159 
 
In light of those considerations, the dissenting opinion found that the difference in 
treatment was in violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. 
 
4.3.1.3.  Reasonable accommodation of religion in employment 
 
Cases involving claims for reasonable accommodation of religion in employment are 
well-documented instances of religious discrimination. They usually involve general rules 
or practices that burden individual forms of manifestation of religion or belief, and 
similarly to the cases discussed above the discussion again revolves around the perennial 
question of whether the unavailability of exemptions constitutes indirect discrimination 
on grounds of religion. Chapter Two briefly touched on Ladele v United Kingdom, which 
is factually similar to McFarlane v United Kingdom. Ms. Ladele was Registrar of births, 
deaths and marriages in London and a devout Christian. She started her employment with 
the local public authority at a time when no legal provision for same-sex civil partnerships 
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existed. 160  Due to her refusal to register same-sex partnerships, she had to face 
disciplinary action and ultimately lose her job.161 Her orthodox Christian views regarded 
marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and precluded her participation in the 
creation of a same-sex institution equivalent to marriage. 162  Before the ECtHR she 
complained under Article 14 ECHR read in conjunction with Article 9 that she had been 
discriminated against on grounds of her religion. More specifically, she claimed that the 
failure of the local authority to treat her differently from staff that did not have 
conscientious objections to registering civil partnerships constituted (wrongful) indirect 
discrimination on grounds of her religion.163  
The ECtHR agreed that the applicant’s refusal to provide the services in question 
was directly motivated by her Christian beliefs and used as a relevant comparator164 a 
registrar with no religious objection to same-sex unions in order to determine whether the 
applicant has suffered discriminated on grounds of her religion. 165  According to the 
majority, the refusal of the local authority to make an exception for the applicant 
amounted to indirect discrimination against her,166 since the general requirement that all 
registrars would also register civil partnerships had a particularly detrimental effect on 
Ms. Ladele.167 However, the policy of the local authority pursued the legitimate goal of 
non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which the ECtHR considers very 
important.168  Therefore, by a majority of five votes to two, the Court dismissed the 
applicant’s complaint about discrimination compared to registrars with no religious 
objections to same-sex unions. The ECtHR reached the same conclusion, albeit 
unanimously, for similar reasons in Macfarlane,169 a case arising from a complaint of a 
Christian counselor who also argued that his employer’s insistence that he provide 
relationship and sexual therapy to same-sex couples subjected him to unlawful religious 
discrimination.170 All in all, in both Ladele and McFarlane it has been clear that the 
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principle of equal treatment has played a central role to the reasoning of the court in 
justifying the restrictions applied.171 
The results in those cases have been interpreted to denote that the principle of equal 
treatment, at least as exemplified in anti-discrimination laws, may sketch the scope of the 
right to hold religious beliefs and live according to them.172 For instance, judgments on 
accommodation of religion in employment have been connected with broader principles 
of fairness and it has been argued that the role of the courts in diverse societies should not 
be to stand guard over public morality, but to ensure that the majorities will not impose 
their opinions ‘on those who, for whatever reason, comprise a small, weak, unpopular or 
voiceless minority’. 173  I think that the examination of whether particular cases of 
disadvantageous treatment constitute wrongful discrimination has to track the moral 
wrong underlying religious discrimination and not ‘weigh’ equality on grounds of religion 
against other equality claims, such as equality on grounds of sexual orientation, as if those 
different ‘equalities’ are antagonistic. Nevertheless, a moral analysis of discrimination 
deserves separate discussion, which will be take place in Chapter Four. For now note that 
in cases on accommodation of religion in employment, such as Ladele and MacFarlane, 
the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination seems to play limited role in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The Court applies the same tri-partite test, i.e. legality, 
legitimacy and proportionality, in the examination of all complaints about religious 
discrimination, regardless of whether they involve direct or indirect discrimination.  
 
4.3.2.  Cases with no separate examination of complaints under Article 14 ECHR 
 
It would be interesting now to turn to a significant number of cases where either the 
applicants complained about a violation of their right to freedom of religion without 
submitting a separate complaint under Article 14 (read in conjunction with Article 9) or 
the ECtHR held that the discrimination complaint has been sufficiently addressed under 
its assessment of individual complaints submitted under Article 9 ECHR.174 The next 
pages will demonstrate that skipping an analysis under Article 14 has not barred the 
ECtHR from following a methodologically similar approach to the more mainstream anti-
discrimination complaints thus far discussed, and from ultimately reaching important 
judgments on religious discrimination solely through an interpretation of the principles 
underlying the right to freedom of religion. 
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4.3.2.1.  Conscientious objection to military service 
 
Bayatyan v Armenia involved the application of a Jehovah’s Witness, who was convicted 
by the Armenian courts for refusing to comply with military duties due to his religious 
convictions.175 The applicant was willing to perform alternative civilian service, but no 
such option was available at the time. Before the ECtHR he complained of a violation of 
his right to freedom of religion. Notably his application was based on the argument that 
the right to freedom of religion should be interpreted to include a right to conscientious 
objection to military service176 without including an additional complaint about religious 
discrimination. On that account, Bayatyan should be distinguished from Thlimmenos, 
whose complaint was legally based on the right to freedom from discrimination. 177 
Notwithstanding their different legal bases, however, both cases involve essentially the 
same question, viz. whether general rules that disadvantage individuals who refuse to 
comply with their military obligations on grounds of religion are compatible with equal 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. 
The majority of the Grand Chamber held that although Article 9 ECHR does not 
expressly protect a right to conscientious objection,178 opposition to military service when 
motivated by deeply held religious beliefs falls within the protective scope of the right.179 
Moreover, there was no doubt that the applicant’s objection to military service was 
motivated by his genuinely held religious beliefs, which conflicted with the obligation to 
join military service. As the majority held 
 
[I]n this sense, and contrary to the Government’s claim, the applicant’s situation 
must be distinguished from a situation that concerns an obligation which has not 
specific conscientious implications in itself, such as a general tax obligation.180 
 
It is notable that drawing distinctions between laws that inevitably share burdens among 
all life plans, and laws that ‘negligibly or maliciously’ impose burdens only on members 
of particular religious groups resembles to the typical judicial methodology of exposing 
wrongful discrimination,181 which the majority of the ECtHR, very naturally, integrated 
into the right to freedom of religion under Article 9. Again, an investigation of the reasons 
for that requires deeper examination of the wrong of religious discrimination and the 
moral relationship between the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom from 
religious discrimination. This investigation has to be postponed until the next chapter. 
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Furthermore, since no alternative civilian service was available at the time, the 
applicant had no choice but refuse to comply with his military duties in order to act in 
accordance with his religion. However, according to the Grand Chamber, ‘such a system 
failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of society as a whole and those of the 
applicant’,182 which is necessary in a democratic society.183 The applicant was prepared to 
share the relevant social burdens equally to his compatriots by joining alternative civilian 
service. 184  The Grand Chamber held that respect for ‘pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness’185 requires that the majority does not abuse its dominant position186 and 
that it provides opportunities to religious minorities to serve society in accordance to their 
conscience. Such opportunities, far from creating ‘unjust inequalities or discrimination’, 
could ensure ‘cohesive and stable pluralism and promote religious harmony and tolerance 
in society.’187 
The Bayatyan case is important not least because the ECtHR infused an analysis of 
the importance of fair distribution of burdens into its interpretation of the moral principles 
underlying the right to freedom of religion. On that account, Bayatyan and Thlimmenos 
seem to be normatively related given that similar equality considerations (and 
methodologies) proved crucial in the judgments of the ECtHR, despite the different legal 
bases of the two complaints. Bayatyan is therefore an important indication that the 
relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination may 
be deeper than often assumed, in the sense that the right to freedom of religion requires, 
by itself, treatment as equals in the distribution of burdens and benefits regardless of 
religion or belief. 
 
4.3.2.2.  Reasonable accommodation of religion in employment 
 
In June 2005, Francesco Sessa, a Jewish lawyer in Naples, appeared before court in his 
capacity as representative of one of the two complainants in criminal proceedings against 
several banks. The investigating judge invited the parties to choose between two dates for 
the adjourned hearing, but both dates coincided with the official Jewish religious holidays 
of Yom Kippur and Sukkot. Mr. Sessa complained that he would be unable to attend the 
adjourned hearing because of his religious duties, but the judge rejected his application 
for an adjournment. The Italian courts dismissed Sessa’s subsequent appeals noting that 
the judge who rejected the adjournment application had no intention to offend the dignity 
or freedom of religion of the applicant.  
Before the ECtHR, Mr. Sessa alleged that the refusal of the judicial authority to 
adjourn the hearing amounted to an unjustifiable limitation on his right to freedom to 
manifest his religion under Article 9 ECHR188 and his right to freedom from religious 
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discrimination under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9.189 He also argued that 
the request for an adjournment was filed four months in advance, leaving ample time to 
the judicial authorities to re-organise the timetable of hearings without adversely affecting 
the proceedings or the rights of other litigants. By contrast, the Italian government argued 
that there was no interference with the applicant’s right to manifest his religion, as he had 
not been prevented from attending Jewish religious holidays. Even if there has been an 
interference with his right, it was justified on the rights of others to proper administration 
of justice, which had to take precedence in the circumstances of the case. 
By a tight majority of four to three, the ECtHR found no violation of Article 9. 
More specifically, the majority was not convinced that ‘setting the case down for hearing 
on a date which coincided with a Jewish holiday and refusing to adjourn it to a later date 
amounted to a restriction of the applicant’s right to practice his religion freely.’190 The 
applicant was not under pressure to change his religious beliefs or to refrain from 
manifesting his religion.191 Rather, in certain cases ‘the specific contractual obligations 
between the persons concerned and their respective employers’ may justify restrictive 
measures.192 Even if there was interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9, the 
majority held that the interference would be proportionate to the legitimate aim sought, 
viz. the rights of others to proper administration of justice. Finally, the majority also 
dismissed the complaint about religious discrimination because the applicant failed to 
demonstrate that he was subjected to differential treatment compared to other similarly 
situated individuals.193 
In their dissenting opinion, Judges Tulkens, Popović and Keller held that the refusal 
to adjourn the hearing violated Article 9 ECHR. The dissenting opinion held that refusal 
to adjourn for a different date was disproportionate because when various possible means 
to achieve a legitimate aim are available the state authorities should pick those that are 
least restrictive of individual rights. As the dissenting judges put it 
 
[I]n the present case we believe that the conditions were met for attempting to reach 
a reasonable accommodation of the situation, that is to say, one that did not impose 
a disproportionate burden on the judicial authorities. By dint of a few concessions, 
this would have made it possible to avoid interfering with the applicant’s religious 
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freedom without compromising the achievement of the clearly legitimate aim of 
ensuring the proper administration of justice194 (emphasis on the original) 
 
It is notable that the dissenting judges grounded the state duty to take steps towards 
reasonable accommodation of religion on Article 9, rather than on the applicant’s 
complaint under Article 14 ECHR.195 Recall that failure to try reasonable accommodation 
is a paradigmatic case of indirect discrimination, which the dissenting opinion read into 
the right to freedom of religion under Article 9. 
Moreover, the dissenting judges highlighted that the applicant notified the 
authorities well in advance so as to allow them enough time to re-organise the timetable 
of the hearings and ensure that the rights of others were respected. To that end, the 
dissenting opinion distinguished the case from S.H. and H.V. v Austria,196 a case with 
similar facts to Sessa. The applicants in S.H. and H.V. informed the judicial authorities 
that the hearing of their case coincided with Jewish holidays only some days in advance 
of the scheduled hearing. In the circumstances of the case, as the EComHR held, the 
complexity of re-arranging a hearing entailed that the refusal to adjourn was proportionate 
to the legitimate aim of securing proper administration of justice. But, as it became clear 
from the Commission’s reasoning in S.H. and H.V., had the applicants duly informed the 
court that their scheduled hearing coincided with an important Jewish holiday, the 
Austrian court would have had to adjourn it. Furthermore, the dissenting judges in Sessa 
held that the Italian government failed to demonstrate that granting a potential 
adjournment would have caused such disruption to proper administration of justice that no 
it was possible. Interestingly, the dissenting judges referred to that argument as the public-
service disturbance test.197 Although the ground for the refusal to adjourn was legitimate 
‘in the absence of any further explanation, appears in this case to be more in the nature of 
an excuse.’198 The adjournment might have caused some administrative inconvenience but 
given the facts before the ECtHR (duly notice and non-urgent case) the dissenting opinion 
found such inconvenience minimal and a small price to be paid ‘in order to ensure respect 
for freedom of religion in a multicultural society.’199 
There is an additional point to be added in connection with the distinction between 
interest-based and reason-blocking theories of rights discussed in Chapter Three. The 
ECtHR has examined the individual complaints in Bayatyan and Sessa, among other 
cases, as questions concerning the allocation of burdens in a liberal democracy. The 
examination of the Court focused on the reasons behind the limitations in question and 
not on whether the interests underlying different instantiations of the right to freedom of 
religion were strong enough in the circumstances to outweigh other legitimate pro tanto 
collective interests, such as public order or the proper administration of justice. More 
specifically, the Court examined how others have been treated in comparable, actual or 
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hypothetical, cases such as the majority Jewish community in France in Cha’are Shalom, 
and other requests for adjournment through the juxtaposition of Sessa and S.H. and H.V. 
When disadvantageous treatment becomes established, then the Court closely investigates 
the reasons behind the disadvantage in question. I think that, again, a reason-blocking 
account of the right to freedom of religion clearly captures that approach. For a reason-
blocking interpretation explains that an enquiry about whether the distribution of burdens 
has been fair is shaped, and required, by more abstract moral principles, such as equal 
respect for ethical responsibility. That is, that inquiry must take place regardless of 
whether or not the applicant has submitted an additional complaint under the Article 14 
ECHR. For under a reason-blocking account of the right, all the applicants had a right to 
was an egalitarian scheme of religious freedom that excludes certain kinds of reason as 
motivations for collective action, not to any specific object of that scheme. An 
interpretation of a government’s overall behaviour seeks to unveil exactly those 
impermissible kinds of reason, which might have corrupted otherwise legitimate 
majoritarian arguments, such as those concerning public holidays or those about catering 
in custodial institutions. 
 
4.3.2.3.  Accommodation of religion in the provision of services 
 
One of the first ECHR cases involving the argument that lack of accommodation of 
religion violates the right to freedom of religion is Jakóbski v Poland. Mr. Jakóbski, a 
Buddhist detainee in a Polish prison, complained to the ECtHR about a violation of his 
right to freedom of religion due to the fact that the prison authorities refused to provide 
him with vegetarian meals in accordance to his religious dietary rules.200 The ECtHR held 
that although the freedom of religious manifestation does not protect every act motivated 
or inspired by religion or belief, observing dietary rules constitutes a direct expression of 
beliefs in practice. 201  Refusal to provide meat-free meals amounted therefore to an 
interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion. Interestingly, the ECtHR stated that 
‘the circumstances of the applicant’s case and in particular the nature of his complaint are 
more appropriately examined from the standpoint of the respondent State’s positive 
obligations.’202 On that account, the Court analysed the case through the lens of a positive 
duty on the state to take ‘reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s 
rights under paragraph 1 of Article 9 or in terms of an interference by a public authority to 
be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles are broadly 
similar.’203 More specifically, in both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance 
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole. 
In the context of the case, the ECtHR noted that while a decision to accommodate 
one prisoner may have financial implications for the custodial institution, the Court 
should still find out whether the balance between the interests of the institution and the 
interests of the applicant had been struck in a fair way. In the instant case, the applicant’s 
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religion required a simple meat-free diet without any special products. Thus, the ECtHR 
was not convinced that his request would have any serious consequences for the prison. 
The Polish authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the prison 
authorities and those of the applicant and therefore Article 9 ECHR was violated. 
The similarities between the reasoning of the ECtHR in Jakóbski and the public-
service disturbance test of the dissenting opinion in Sessa are striking. Both held that 
‘minimal’ administrative inconvenience is not a sufficient reason to curtail the right to 
freedom of religious manifestation, even if the grounds for the inconvenience are totally 
legitimate (i.e. proper administration of justice in Sessa, smooth operation of custodial 
institutions in Jakóbski).204 Moreover, the ECtHR has offered some further insights on the 
meaning of ‘minimal’ administrative inconvenience in Gatis Kovalkovs v Latvia.205 The 
applicant in Gatis Kovalkovs, a follower of the Hare Krishna movement, submitted an 
application to the ECtHR complaining among others that his right to freedom of religion 
was violated because the Latvian prison authorities prevented him from reading religious 
literature and from undisturbed meditation, whereas they also took away his incense sticks 
from his cell.206 The ECtHR held that the degree of interference with the right to freedom 
of religious manifestation was proportionate to the legitimate aim sought because the 
applicant had been offered access to alternative premises for performing religious rituals 
but had the offer turned down.207 Moreover, some inconvenience in enjoying religious 
freedom is ‘almost inescapable in prisons’.208 For instance, burning incense sticks creates 
a powerful odour that is disturbing for other prisoners.209 All in all, the limitations under 
scrutiny were found proportionate and therefore not in violation of Article 9. 
Turning back to Jakóbski, the applicant also complained about discrimination on 
grounds of religion, given that other religious groups in prison had their special dietary 
requirements accommodated. But the Court, similarly to Sessa, found that it was not 
necessary to examine separately the discrimination complaint holding that  
 
[W]here a substantive Article of the Convention or its Protocols has been relied on 
both on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 and a separate breach has been 
found of the substantive Article, it is not generally necessary for the Court to 
consider the case under Article 14 also, though the position is otherwise if a clear 
inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental 
aspect of the case […]. In the circumstances of the present case the Court considers 
that the inequality of treatment, of which the applicant claimed to be a victim, has 
been sufficiently taken into account in the above assessment that led to the finding 
of a violation of a substantive Convention provision.210 (emphasis added) 
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Cases such as Jakóbski, where the Court finds it unnecessary to engage into an 
analysis falling under Article 14 of the Convention because parts of an anti-discrimination 
analysis have already taken place in the examination under Article 9, along with cases 
where the ECtHR uses Articles 9 and 14 interchangeably and without a particular pattern, 
such as Thlimmenos and Bayatyan (both on conscientious objection to military service) 
and Ladele and Sessa (both on reasonable accommodation of religion in employment) 
show that there is a deeper connection between freedom of religion and freedom of 
religious discrimination. The two provisions seem to involve similar questions, which is 
further highlighted by the fact that the methodology followed by the ECtHR is similar in 
its examination of individual complaints under Article 9 and individual complaints under 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. But do both rights protect us from the 
same moral wrong? If yes, what does this mean about the right to freedom from religious 
discrimination? Is there anything morally distinctive about it? If not, why individual 
complaints about violations of the right to freedom of religion seem interlaced with 
complaints about violations of the right to freedom from religious discrimination? Is the 
interchangeable use of those provisions simply a symptom of an analytical confusion on 
behalf of the ECtHR? If not, then why does it happen? Those questions are important 
because obscurities in the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from 
religious discrimination add fuel to arguments that equate all limitations on freedom of 
religious manifestation, such as those arising from refusal to grant exemptions from 
general laws on religious grounds, with religious discrimination. Those arguments are 
challenging on a strategic level too, since they cultivate the impression that freedom of 
religion complaints may be framed either as complaints under the right to freedom of 
religion or as complaints under freedom from religious discrimination, with the latter 
solution being considered more promising to secure accommodation.211 
 
4.4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlighted a doctrinal confusion regarding the relationship between the right 
to freedom of religion and the right to freedom from religious discrimination under the 
ECHR. The chapter highlighted that in various similar cases raising questions of religious 
freedom and accommodation, such as conscientious objection to military service, 
accommodation of religion in employment and accommodation of religion in the 
provision of services, the ECtHR employs Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention 
interchangeably and without a consistent pattern. Moreover, the jurisprudence of the 
Court seems to be drawing no meaningful distinctions between direct and indirect forms 
of discrimination in cases involving complaints about religious discrimination. As a 
result, both the methodological commonalities and the outcomes of the cases discussed 
show signs of a potentially deeper relationship between the rights to freedom of religion 
and freedom from discrimination. It is important to investigate that potentially deeper 
relationship further, not least because this thesis has already suggested an interpretation of 
freedom of religion that gives prominence to equality. The next chapter will engage in a 
                                                        
211 See e.g. Evans, Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 168-211. 
Chapter 4 | Freedom from Religious Discrimination in the ECHR 
 127 
more thorough investigation of the normative relationship between freedom of religion 
and freedom from religious discrimination. 
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5 
 
Two Birds with One Stone: The Relationship Between Freedom of 
Religion and Freedom from Religious Discrimination Under the 
ECHR 
 
 
[T]he authorities must use all available means to combat racism and racist 
violence, thereby reinforcing democracy's vision of a society in which 
diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of its enrichment. 
 
Nachova v Bulgaria1 
 
 
A good hostess needs good imagination. 
 
Martha Nussbaum2 
 
 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
What is the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom from religious 
discrimination? When do limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief 
constitute discrimination against individuals on grounds of conscience? Or else, when do 
those limitations wrongfully disadvantage individuals in the particular sense that grounds 
unjustifiable forms of discrimination? Those questions are intertwined with pressing 
issues of accommodation of religious beliefs in liberal multicultural democracies and have 
proved challenging for European human rights law. One of the reasons is that, as Chapter 
Two and Chapter Four discussed, the ECtHR is experiencing a surge in individual 
complaints about lack of accommodation, which are legally based both on the right to 
freedom of religion and on the right to freedom from religious discrimination.3 So far the 
analysis has already suggested that the dual legal basis of those complaints emanates from 
the idea that failure to accommodate individual conscience not only limits the applicants’ 
right to freedom of religion or belief, but also betrays state failure to treat them with equal 
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respect to other citizens, who find their spiritual commitments more easily (or more likely 
to be) accommodated.  
Chapter Four emphasised that, on a doctrinal level, the ECtHR has dealt with such 
cases through employing Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention (read in conjunction with 
Article 9) interchangeably and without a consistent pattern. It is noteworthy that the 
ensuing uncertainty has been repeatedly criticised, among others, in the latest report of the 
UK Equality and Human Rights Commission on freedom of religion and religious 
discrimination, which stresses the ‘widespread confusion’ over which laws protect 
religious freedom in the UK.4 The fusion of freedom of religion and equal treatment is 
fueled by an enduring confusion over crucial doctrinal questions. But it raises important 
normative questions as well. 
Seeking to make sense of that relationship, a rapidly emerging literature – both on 
European human rights and on UK equality law5 – explores the increasing role of equality 
norms in the judicial examination of complaints under the right to freedom of religion or 
belief. Some scholars argue that framing freedom of religion claims as equality claims 
promises better chances of success before the courts.6 For instance, Wintemute notes that 
the ‘very limited success’ of a ‘liberty’ approach based on Article 9 ECHR is a good 
reason to consider an alternative ‘equality approach’, which is based on indirect 
discrimination and engages Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. 7  The 
assumption is that theoretically and practically more robust anti-discrimination norms can 
lead to stronger protection of the right to freedom of religion for majority and minority 
groups alike.8 Other scholars disagree. Leigh and Hambler argue, for instance, that an 
approach based on freedom of conscience, rather than on freedom from discrimination, 
can offer more robust protection to believers. 9  In cases such as Ladele v United 
Kingdom,10 involving the complaint of a religious registrar who eventually lost her job 
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because of her refusal to register same-sex civil partnerships, an approach based on liberty 
of conscience can also fit the principle that public bodies should not be allowed to ‘pick 
and choose’ which ‘human rights they prefer by prioritising one stream of equality law 
(sexual orientation) over another (religion or belief) rather than to hold the two in 
balance.’11 
As Chapter Two discussed, at the moment both those approaches are influential in 
European human rights law as well as in legal theory12 and law and religion.13 Their 
shared premise is an implicit assumption, namely that the relationship between a ‘liberty’ 
approach (grounded on the right to freedom of religion) and an ‘equality’ approach 
(grounded on the right to freedom from discrimination) is antagonistic, and that courts 
should only pick one out of the two. This Chapter unravels and challenges that prevalent 
assumption, and develops a new theoretical approach to freedom of religion and 
discrimination under the ECHR. I will pursue two separate yet interwoven arguments. 
First, the seeming confusion about the relationship between freedom of religion and 
freedom from religious discrimination can be unraveled through an in-depth analysis of 
the moral wrongfulness of religious discrimination. I argue that discrimination and 
disadvantage may be used in descriptive and moralised senses, and that distinguishing 
between the two has significant theoretical and practical implications for a substantive 
theory of religious discrimination. The aim of this Chapter is not to articulate or defend a 
general theory of justification of discrimination law, but to track the most convincing 
normative justification for laws protecting against religious discrimination. Second, the 
rights to freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination share their 
normative foundations in the exclusion of certain reasons, such as prejudice, as grounds 
for coercive prohibitions or disadvantageous treatment. I argue that an account unifying 
the two rights can explain morally important dimensions of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in cases involving complaints about lack of accommodation of religious beliefs. It 
does so more successfully than arguments insisting that certain individual interests, 
protected as rights or as grounds of discrimination, are simply to be privileged over 
others. 
 
5.2.  Discrimination and Arbitrariness 
 
Discrimination is a morally laden term. In its prevailing sense in our public discourse and 
litigation, to say that a person has been discriminated against is tantamount to saying that 
she has been morally wronged. But is discrimination always morally wrong? If not, when 
is it wrong, and why? Consider a first, semantic attempt to answer the question. 
Discrimination is wrongful, it has been argued, only when it is accompanied by the word 
‘against’, as in discrimination against women or discrimination against homosexuals. By 
contrast, as Lippert-Rasmussen argues, discrimination between people, for instance 
through designating different shower rooms for men and women, raises no interesting 
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moral questions.14 But that semantic distinction overlooks an important moral dimension. 
The policy of separate shower rooms does not constitute wrongful discrimination on 
grounds of sex, not because it discriminates between sexes rather than against, but 
because it does not depend on the reasons for action that ground the wrong in 
discrimination. Consider another example. Could we tell the difference between an 
employer who discriminates between men and women in his hiring procedure, from one 
who discriminates against women or against men? There is no clear difference between 
the two expressions – none that can be semantically explained. Depending on the 
circumstances of the case, in both instances we may argue that the employer treats people 
disadvantageously on grounds of sex and that it is morally wrong to pick one’s employees 
on grounds of sex. But we use moral arguments, rather than semantics, to reach that 
conclusion. 
Despite the fact that the social meaning of discrimination is laden with negative 
connotations, societies routinely discriminate. Sometimes this may be done for public 
safety reasons. For instance, in most European states individuals under the age of 17 
cannot obtain a driving licence. However, it would be far-reaching to claim that teenagers 
under 17 therefore suffer from age discrimination. In this case it is widely shared that 
public safety reasons are enough to justify their exclusion. Lack of adequate resources is 
another often employed basis to justify certain forms of discrimination. The Faculty of 
Laws at University College London does not admit every applicant to its graduate 
programmes mainly because it would be impossible to maintain any sense of rigorous 
academic quality if the student body consisted of hundreds (if not thousands) of people.15 
The admissions officers must discriminate therefore between applicants on grounds of 
their academic credentials and they typically select only those with stronger qualifications 
than others. That policy may disadvantage applicants with weaker qualifications, but does 
it subject them to wrongful disadvantageous treatment? Consider another possibility. 
What if most of the rejected applicants were women, or what if they belonged to racial or 
religious minorities? Could we then claim that the admissions policy is indirectly 
discriminatory and (possibly) wrongful as a result? If yes, which would be the reasons 
behind that claim? 
Let’s accept arguendo that the admissions officers do not privilege any candidate 
because of his race, sex or religion. Rather, they believe that each individual bears equal 
worth and that each application deserves equal consideration. But this year, amidst 
adverse economic conditions and a huge number of applications, the admissions officers 
realise that a radically different system of admissions is essential. The university’s budget 
cannot sustain the extra resources required by the admissions team to compare the full 
number of applications through weighing different qualifications and achievements. Upon 
reflection the admissions officers decide to radically reduce the number of applications by 
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simply rejecting all applicants whose surname starts with a vowel. That criterion, they 
think, is not discriminatory since it is neither based on group membership nor on cultural 
references to disadvantage. Clearly some people, including myself, would unfairly benefit 
from that capricious criterion. But is an admissions policy excluding people on the basis 
of surname discriminatory? Is discrimination synonymous to arbitrariness? 
 
5.3.  Two Senses of Discrimination 
 
We could think of numerous examples of rules or state policies that treat some people 
more advantageously than others based on certain protected characteristics, but which of 
those distinctions are benign and which are morally wrong? Although the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate discrimination is fine, there must be principles that distinguish 
the action of the admission officers, who exclude applicants with surnames starting with a 
vowel, from the moral wrong that another hypothetical admissions policy excluding 
applicants on grounds of their race or religion would induce. To discover that difference, 
we first have to expose and untangle an important distinction. That is, we have to 
distinguish between a moralised and a descriptive (also called generic16) concept of 
discrimination. The moralised concept ‘picks out acts, practices or policies insofar as they 
wrongfully impose a relative disadvantage on persons based on their membership in a 
salient social group of a suitable sort.’17 Discrimination in the moralised sense is always 
wrongful. By contrast, the descriptive concept dispenses with the word ‘wrongful’. In its 
descriptive conception discrimination is indistinguishable from words that are not as 
morally laden, such as distinction or classification.18 
When a complaint about discrimination is made under its moralised sense, then the 
expression ‘discrimination is wrong’ ends up as nothing more than a tautology. In other 
words, the moralised sense of discrimination includes a substantive, negative moral 
judgment about specific types of disadvantageous treatment. In European human rights 
law, whenever the justifiability of specific restrictive rules or practices is under 
investigation, the ECtHR employs discrimination not in the descriptive, but in the 
moralised sense, meaning wrongful discrimination. At first blush, this practice is signified 
textually by the construction of Article 14 of the Convention: the article refers to 
‘prohibition of discrimination’, not to prohibition of ‘wrongful’ discrimination. Moreover, 
cases on religious discrimination, such as those discussed in the previous chapter, confirm 
the use of the moralised sense of discrimination. In Thlimmenos v Greece,19 where the 
applicant complained of religious discrimination based on the refusal of the state to 
appoint him to a post of chartered accountant due to his criminal conviction for military 
disobedience, the ECtHR focused not on whether the discrimination in question has been 
wrongful, but on whether the moralised concept of discrimination applied to the facts of 
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the case. The Convention therefore prohibits wrongful discrimination and not any 
distinction between people, even if that is based on protected characteristics.  
The rest of this chapter will use discrimination in its moralised sense to denote 
wrongful discrimination. If the term has to be employed in a descriptive form, this will be 
linguistically signified by words such as classification or distinction in lieu of 
discrimination. 
 
5.4.  Deciphering Disadvantage 
 
5.4.1.  Disadvantage in a comparative sense 
 
Under the moralised sense of discrimination, its wrongfulness springs from different 
forms of disadvantageous treatment inflicted upon members of socially salient groups due 
to their membership of those groups. But what do we mean by disadvantageous 
treatment? Could we describe it in the abstract? Recall Jakóbski v Poland, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter.20 The applicant argues that failure to accommodate his 
request for vegetarian meals constitutes wrongful disadvantageous treatment on grounds 
of his religion. The Polish government argues that not accommodating his request does 
not impose any disadvantage on him. And even if non-accommodation constitutes 
disadvantageous treatment, it is not wrongful because smooth functioning of prisons 
requires a uniform no-exception meal policy. How can we tell if the applicant has indeed 
been subject to disadvantageous treatment? Could we answer that question in the 
abstract? Or else, is a comparable, yet more favourably treated case, always required as a 
reference point for our examination of the claim? What if there are no such comparable 
cases? What if no one has ever asked for accommodation of his dietary requirements in 
the prison’s meal programme before? Note that that last possibility is particularly 
troubling for establishing religious discrimination. For religious discrimination, primarily 
in the indirect form of lack of accommodation, often involves claims that are unavailable 
to non-religious people and therefore difficult to analogise with other individual claims 
for accommodation. 
Deciphering disadvantage is central to discrimination theory. Perhaps the dominant 
approach, as expressed by Altman, is that disadvantage is ‘inherently comparative’ and 
typically understood in ways defined by reference to how others are treated.21 Lippert-
Rasmussen interprets disadvantage along the lines of discrimination itself, which is 
‘essentially comparative’ because what matters is how someone treats certain people 
compared to others.22 He argues that unlike other morally wrong acts, such as breaking 
promises or lying, we cannot discriminate unless we treat some people better than 
others. 23  Likewise, Fredman notes that direct discrimination ‘is primarily a relative 
concept’ that relies ‘heavily on the possibility of finding an appropriate comparator.’24 In 
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her view, direct discrimination is therefore ‘highly restricted’ because, as a relative 
concept, equality ‘is achieved if both parties have been equally well treated; but it is also 
achieved if they have been equally badly treated.’25 By the same token, arguing that we 
would have treated anyone else in the same disadvantageous way may rebut any 
complaint of discrimination. In fact, before the UK courts, this is exactly what the owners 
of a small hotel in Cornwall did when they were accused of discriminating against an 
unmarried same-sex couple by refusing to accommodate them in a double room: they 
claimed that their refusal did not amount to discrimination as they would treat any 
unmarried couple in the same way.26  
But disadvantage is conceptually distinct from discrimination, for not all forms of 
disadvantageous treatment can ground discrimination in the moralised sense described 
above. The problem is not just evidentiary, namely about how to establish that a particular 
rule or policy disadvantages the members of a given socially salient group in order to 
activate their legal protection from discrimination. It is primarily normative because any 
plausible moral interpretation of discrimination rights has to account for the distinct forms 
of disadvantage that discrimination, in the sense that our existing European legal practice 
employs it, ought to protect us from.  
I think that the predominance of comparative approaches to disadvantage emanates 
from the well-known idea that equality is essentially comparative and derives its moral 
power and limits from how others are treated.27 As Westen has famously argued, equality 
is concerned with ‘relative deprivation’ and its endurance is due to the fact that it is empty 
of content.28 That criticism of equality springs from an interpretation of the concept along 
Aristotelian lines, or else, ‘treating likes alike’. If the prime moral entailment of equality 
is consistency in treatment, then indeed we have to find out how ‘alike’ cases are treated 
and we do face serious complications of ‘leveling down’, of assimilation and diversity, 
and of establishing who to compare to. But that conception of equality is unattractive and 
now discredited in political philosophy, which has long ago moved towards more 
complex, multi-dimensional accounts such as, among others, equal liberty and equality in 
the distribution of primary goods,29 substantive equality,30 equal chances to develop our 
capability to achieve valuable functionings and freedoms, 31  equality of opportunity,32 
equality of resources,33 equality of outcome,34 democratic equality,35 equality as social 
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inclusion36 and equality as parity in political participation.37 I will further explore the 
relationship between equality and prohibition of discrimination later in this chapter, but it 
is important, for now, to note that under a political theory of equality where consistency in 
treatment is the main desideratum, seeking comparators is indeed essential to expose 
disadvantage. 
Meanwhile, as Chapters Three and Four discussed, the ECtHR investigates whether 
the anti-discrimination principle has been violated by seeking actual (or hypothetical) 
people in analogous situations that have been treated more favourably than the applicants 
in the case under investigation. What matters in those comparisons is not how favourably 
or unfavourably specific individuals or groups have been treated, but how they have been 
treated relatively to other similarly situated individuals or groups. Typically the 
comparison group is part of the same society as the disadvantaged group, or at least 
subject to the same overarching political structure.38 For instance, in Ladele, the ECtHR 
had to seek a hypothetical comparator in order to decide whether or not a registrar who 
objects to same-sex partnerships, but based on non-religious reasons, would have been 
treated differently under the circumstances of the case.39 Of course seeking comparators is 
not restricted to freedom of religion cases. Rather, it is one of the common interpretative 
mechanisms of the Convention as, for example, cases involving complaints of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation40 and indirect discrimination through the 
‘disparate impact’ of certain general regulations on equal access to education illustrate.41 
And more generally, discrimination law is an area of increasing cross-fertilisation 
between the ECHR and EU law, where comparative constitutional law also plays 
significant role.42 Moreover, discrimination as imposition of a relative disadvantage is 
congenial to how international human rights law has framed anti-discrimination 
protection. For instance, Article 2(2) of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion and Belief, provides that 
 
[F]or the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression ‘intolerance and 
discrimination based on religion or belief’ means any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as 
its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.43 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
35 E. S. Anderson, ‘What is the point of equality?’ (1999) 109(2) Ethics 287. 
36 H. Collins, ‘Social inclusion: A better approach to equality issues?’ (2005) 14 Transnational Law & 
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16. 
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(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 287. 
38 Altman, ‘Discrimination’. 
39 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, §104. 
40 E.B. v France, Application no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008, §48. 
41 DH v Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, 13 November 2007. 
42 In DH (ibid) the ECtHR cited Griggs v Duke Power, 401 US 424 (1971), a landmark judgment of the US 
Supreme Court, in order to extend indirect discrimination to cases of rules having a ‘disparate impact’. 
43 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, A/RES/36/55, 25 November 1981. 
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Seeking comparators is therefore a ubiquitous judicial mechanism for establishing 
wrongful discrimination. Meanwhile, despite skepticism, locating comparable cases is not 
always hard. Consider the common example of a state that grants its mainstream religious 
groups various forms of accommodation, whereas it also accommodates, through 
exceptions from the generally applicable work schedule, certain important secular 
interests. However, it refuses analogous forms of accommodation to the members of a 
minority religious group despite that they are similarly situated. It might be relatively easy 
to argue then that the members of the minority group suffer indirect discrimination 
because, but for their religion, they would not have had to endure the disadvantage in 
question. In these cases, as Leader notes, the degree of ‘loss of freedom’ depends on its 
link with broader sets of options in an ever-changing network of time and choice 
patterns.44 Moreover, according to Wintemute, this comparative exercise is an attractively 
clear proposition since disadvantaged individuals need only to ‘demand a particular 
amount of religious liberty under Articles 14 and 9… rather than demand this amount in 
the abstract (with no comparator) under Article 9.’45 
However, as was briefly discussed in Chapter Two, an interpretation of 
discrimination that explains its aim and applicability through the availability and selection 
of comparators exposes the entire concept to serious weaknesses. Standard patterns of 
selection of comparators may buttress conformist pressures to dominant interpretations of 
a culture or religion as a precondition of equal treatment and invite value judgments about 
which aspects of a comparator are valuable and which are not.46 Moreover, there are many 
cases where no comparators are available. Thus, a worrying potential is that the equality 
principle might not be able to gain sufficient traction in cases, such as those involving the 
wearing of religious symbols, where it is contestable whether there are other 
commitments matching religious duties in categoricity or importance so as to enable 
courts to draw accurate analogies. For many people it is absurd to analogise the 
importance of a cross for a Christian to the importance of a designer bag to someone 
fashion-conscious or to the importance of a football hat to a sports fan. Time and again, 
analogising non-religious commitments with categorical needs of conscience emerges as a 
significant challenge for an interpretation of religious discrimination that aims to capture 
both freedom and equality. But, on the other hand, it has also been argued that the 
categoricity of religious commitments can be met through health-related analogies. 47 
States are usually sensitive to health concerns and, according to Eisgruber and Sager, 
accommodation of health and accommodation of religion have something in common: 
like refusal to accommodate in cases of health concerns, refusal to accommodate the need 
to wear religious symbols is likely to arise from neglect, rather than from an effort to 
equally share social burdens.48 Other analogies may spring from family commitments. As 
Shiffrin notes, states often provide exemptions from general rules to accommodate 
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parents or people who have to undertake spousal care.49 Health-related analogies and 
family commitments may help circumvent problems with analogising religion to other 
commitments without, however, changing the main idea, namely that we have to track 
down comparators in order to establish disadvantage. 
Overall, instances of accommodation of special needs are unexceptional in the 
European legal landscape. They are rather ubiquitous. Even hardline secular models of 
constitutional arrangements, which perceive religion as ‘a threat to secularism’ to be 
distanced from the state,50 support certain ‘pragmatic’ accommodations of religion.51 In 
France, for instance, there is accommodation of religion in terms of holidays, prayers, 
food regulations, support for private religious education, and indirect financial support, 
whereas similar examples of religious accommodation have emerged in Turkey too.52 
Other contracting parties to the Council of Europe, such as the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands, have embraced an even more open and accommodating 
stance towards religion.53 
 
5.4.2.  Problems with drawing analogies between religious and secular commitments 
 
Even so, how should we deal with cases where actual comparators are for some reason 
unavailable and potential analogies to other similar hypothetical cases are implausible? 
One suggestion to overcome those difficulties is to replace the ‘less favourable treatment’ 
requirement of discrimination with ‘unfavourable’ treatment.54 That approach has proved 
successful in contexts such as pregnancy discrimination, disability discrimination, and 
victimisation, where proving ‘unfavourable’ rather than ‘less favourable’ treatment has 
proved more practical. As Fredman argues, in the context of harassment ‘the principle that 
likes should be treated alike has expressly been replaced by a reliance on breach of 
dignity as the basis of the harm… sensitivity to the underlying value of dignity has led to 
protection against discrimination by association and discrimination by perception.’ 55 
Pregnancy discrimination cases, where no male comparators exist for pregnant women, 
                                                        
49 S. V. Shiffrin, ‘Egalitarianism, choice-sensitivity, and accommodation’, in R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. 
Scheffler and M. Smith (eds.) Reason and Value:  Themes from the Work of Joseph Raz (Oxford University 
Press, 2004) 270-302. 
50 A. Sajo, ‘Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 605, 625. See also S. Bruce, Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 2013) 177-202. 
51 K. Alidadi, ‘Reasonable accommodations for religion and belief: Adding value to Article 9 ECHR and the 
European Union’s anti-discrimination approach to employment?’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 693. See 
also E. Bribosia, J. Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable accommodation for religious minorities: A 
promising concept for European antidiscrimination law?’ (2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 137. 
52 D. McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European public square and in European public life – Crucifixes in the 
classroom?’ (2011) 11(3) Human Rights Law Review 451, 454. 
53 F. Vermeulen and V. Bader, ‘Reasonable accommodation of religious claims in Europe? Basic tensions 
and socio-legal debates’, Summary of results of the Religare project, December 2012, at 
<http://www.religareproject.eu/system/files/Summary%20WP7_FINALCONFERENCE_form.pdf>. Also 
L. Zucca, ‘The crisis of the secular state – A reply to Professor Sajó’ (2009) 7(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 494, 501-504. 
54 Fredman, Discrimination Law, 169. 
55 ibid 
Chapter 5 | Two Birds with One Stone 
 138 
are particularly useful here. A pregnant woman is ‘no longer just a woman’ but a woman 
with a child with no masculine equivalent.56 That has led both American and English 
courts to be dismissive in early cases discussing complaints of sex discrimination on 
grounds of pregnancy. 57  Progressively, judicial tests involving comparisons between 
pregnant women and ill men improved protection of their rights under legislation 
prohibiting sex discrimination, but the downside was that drawing analogies between 
pregnancy and illness gave rise to stigmatisation of pregnant women. Moreover, focusing 
on the women’s capability to work brushes aside crucial positive aspects of pregnancy, 
such as the need of a mother to breastfeed her children and to build up her relationship 
with them. 58  Nevertheless, in a series of important cases the CJEU has held that 
establishing disadvantage does not require comparators of any sort. Since only women 
could become pregnant, discrimination on grounds of pregnancy falls within the 
protective scope of sex discrimination.59 Some years later, the UK followed a similar 
approach in the Equality Act 2010, which provides in s. 4 that ‘unfavourable’ treatment – 
instead of ‘less favourable’ treatment – falls within its protective scope. 60  Various 
safeguards to protect pregnant women have progressively complemented that approach, 
including employment protection legislation, maternity leave and pay, and social security 
schemes in various EU countries.61  
Cases of disability discrimination furnish another example of the difficulties that a 
comparative approach to disadvantage involves.62 Notably, the choice of comparators in 
cases of disability discrimination depends on the model of disability that informs our 
discussion.63 Two prominent models include the ‘medical’, which focuses on functional 
limitations that the disability poses on an individual, and the ‘social’, which focuses on 
the effects of the existing built and social environment to certain individuals.64 Thus, far 
from just a comparison, the choice of comparators in cases of disability depends on a 
value judgment about which similarities matter and which do not. The effectiveness of 
discrimination law heavily depends on whether we compare a disabled person to an ill 
person (that would be under the ‘medical model’) or we compare a disabled person to an 
able-bodied person whose access to workforce or a restaurant is just not impeded (under 
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the ‘social model’).65 In any event, the value judgment, namely the social meaning of the 
difference in the context of the case, 66  pre-exists the comparison and illustrates that 
comparators themselves do not tell much about what rights we have under a fair scheme 
of distribution. Rather, problems with accommodation of disability are ‘problems of 
justice’67 that require drawing on political principles on fair distribution of resources and 
human dignity to be resolved. 
Although religious discrimination poses different challenges from both pregnancy 
and disability discrimination, the above concerns apply here too. Similarly to pregnancy 
discrimination, treating individuals or groups less favourably on grounds of religion or 
belief cannot always be established due to unavailability of suitable comparators. 
Comparisons with individuals who due to their health conditions have been granted some 
form of accommodation in the workplace or elsewhere may be stigmatising for religious 
people, for whom religion is incomparable to illness and all its negative connotations. 
Meanwhile, as in pregnancy discrimination, focusing on the capability to function as fully 
as other non-religious individuals cannot capture various positive dimensions of enjoying 
freedom of religion, such as praying or identification with religious communities. For 
similar reasons to pregnancy and disability discrimination, it follows that unfavourable or 
disadvantageous, rather than ‘less favourable’, treatment on grounds of religion should be 
enough to ground religious discrimination complaints. 
However, we have to specifically address another interpretative challenge, which is 
associated with broader critiques of egalitarian theories of freedom of religion. According 
to Laborde, egalitarian theories of freedom of religion are unsuccessful in their main 
ambition, namely ‘to demonstrate that (what we traditionally mean by) religion can be 
unproblematically analogised with, or extended to, other kinds of practices and beliefs.’68 
In her view, analogising religion with a vague category of ‘conceptions of the good’ and 
not providing satisfying criteria of what kinds of commitments are comparable to religion 
doom egalitarian theories to failure to ground a coherent normative theory of freedom of 
religion.69 In similar vein, McConnell argues that comparisons between religious and non-
religious interests are unsystematic and incoherent,70 and Koppelman notes that the only 
way to systemise those comparisons is through a theory on secular interests, which 
currently lacks from egalitarian theories of religion.71 Their criticism is arguably fueled by 
the failure of the existing egalitarian theories of freedom of religion to adequately explain 
the role and value of those comparisons. For instance, although Eisgruber and Sager insist 
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that ‘Equal Liberty does not depend on the possibility of close comparisons of religious 
and secular interests or of a theory by which such close comparisons could be guided’72 
they do not clearly explain whether the role of those comparisons is just evidentiary or 
can also be constitutive of a violation of the moral right to freedom of religion under 
certain circumstances. 
In any event, an analysis of egalitarian theories of freedom of religion that starts 
from the assumption that their main ambition is to draw analogies between religion and 
other beliefs and then criticises them for failing to do so, does not spring from the 
evidentiary problems of establishing disadvantage. Rather, this is a normative claim based 
on the idea that seeking comparators through analogies betrays a poor conception of 
religious freedom. We have to examine that claim as part of our discussion about the role 
of comparators for establishing disadvantage, not least because the success or failure of 
that critique is crucial to unveil the normative connections between a particular 
interpretation of our moral right to freedom of religion and an interpretation of our moral 
right to freedom from discrimination based on certain characteristics. 
 
5.4.3.  Comparators, equality, and diagnosis 
 
Let’s return to one of the main questions that started the previous section: is disadvantage 
relative to how others are treated? Recall that our question is whether disadvantageous 
treatment, on grounds of religion – or race or sexual orientation or on any other protected 
ground – can exist in the abstract or its demarcation can only be relative to the treatment 
of others. I think that we have to draw again a distinction between a descriptive and a 
moralised sense of disadvantage. Disadvantageous treatment may be wrongful for a 
number of reasons, for instance when it flows from violating a promise we made to 
another agent.73 In this descriptive sense disadvantage can, indeed, be suffered only in 
relative terms. For we have to look at how other people have been treated in comparable 
situations in order to establish that someone has been treated disadvantageously. In a 
descriptive sense, someone could complain of disadvantageous treatment by virtue of his 
race or religion every time he has been treated less favourably compared to others. So 
every time someone enjoys more goods, better services, or easier access to health or 
education by virtue of his membership in a socially salient group, such as an ethnic or a 
religious group, other people who do not enjoy those benefits can complain for being 
treated disadvantageously on grounds of their ethnic origin or religion. 
However, when we use discrimination in the moralised sense described earlier, 
meaning wrongful discrimination, disadvantage cannot be used in the descriptive sense 
because not all forms of disadvantage are wrongful. Not all forms of disadvantageous 
treatment can ground discrimination. Consider the example of positive measures. It is 
widely believed that positive measures, such as quotas in education or in political 
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representation, are necessary to correct past injustices against certain social groups.74 The 
CJEU, for instance, has accepted that positive measures, such as quotas in employment, 
do not violate anti-discrimination protection,75 whereas the EU Employment Equality and 
Race Equality Directives expressly provide for positive measures in order to rectify 
injustices and achieve ‘full equality in practice.’76 Under a descriptive model that defines 
disadvantage relatively to how others have been treated, members of majority or powerful 
groups may therefore claim disadvantageous treatment on grounds of their race or sex. 
But this form of disadvantage that men, for instance, might suffer by virtue of 
positive measures is not the kind of disadvantage that informs wrongful discrimination. 
Discrimination, in the moralised sense used by the ECtHR, is grounded on wrongful 
disadvantageous treatment. In the context of discrimination disadvantageous treatment is 
wrongful if someone’s properties, including race, or someone’s membership in a certain 
socially salient group, including a religious group, form the basis of legal distinctions. 
Thus, only wrongful disadvantage, that is, disadvantage in a moralised sense, can ground 
wrongful discrimination. But if that is the case, then disadvantage occurs independently of 
how other people have been treated. Disadvantage, in the moralised sense, is wrongful 
every time the government treats certain people with less respect and concern. That is, 
every time that the calculation of what makes the community better off as a whole is 
likely to have been corrupted by the wrong sort of reasons, such as reasons that disparage 
or express contempt for certain members or sections of the community. 
This is not to suggest that the circumstances under which people are treated 
differently based on certain traits are irrelevant. Nevertheless, how others have been 
treated plays an evidentiary, rather than a constitutive role. More specifically, if our 
interpretation of a particular practice shows that an individual has been disadvantaged (in 
a moralised sense) because he has been refused a place in higher education based on his 
sex, race or religion, the moral wrong he suffers holds irrespective of whether or not 
others have been treated more favourably. More favourable treatment of individuals of 
other races or religions may serve as an indicator, or even as prima facie evidence of 
wrongful disadvantage. But the wrong of discrimination exists independently of that. 
Furthermore, this argument does not suggest that the fundamental state duty to treat 
citizens as equals is not comparative. There is a comparative element in the idea that a 
state should treat everyone with equal respect and concern. But the principle of treating as 
equals is comparative in a much broader sense than seeking comparators through drawing 
analogies between religious and secular interests. Although what treatment with equal 
respect and concern would require in more concrete cases will depend on the particular 
circumstances, according to Dworkin defining what treating as equals requires is ‘the 
same question as the question of what it means for the government to treat all its citizens 
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as free, or as independent, or with equal dignity.’77 The question requires interpretation of 
the practice in question based on the principles of freedom and equality that justify the 
institutions of democracy and law, and treatment as equals may require equal treatment, 
but this is not always the case. As people vary in their capabilities, aspirations and 
circumstances, the state may end up treating people differently while showing equal 
regard for them as individuals given their characteristics and social situations.78 
So, what are the courts looking for when they seek actual or hypothetical 
comparators? I think that the criticism against egalitarian theories of freedom of religion 
for engaging in arbitrary comparisons between religion and other kinds of beliefs 
overstates the purpose and ambition of their often comparative methodologies. Seeking 
comparators is just a prominent judicial test through which courts wish to diagnose a 
violation of non-discrimination and not explain which practices constitute wrongful 
discrimination or whether we have a right to accommodation and under which 
circumstances. This is part of a more general distinction between diagnostic and 
constitutive questions that is important to track in human rights theory.79 In fundamental 
rights discourse, constitutive questions include, for instance, what rights we have or how 
broad the scope of the right to freedom of religion is. By contrast, diagnostic questions 
focus on how to decide constitutive questions about the grounds of rights. A diagnostic 
question would look at how we can decide about the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion, or at how we can find out whether a general rule violates the state duty to treat 
everyone with equal respect and concern regardless of religious affiliation. 
The task of human rights institutions and courts is to discover whether a right has 
been violated. To do so they employ various diagnostic tools, whose purpose is to 
diagnose a human rights violation and their success is judged upon their accuracy rate, 
namely upon the number of false positive (i.e. when they find a violation of human rights 
when there was none) and false negative (i.e. when they find no violation of human rights 
when there was one) decisions they reach. As Letsas argues, ‘we want to make sure that 
the way courts go about deciding about someone’s rights have been violated maximises 
correct results and minimises false ones (positives or negatives).’80 The diagnostic nature 
of the courts’ decisions entails that their decisions, whether positive or negative, do not 
mean that a right has in fact been violated. For their reasoning is part of a diagnosis and 
not a normative theory about what rights should people have. Think of a thermometre, 
which does not tell us what temperature is or what factors influence its increase. It just 
indicates a specific temperature at a specific time. Likewise, judicial tests about human 
rights do not provide insights on what rights we have. They merely indicate violations of 
rights.81 Just like medical diagnosis, they may be indirectly diagnostic as well: doctors (or 
human rights courts) may be looking at proxies that do not constitute themselves a disease 
(or a violation of rights) but are proxies for a violation. 
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The distinction between diagnostic and constitutive questions is important, albeit 
often overlooked, in human rights theory. Examples of conflation between constitutive 
and diagnostic questions are arguments implying that judicial tests reflect the structure of 
human rights themselves. It is often suggested, for instance, that the use of the 
proportionality test by the ECtHR betrays a particular constitutive theory of human rights, 
that is, a theory about what human rights are.82 Rivers argues that proportionality weakens 
human rights83 and Tsakyrakis that it contravenes the anti-utilitarian nature of rights.84 In 
law and religion, Leigh and Hambler 85  and Carolyn Evans 86  both hint at something 
similar when they argue that the ECtHR misunderstands human rights because its 
proportionality test does not pay much attention to the scope and amplitude of the right to 
freedom of religion. The criticism against egalitarian theories of freedom of religion that 
was discussed above, namely that analogies between the treatment of religious and secular 
interests in order to establish disadvantage or to assess a complaint of a violation of the 
right to freedom of religion offer a poor theory of freedom of religion, is another example 
of amalgamating constitutive and diagnostic questions about rights.  
As Vickers notes, in complaints of indirect discrimination arising out of limitations 
on the right to freedom of religious manifestation at the workplace, the courts focus ‘on 
the interpretation of justification and proportionality, such that their meaning becomes the 
all-important test of whether restrictions of religious freedom at work are lawful.’ 87 
Indeed, if the prime focus of our analysis is on ‘all-important’ judicial tests, such as 
proportionality, it is logical to assume that those tests do all the work in determining when 
limitations on freedom of religion are justifiable.88 But if proportionality mirrors the scope 
of our rights, then whenever a particular measure is found proportionate, namely 
whenever there is no serious interference with the liberty in question and the legitimate 
aim pursued is important, that would mean that there is no right. Individuals would indeed 
have had their rights protected, albeit only in cases of serious interferences for minor 
gains for the collective good. But, as I argued in Chapter Three, this rule-utilitarian model 
that gives relative priority to rights is both morally unattractive and incapable of capturing 
significant parts of our common legal practice under the Convention.  
The same problems hold, perhaps even more crudely, if the availability of 
comparators is taken to reflect morally important elements of a normative theory of 
freedom of religion. Under that assumption, whenever no comparable cases are available, 
an applicant could not have suffered disadvantage on grounds of religion. But this is 
implausible as examples from pregnancy and disability discrimination, where no direct 
comparators exist, demonstrate. Our right to freedom from discrimination on grounds of 
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religion is not conditional upon how others are treated. The fact that the ECtHR employs 
such comparisons does not entail that our rights are in fact conditioned by how others or 
their beliefs are treated, any more that it follows that the symptoms which indicate the 
presence of a disease, consist the disease itself. Judicial tests such as proportionality and 
locating comparable cases are regularly criticised for being vague, uncertain, context-
dependent and subjective. Those shortcomings are substantively worrying for human 
rights theory only if we err in considering those tests constitutive of a substantive account 
of rights. 
The structure of the ‘seeking comparators’ test is roughly outlined in certain anti-
discrimination provisions that require ‘less favourable’ treatment to ground 
discrimination, and therefore insinuate the need to investigate how (similarly placed) 
others have been treated under comparable circumstances. However, seeking comparators 
is just one of the various possible ways to find out whether certain rules or practices 
wrongfully disadvantage certain people in violation of our right to be treated as equals by 
the state. There may well be other diagnostic tests capable of exposing the relevant facts 
and assigning the appropriate weight to them, and they may well be equally or even more 
accurate compared to seeking comparators. Examples from cases on pregnancy and 
disability discrimination are useful because they show that courts should be flexible and 
attendant to the fact that a method of review is not a theory of what rights we have. The 
argument, therefore, that the reason why claims under the right to freedom of religion 
often take the shape of equality claims is the framing of anti-discrimination provisions 
which requires comparators merely overstates the role of those tests.  
This is not, of course, to underestimate the importance of diagnostic tests. 
Diagnostic tests, such as seeking comparators, are crucial in the real world bewildered by 
resource and time constraints. The ECtHR cannot ask all the moral questions that are 
relevant to rights, but it can, and should, look for the right indicators of a human rights 
violation. Recall that the success or failure of a particular diagnostic test is indeed results-
oriented, based on how accurate the test has proven with regard to violations of human 
rights. Yet it is important that judges have good philosophical understanding of human 
rights because the accuracy of adjudication is connected to questions about the nature and 
grounds of rights. Just like doctors, judges look at some and not all symptoms of a human 
rights violation, so their understanding of the right in question is important to decide 
which symptoms are relevant in a given case. The closer a diagnostic test about rights is 
to their nature, the more accurate it can prove to be in practice.  
All in all, establishing disadvantage, in the moralised sense defended above, does 
not depend on the availability of comparable cases. Deciphering disadvantage requires 
distinctions between its descriptive and moralised senses as well as distinctions between 
constitutive and diagnostic questions of rights. But disadvantageous treatment is not the 
only symptom of wrongful discrimination. There may well be no symptoms at all, as it 
happens, for instance, in cases of indirect systemic discrimination that sometimes can 
only be exposed through statistical evidence substantiating social exclusion of certain 
groups. Thus, to what extent a particular state practice constitutes wrongful discrimination 
on grounds of religion will depend on a moral interpretation of the practice in question. It 
depends on a theory of the moral wrong of discrimination, where the analysis now turns. 
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5.5.  Theories of Discrimination 
 
Turning back to one of our initial questions, could an admissions policy that selects 
students according to their achievements and qualifications be discriminatory? We cannot 
reject that possibility on the basis that the policy in question is now ubiquitous in 
academic admissions – after all, most English universities were admitting only men 
during the 19th century and, however ubiquitous back then, that practice was and remains 
morally unjustifiable. Rather, in order to figure out whether discriminating on academic 
credentials is wrongful, our intuitions would probably contrast it with other, more 
straightforward, instances of discrimination. A possible answer could then be that the 
selection process is not discriminatory because it treats applicants on merit, rather than on 
some other arbitrary criteria. Closely related would be another response, namely that the 
admissions policy is justifiable since it does not reject applicants based on ‘immutable’ 
characteristics.89 Others could defend the admissions policy based on the fact that the 
rejected students do not form a socially salient group discriminating against which is pro 
tanto morally wrong ‘given the social world in which we live.’90 Or, finally, some might 
argue that academic rejections do not wrongfully disadvantage applicants with weaker 
credentials (who are treated less favourably than others) because strong academic 
credentials are morally relevant to the high academic quality that every good university 
seeks to maintain. Those responses sketch some of the most influential theories about the 
moral wrong of discrimination. They share the sense that the wrong of discrimination 
concerns the morally impermissible kinds of reason guiding the action of the 
discriminating party. But they are based on different principles and we have to closely 
examine them to find out which is the most attractive – if anyone is. 
 
5.5.1. Merit, immutability, freedom and moral relevance 
 
The first theory that I wish to examine grounds the wrong of discrimination on failure to 
treat people on merit. For instance, Hook argues that if X and Y are competing for a post 
and my decision to hire X ‘is based on X’s sex or race, and not on merit, then it is a case 
of racial or sexual discrimination against Y, which is morally wrong.’ 91  Moreover, 
according to Goldman, discriminatory practices are wrong because competent individuals 
stay out of the jobs they deserve.92 The merit justification is intuitively attractive. But an 
important question is which individual properties count as merit. As McCrudden argues, 
there are many different conceptions of merit pointing to different and sometimes 
incompatible policy directions.93 Merit also depends heavily on context. For instance, 
according to Dworkin, merit cannot be defined in the abstract and ‘if quick hands count as 
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“merit” in the case of a prospective surgeon, this is because quick hands will enable him 
to serve the public better and for no other reason. If a black skin will, as a matter of 
regrettable fact, enable another doctor to do a different medical job better, then that black 
skin is by the same token “merit” as well.’94 Dworkin’s argument that the colour of one’s 
skin may be considered ‘merit’ under certain social circumstances demonstrates that merit 
should not be confused with the very different and dangerous idea that one race is 
inherently more worthy than another. The two ideas are different. 
Additionally, grounding the wrong of discrimination on (lack of) merit blurs the 
distinction between anti-discrimination and meritocracy. Meritocracy, contrary to the 
intuitions we have about the wrong of discrimination, is not necessarily grounded on 
fairness. In fact, sometimes, as Cavanagh argues, ‘hiring on merit has more to do with 
efficiency than fairness.’ 95  More importantly though, fixing merit as the normative 
justification for anti-discrimination fails to account for cases of racial, sex or religious 
discrimination that occur when someone (e.g. an employer) believes that black people, 
women, or Muslims are morally or intellectually inferior. In these cases merit makes this 
behaviour look tantamount to non-meritocratic treatment.96 Finally, and specifically with 
regard to religious discrimination, although treating everyone on merit is important in the 
realm of employment or academic admissions, the merit justification cannot explain how 
prohibition of discrimination can complement protection of the right to freedom of 
religion, especially in cases involving conscientious objection to military service or bans 
on religious symbols in public spaces. This shortcoming is important because, as the 
previous chapters discussed, those claims commonly involve complaints under both 
religious discrimination and freedom of religion. 
Another theory of discrimination grounds its unfairness on the wrongfulness of 
disadvantaging others based on immutable characteristics that they cannot control. This is 
why, according to Kahlenberg, racial discrimination and disability discrimination are 
wrong.97 However, there are instances in which it is justifiable to exclude people from 
certain activities, such as higher education or sports teams, based on features beyond their 
control, such as their intelligence, height or bodily strength. It follows that we need 
something more than immutability to explain moral wrongness. At this point, however, it 
is important to discuss another challenge to immutability, namely that certain protected 
grounds of discrimination, including conscience, are not immutable in the way race, 
disability and ethnic identity are. According to Plant, there is a fundamental difference 
between religious identity, which is ‘self-chosen and self-assumed’ and other forms of 
identity which are ‘given matters of fact’ such as ethnic origin, gender and sexual 
orientation.98 Shiffrin adds that even though we may disagree about the immutability of 
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religion, the ways we manifest our beliefs, and the extent to which we follow its tenets, 
constitute choices.99  
However, for our present purposes the classification of religion, if at all possible, 
would make no difference to the moral wrong that treating people disadvantageously 
based on their conscience induces. As was briefly discussed in Chapter Two, religion is 
valuable for so many people that its free enjoyment should be a possibility for all who can 
(in principle) choose it. If choosing should be a possibility, it should not be effectively 
ruled out as an option by prohibitive costs.100 Discriminatory laws and policies impose 
exactly that kind of costs to people who wish to live according to the tenets of their 
religion, or far from any religious commands. This argument aims to protect individuals 
and groups from discrimination on the basis of their religious affiliation in different 
settings, as well as to protect people or groups without any religious affiliation. Nothing 
in this argument assumes that religion is always a choice. 101  Many people treat the 
religious attachments of their ancestors or communities as a natural continuation of their 
own existence, without questioning the value of these religious or cultural traditions. But 
in a liberal democracy committed to freedom of conscience authenticity in making 
important life choices requires that even uncritical choices are (other things being equal) 
free choices with which a democracy should not interfere. 
Instead of merit and immutability, Moreau favours a liberty-based account of 
discrimination. 102   More specifically, she argues that antidiscrimination legislation 
protects our deliberative freedoms, that is, our freedoms to have our ‘decisions about how 
to live insulated from the effects of normatively extraneous features of us, such as our 
skin colour or gender.’103 Under her account, extraneous features, such as the beliefs of 
our employers, service providers and landlords among others, should not figure in our 
deliberations as ‘costs’ when we decide where we want to work or where we wish to 
live.104 Thus, we are entitled to those ‘deliberative freedoms’ independently of whether 
others enjoy those freedoms. On a liberty-based account of the wrong of discrimination 
‘the conclusion that an act or policy is discriminatory is based upon at least two kinds of 
normative judgments: first, that the trait in question is normatively extraneous, and 
secondly, that the deliberative freedom is one that, in this context, considering the 
interests of others that are also at stake, this person or group of people are entitled to.’105 
Moreau’s focus on deliberative freedoms needs, however, further explication. For 
not all instances of discrimination necessarily involve restrictions on our deliberative 
freedoms. Consider an example. Sam, a shop owner, rejects a job application sent by 
Roger, who is gay, because Sam believes that homosexuality is sinful and wants to fight 
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sexual sins by all means. Following the rejection Roger continues applying and he ends 
up in a much better job. Sam has wrongfully discriminated against Roger by treating him 
disadvantageously on grounds of sexual orientation. However, if we accept arguendo that 
Roger is unaware of the reasons behind the rejection of his application, 106  his 
disadvantageous treatment has not restricted his deliberative freedoms. But under-
inclusiveness is not the only challenge to a deliberative freedoms account of 
discrimination. The account does not fit the phenomenology of discrimination, either. 
Racial discrimination is a hideous form of discrimination not because people should not 
have to take their race into account as a cost in their deliberations. It is wrong irrespective 
of its consequences for peoples’ deliberative freedoms and irrespective of whether or not 
they cherish or exercise those freedoms. It is wrong, in other words, based on non-
teleological reasons – because when some people are treated disadvantageously based on 
their race they are treated as if they bear an inferior moral status compared to others.  
Thus, the wrong of discrimination is better captured by the idea of degraded moral 
status, rather than by its damaging consequences for our deliberative freedoms. There are 
some similar concerns, however, underlying Moreau’s focus on extraneous features and 
theories of discrimination that ground its wrong not on liberty, but on moral relevance. 
According to those theories, discrimination is wrongful because the act that produced the 
result can only be understood if morally irrelevant considerations have been taken into 
account at least at some stage, which might be in the distant past.107 For instance, Bell and 
Waddington argue that certain characteristics, such as sex, race, or sexual orientation are 
prohibited grounds of differential treatment in employment because they are irrelevant to 
an individual’s ability to undertake certain duties.108 Moreover, I think that an account 
based on moral irrelevance makes better sense of the prevailing political sense of 
discrimination, namely that it constitutes a form of departure from equality in need of 
moral justification. 109  Prohibition of translating morally irrelevant differences into 
disadvantage is intertwined with an interpretation of the value of equality in opposition to 
oppression through hierarchies of social status, caste, class privileges and the 
undemocratic distribution of power.110 By the same token, Sunstein argues that there is a 
strong ‘anticaste principle’ underlying prohibition of discrimination, which forbids ‘social 
and legal practices from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into 
systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to do so.’111 
Thus, certain forms of expressive conduct may be particularly harmful due to the 
conception of unfairness generated by its cultural associations with oppression, 
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subordination and disadvantage.112 Oppression, as Anderson argues, means ‘domination, 
exploitation, marginalisation, demeaning and infliction of violence by some groups of 
people upon others’,113 which prohibition of discrimination should aim to challenge.114 
Despite their differences, all above accounts share the seminal idea that discrimination is 
wrong because it perpetrates an unfair situation brought about by individual or collective 
judgments influencing the lives of others based upon morally irrelevant considerations.  
I think that that approach accords with our human rights practice and explains the 
partly expressive and symbolic character of discrimination rights. However, it requires 
further explication because determining which considerations are morally relevant (and 
which are not) in the distribution of resources, burdens or opportunities brings forward a 
host of interesting questions. For instance, Wasserstrom notes that ‘the principle that 
persons ought not to be treated on the basis of morally arbitrary features cannot grasp the 
fundamental wrong of direct racial discrimination,’ because it is too isolated from the 
actual features of a society in which many people have racist attitudes. 115  Lippert-
Rasmussen argues that irrelevance discrimination is inadequate to capture the wrong in 
discrimination because if a shop owner refuses to employ black women because his most 
loyal customers are racists, the race of his employees becomes a relevant factor that an 
account of discrimination based on the relevance theory cannot capture.116 
But justifying the wrong of discrimination on moral irrelevance is distinct from 
theories grounding its wrong on behavioural irrationality. As Gardner argues, if a 
restaurant’s customers are white racists, the owner’s decision not to serve blacks is not 
irrational, but would still be wrong. 117  Still, the criticism put forward by Lippert-
Rasmussen may not be based on a normative confusion over relevance and rationality. It 
may be based on a descriptive interpretation of the idea of relevance. In a descriptive 
sense, the race of someone’s employees is relevant indeed when his clientele is racist. But 
we do not use relevance descriptively here. Theories of moral relevance use it in a 
normative, rather than a descriptive, sense to connote which factors should never be 
relevant according to our principles of political morality. 118  In a descriptive sense 
someone’s race may well be relevant to a shop-owner who wants to please his racist 
customers by employing only white assistants. In the normative sense, race can never be 
morally relevant in the context of the case. 119  Still, it could be argued that similar 
objections to those discussed against merit theories of discrimination, namely that moral 
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relevance confuses anti-discrimination with meritocracy, can apply here too. If an 
employer hires his son over someone better qualified, his decision is based on morally 
irrelevant factors to the employee’s ability to satisfy the job requirements. But that would 
be a case of nepotism rather than discrimination.120 Yet recall that our enquiry focuses on 
the moral wrong that that behaviour inflicts, and not on the separate taxonomic question 
of how such behaviour should be classified. It might well be that the decision of the father 
to hire his son is better understood as nepotism rather than discrimination. But that does 
not deny the possibility that nepotism and discrimination may put us at risk of the very 
same moral wrong. 
 
5.5.2. Discrimination, equality and prejudice 
 
An account grounding the wrong of discrimination on moral irrelevance has to be 
complemented by the reasons why those characteristics are irrelevant and why they ought 
not to be taken into account. Focusing on the wrong of religious discrimination, I think 
that its wrongfulness is morally justified by the principle that in a fair society no one 
should suffer because she is a member of a socially salient group thought less worthy of 
respect, as a group, than others. That principle suggests that religious discrimination 
affects its victims in a fundamental way, namely ‘it distorts their ability to feel pride in 
membership in groups, identification with which is an important element in their life.’121 
Different theories of discrimination embrace different dimensions of that principle when 
they claim that individuals should be judged on merit; that they should not suffer 
disadvantage due to their immutable characteristics; and that they should be free to make 
choices regardless of ‘extraneous’ features.122 Human dignity rules out disadvantaging 
others in ways that would be suitable only if the victims had ‘diminished or degraded’ 
moral status.123 As Hellman argues, discrimination is wrong when it demeans others, 
namely when it debases or degrades them, or else treats someone ‘as not fully human or 
not of equal moral worth’.124  Clearly a certain degree of power or status is necessary to 
demean others because one should be in a position such that this expression of disrespect 
for the ‘equal humanity of others’ can subordinate the other.125  
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Hellman’s account is representative of equality-based theories of discrimination. 
According to equality-based theories, discrimination is wrong because it is founded on 
prejudice and stereotypes, which are interwoven with the idea that certain people are not 
entitled to equal respect and concern because of their membership in certain social 
groups. Stereotypes are wrong precisely because they entrap people in certain identities 
and justify treatment according to those.126 Social exclusion of racial and religious groups 
systematically violates the fundamental right to be treated as an equal by the state. 
Equality, understood not as a ‘flat’ commitment to treat others consistently (‘treating likes 
alike’), but as a commitment to treat others as equals, incorporates a ‘redistributive 
dimension’, which aims ‘to correct disadvantage as well as prejudice within one 
concept.’127 This interpretation of the moral wrong of discrimination ties the concept to 
the equal and objective value of human life, which culminates to the idea that the 
government should treat everyone with equal respect and concern, that is, as equals. I 
think that this account makes moral sense of the use of discrimination by the European 
courts. For instance, as the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice has noted 
in Coleman v Attridge Law 
 
to protect the dignity and autonomy of persons belonging to those suspect 
classifications… treating someone less well on the basis of reasons such as religious 
belief, age, disability and sexual orientation undermines this special and unique value 
that people have by virtue of being human.128 
 
Moreover, that principle explains why it is inadequate to justify the moral wrong of 
discrimination based on the idea that people should not suffer disadvantage based on 
certain immutable characteristics. People do not choose their race or, often, their religion. 
But they do not choose their levels of intelligence or their bodily strength, either. We do 
not say, however, that admission tests based on intelligence or sports tests based on bodily 
strength, such as those that universities and football teams commonly carry out, are 
discriminatory as a result. Race, religion, gender, sexual orientation and disability, among 
others, are different from intelligence or bodily strength not because they are not selected 
– they are as unselected as intelligence, strength and beauty. Rather, exclusions based on 
race or religion are different because historically 129  they have been instituted and 
                                                        
126 A. Timmer, ‘Towards an anti-stereotyping approach for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 
11(4) Human Rights Law Review 707. 
127 Fredman, Discrimination Law, 26. 
128 Case C-303/06 Coleman v. Attridge Law [2008] E.C.R. I-5603, [2008] I.R.L.R. 722, at 9. 
129 There are various theories about why or how the history and current social status of particular groups 
matters. The first is associated with Owen Fiss and his anti-caste understanding of equality laws, according 
to which discrimination laws prohibit certain states of affairs that allow caste-like distinctions between 
people; O. Fiss, ‘Groups and the equal protection clause’ (1976) 5 Philosophy & Public Affairs 107-177. 
See also C. Sunstein, ‘The anticaste principle’ (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 2410-2455, 2411. Another 
theory has been associated with the work of John Hart Ely who has argued that systemic disadvantage 
matters when we assess a policy that differentiates on grounds of protected characteristics because women, 
for instance, are likely to be either entirely excluded from the processes through which the policy has been 
adopted or to have had their voices or interests discounted in that process; see J. H. Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980). See also M. Risse and R. 
Zeckhauser, ‘Racial profiling’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 131, 157-159. There is however a 
Chapter 5 | Two Birds with One Stone 
 152 
reproduced not as a matter of some instrumental calculation, as in the case of intelligence 
or athletic ability, but because of contempt for the excluded race or religion as such.130 
Recall that under the moralised conceptions of discrimination and disadvantage that holds 
regardless of how others are treated. Someone who complains that he has been 
discriminated against on ground of race does not have his claim discounted by the fact 
that people of all races are equally likely to turn their applications down on racial grounds 
because racists of different colours sit occasionally, and with the same frequency, on a 
university’s admissions committee.131 
The debate is ultimately one about moral principle. It can also be framed as an 
inquiry into the attitude that the government must have in order for its actions to have a 
certain kind of meaning – namely, to express an important kind of respect for others. 
Understood in this way, whether an action involves treating a person discriminatorily 
depends on what the agent saw as reasons. It involves an inquiry into the reasons why a 
government disadvantages certain people by denying them, for instance, certain rights, 
powers, or exemptions. The concept of discrimination cannot by itself, however, specify 
whether it is wrongful to impose disadvantages on people based on their religion, and 
when this is so. Substantive moral reasoning is essential to answer that. Moral arguments 
such as those discussed above would entail that, if we revisit one of the examples earlier 
discussed, the admissions officers that consider applications only from students whose 
surnames start with a vowel act unfairly, and in violation of the university’s code of 
ethics, but their actions do not constitute discrimination because their actions are too 
isolated to gain social traction132 and amount to prejudice.133 The same holds for separate 
lavatories for men and women. They do not constitute sex discrimination because that 
form of separation does not, as a practice, express prejudice or contempt for certain 
members of the community.134 For exactly the same reasons, the opposite holds in cases 
where an employer requires his female employees to wear cosmetics at work. As Hellman 
notes, that practice is demeaning for women because ‘it conveys the idea that a woman’s 
body is for adornment and the enjoyment by others.’135 
At this point, I would like to return to equality because questions about which 
conception of the value of equality informs discrimination law regularly concern political 
and legal theory. It has been argued, among others, that there are different definitions of 
the content and requirements of equality, that equality can be both ‘justification for legal 
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intervention’ and a ‘social goal’ of that intervention,136 and that equality is limited in 
terms of the range of anti-discrimination protections that is capable of justifying as it is 
tied to ‘the reproduction of existing social norms rather than the generation of new and 
more liberal norms.’137 As we briefly discussed above, our fundamental entitlement to be 
treated with equal respect and concern by the state entails treating people as equals. In 
some cases treating people as equals will entail distribution of resources or privileges so 
that some people’s shares will end up bigger or smaller than others’, that is, they will have 
been treated unequally.138 But treating as equals does not necessarily require equality of 
treatment.139 In a state where the government has no more than limited resources for 
emergency relief, treating as equals will require giving more resources to the areas of the 
country or the groups of people that have suffered more damage.140 That might not be 
consistent treatment but it shows equal concern for the people in the affected areas.  
A reason-blocking account of our right to freedom from discrimination suggests that 
not every limitation of our right necessarily breaches the moral requirement to be treated 
as equals by the state. Rather, treatment as equals is violated only when the constraint on 
someone’s liberty is justified based on the fact that others condemn his convictions or 
values. Recall that if the justification for the limitation on our right can succeed without 
counting the moralistic preferences of the majority in the balance, then the message of the 
limitation in question would be that it is impossible that everyone’s interests will be 
equally protected, and that the interests of minority groups might at times have to 
succumb to the legitimate concerns of the majority.141 There is no denial of treatment as 
an equal in that case though – not according to the reason-blocking theory of rights we 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. However, if the justification for the restriction 
cannot succeed without relying on majoritarian preferences about personal morality, that 
is, about how we should live, and the state nevertheless resorts to that justification, then 
the message of the limitation is different. It is exactly that some people must have less 
because others dislike the lives they propose to lead, which seems no more justifiable in a 
society committed to treating people as equals, than the proposition that some people 
must suffer disadvantage under law because others dislike them.142 The question therefore 
is not whether any deviation from equal treatment should be allowed but whether the 
reasons for deviation are consistent with the fundamental principle of legitimacy, namely 
that the state should treat everyone with equal respect and concern. 
Equal treatment, in the form of ‘consistent’ treatment or formal equality, is therefore 
derivative from, not antagonistic to, treating as equals.143 Sometimes consistent treatment 
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will be required, but in other cases it will be not. Discriminatory rules are distinct from 
other forms of arbitrariness, not because they inflict disadvantage to some and not to 
others, in the thin descriptive sense earlier discussed, but because it is unacceptable to 
count prejudice ‘among the interests or preferences government should seek to satisfy.’144 
It is the absence of a ‘prejudice-free’ justification for coercive action that makes laws or 
policies discriminatory. As it happens with the right to freedom of religion itself, 
limitations on our right to freedom from religious discrimination are justifiable provided 
that they are motivated not by prejudice, but because of a rational calculation about the 
socially most beneficial use of limited resources for education or healthcare or any other 
domain of the common good.145  
I think that this reason-blocking interpretation of the normative justification 
underlying the right to freedom from discrimination, and the right to freedom from 
religious discrimination in particular, is better suited than other accounts of the wrong of 
discrimination earlier discussed to explain certain morally important parts of the judicial 
practice under the Convention that were examined in Chapter Three. Consider some 
examples. In European Roma Rights Centre, the UK House of Lords found that the fact 
that the UK immigration officers were far more likely to reject visa applications from 
Roma people constitutes discrimination because, as Lady Hale argued, each person should 
be ‘treated as an individual and not assumed to be like other members of a group.’146  
Moreover, in the employment realm, in cases such as Eweida and Ladele the fact that 
some religious groups may need to exercise their ‘right to resign’ more often than others 
indicates that a ‘parallel right to equality’ may have been infringed.147 The account of 
religious discrimination defended in this chapter explains what that ‘right to equality’ 
means on a practical level too. The ECtHR seeks for comparators not because their 
availability is constitutive of the scope or structure of our right to freedom from religious 
discrimination, but because inconsistent treatment of similarly situated individuals is a 
symptom of perseverance of impermissible kinds of reason, such as prejudice. The right to 
freedom from religious discrimination precludes governmental actions motivated by those 
very kinds of reason. 
But if the absence of a prejudice-free justification is what makes a rule or practice 
discriminatory, could this mean that discrimination is wrongful only against minorities? 
Or else, can members of socially prominent groups, such as members of religious 
majorities such as Christians in the UK, be victims of discrimination, as it has been 
argued in the wake of the Eweida and Ladele cases?148 In racial discrimination, it has 
been argued that dominant social groups, such as white people in the United States, 
cannot be victims of discrimination because they systematically enjoy various advantages 
for being white. As Scanlon has argued, white people can discriminate against blacks but 
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not the opposite because discrimination is ‘unidirectional’, in the sense that it applies only 
to actions that disadvantage members of groups ‘that have been subject to widespread 
denigrations and exclusion.’149 Unidirectionality of discrimination is grounded on the idea 
that prejudice involves attitudes associated not with one particular agent but ‘widely 
shared in the society in question and commonly expressed and acted on in ways that have 
serious consequences.’ 150  Owen Fiss has famously described discrimination as the 
‘perpetual subordination’ of already disadvantaged groups, whose political power remains 
severely circumscribed.151 
However, notwithstanding various potentially unfair advantages of dominant social 
groups, it is too rigid to suppose that people belonging to dominant groups may not be 
victims of discrimination. Even if the disadvantages on grounds of their group 
membership might be too small given the advantages they enjoy, it still does not follow 
that they cannot be victims of discrimination. Unfortunately this chapter cannot discuss 
this important point further but, in a moralised sense, discrimination against Christians in 
a Christian-dominated country is plausible provided that the moral interpretation of the 
limitations on their rights indicates that they are likely to have been polluted by the 
impermissible reasons earlier discussed. 
That point brings the discussion back to another important question. Thus far the 
analysis of the wrong in discrimination did not distinguish between direct and indirect 
forms of discrimination. Do they inflict the same kind of wrong? As Chapter Four 
discussed, there are two types of indirect discrimination: structural and non-structural. 
Recall that some of the most egregious forms of indirect discrimination are commonly 
referred to as structural because they depend on legal rules and social norms that 
systematically disadvantage the members of certain socially salient groups. The account 
of religious discrimination favoured here shows that direct and structural indirect 
discrimination are morally wrong for the very same reason. They are morally wrong 
because legitimate governmental action can never be motivated by reasons that express 
contempt for certain members or sections of the community because of their beliefs or 
group membership. No one should be denied employment and equal opportunities to 
flourish because others think that she should have less because of who she is or what she 
believes. 
On the other hand, non-structural indirect discrimination is often intertwined with 
structural indirect discrimination or with direct discrimination. For instance, a given 
company’s promotion practice that favours men over women is linked to structural sex 
discrimination that pre-exists the policy. Furthermore, it is often argued that one of the 
main differences between direct and indirect discrimination is that the former is process-
oriented, whereas the latter is result-oriented.152 On that account, direct discrimination 
involves flaws in procedures, which lead to unfair outcomes. Such flaws might be 
conscious or unconscious, albeit intentional. Indirect discrimination, by contrast, involves 
problematic outcomes. Nevertheless, that distinction between process and outcomes is too 
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crude. Indirect discrimination does involve process wrongs, albeit on a different level to 
direct discrimination. More specifically, in cases of structural indirect discrimination, 
disadvantageous treatment of certain socially salient groups is not sufficient by itself to 
ground structural discrimination. Rather, it is the link between group membership and 
disadvantageous outcome that highlights who is disproportionately affected and how. 
Focusing on outcomes, rather than procedures, does not detract from the fact that the 
moral wrong is the same here too: procedures that turn certain forms of difference into 
disadvantage are morally wrong when they are motivated by reasons that disparage or 
demean certain sections of the community. The added value of indirect discrimination is 
its ability to challenge reigning social norms that reproduce various forms of inequity,153 
but its normative justification is philosophically indistinguishable from the normative 
justification of prohibition of direct discrimination. 
 
5.6.  Two Birds with One Stone: Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religious 
Discrimination 
 
5.6.1.  Freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination 
 
The preceding analysis promotes an interpretation of the right to freedom of religion and 
the right to freedom from religious discrimination in light of each other. Limitations on 
the right to freedom of religion, either in the form of direct prohibitions or in the form of 
lack of accommodation, which cannot be justified on prejudice-free reasons, violate both 
the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom from religious discrimination. 
Respect for human dignity requires that each one of us is personally responsible to make 
important ethical decisions independently and authentically, including religion, belief and 
membership in any communities of faith. Any form of subordination to the moral 
preferences of the majority about the fact that some should enjoy less as a matter of 
prejudice violates the fundamental right to be treated with equal respect and concern by 
the state. That moral principle unifies the right to freedom of religion and the right to 
freedom from religious discrimination, regardless of whether comparators are available. 
The two rights are intertwined. Each one presupposes the other. 
That interpretation is attractive because it makes moral sense of the practice of the 
ECtHR, which uses the two provisions interchangeably and without a discernible pattern. 
Time and again, in cases examining similar complaints about conscientious objection to 
military service, such as Thlimmenos v Greece (decided under Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 9 ECHR) and Bayatyan v Armenia (decided only under Article 9), about lack 
of accommodation of religion in employment, such as Ladele and McFarlane (decided 
under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR) and Sessa and S.H. and H.V. 
(decided only under Article 9) and about lack of accommodation of religion in the 
provision of services, such as Cha’are Shalom (decided under Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 9 ECHR) and Jakóbski and Gatis Kovalkovs (decided only under Article 9) 
                                                        
153 M. Selmi, ‘Indirect discrimination and the Anti-discrimination mandate’, in D. Hellman and S. Moreau 
(eds.) Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 250, 266-267. 
Chapter 5 | Two Birds with One Stone 
 157 
the ECtHR grounds its judgments on the very same correlative moral principles of 
equality and fairness despite using different legal bases. Certainly, under both provisions 
the task of the ECtHR remains the same, namely to determine whether state measures that 
treat differently people on grounds of their religion interfere with people’s rights, are 
prescribed by law and pursue a legitimate aim in ways proportionate to the aim sought.154 
But unifying the two rights also helps to explain that the ECtHR intervenes only 
whenever the reasons that our rights are supposed to exclude are present in the particular 
political conflict, namely whenever the interpretation of specific limitations shows that 
they denigrate certain members or sections of the community on the basis of their spiritual 
commitments. This reason-blocking interpretation explains the partly symbolic and 
expressive character of the moral rights to freedom of religion and freedom from religious 
discrimination and provides for a more cohesive interpretation of the two compared to 
interest-based accounts that insist that certain individual interests, protected as rights or as 
grounds of discrimination, are simply to be privileged over others.  
It also explains what the ECtHR decides when it dismisses Article 14 claims of 
religious discrimination because they were sufficiently addressed under Article 9 ECHR. 
An egalitarian analysis of the right to freedom of religion takes place under the discussion 
of Article 9 of the Convention regardless of whether or not the applicant has complained 
under the Article 14 ECHR as well. This is what the Court means when it holds that ‘the 
inequality of treatment has been sufficiently taken into account’ in its assessment of the 
right to freedom of religion.155 It is not essential therefore to rule on both complaints. The 
argument that the two rights share their normative foundations on the need to protect our 
ethical responsibility from certain impermissible kinds of reason explains why ruling on 
only one violation out of the two is enough. It follows that arguments building on the 
distinction between freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination and 
claiming that individual complaints under Article 9 would fare better if framed as anti-
discrimination claims based on Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 have value only as 
suggestions for litigation strategy, and do not offer a convincing substantive account of 
the right to freedom from religious discrimination.156 
A possible objection could be the following. If both rights protect us from the very 
same moral wrong and provide for similar right-based politics, then why the Convention 
includes two distinct provisions? What is the role of Article 14 if an investigation of the 
inequality of treatment takes place within the examination of Article 9 ECHR regardless? 
This is an important, albeit not too worrying, objection. The objection disregards that the 
existence of distinct provisions for different rights does not entail that those rights spring 
from different normative foundations. Consider S.A.S. v France, a case on the prohibition 
of the full-face veil from the public space in France that will be more thoroughly 
discussed in the next chapter. The applicant based her complaint, among others, on 
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various individual rights, including respect for private life, freedom of religion and 
freedom from religious discrimination. Both her application and the ECtHR in the 
examination of her complaint employed and analysed the rights to respect for private life 
and freedom of religion in parallel and interchangeably without drawing any meaningful 
normative distinction between them. In fact, the same has happened in several cases 
involving the wearing of religious symbols in public, such as Dogru and Kervanci v 
France,157 Jasvir Singh v France,158 and Ranjit Singh v France.159 It is impossible to 
discuss this point further here, but it might well be that apart from Article 9 and Article 14 
in conjunction with 9, other rights, such as respect for private life and freedom of 
expression, draw their normative power from similar sources. And in any event the 
inclusion of additional provisions is not necessarily morally important. It may be justified 
on reasons of legal certainty, or on facilitating litigation and the structure of judicial tests. 
A particular taxonomy of rights does not mean that something valuable hangs from it, or 
from the construction of the Convention. Recall that in this chapter we already examined 
– and dismissed – the idea that judicial tests play a constitutive role about what rights we 
have. Some of those arguments apply here as well. 
 
5.6.2.  Freedom from religious discrimination and freedom from sexual orientation 
discrimination 
 
If an appeal to our rights to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination is just a 
way of excluding certain kinds of reason from politics, then how can we resolve conflicts 
between rights? What does an analysis of discrimination based on prejudice entail in cases 
where accommodation of religious claims might conflict with the right to freedom from 
discrimination on ground of sexual orientation? As Chapter Three argued, reliance upon 
religious beliefs, regardless of whether those beliefs form part of traditional and respected 
or minority and unpopular religions, cannot immunise believers from the reach of certain 
secular laws. But can a moral analysis of the wrong in religious discrimination help us 
locate clear answers in cases where different grounds of discrimination find themselves in 
tension? 
The ECtHR has addressed that sort of intra-discrimination conflict in Macfarlane v 
United Kingdom and Ladele v United Kingdom, which were jointly decided in 2013.160 
The Ladele case examined the complaint of a Christian registrar, who faced disciplinary 
action and ultimately lost her job because she refused to register same-sex partnerships.161 
Her orthodox Christian views regarded marriage as the union of one man and one woman, 
and thus precluded her participation in the creation of a same-sex institution equivalent to 
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marriage.162 The ECtHR agreed that her refusal was directly motivated by her Christian 
beliefs and used as a relevant comparator a registrar with no religious objection to same-
sex unions in order to determine whether the applicant has been discriminated against 
based on her religion.163 The refusal of the local authority to accommodate the applicant 
did amount to indirect discrimination against her,164 since the general requirement that all 
registrars would also register civil partnerships had a particularly detrimental effect on 
Ms. Ladele due to her religious beliefs.165 However, given that the policy of the local 
authority pursued the legitimate goal of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, which the court considers very important, the indirect discrimination in 
question was found justified.166 Therefore, the Strasbourg court held unanimously that 
dismissing the applicant was not a disproportionate measure. The Court reached a similar 
result in Macfarlane,167 a case arising from a complaint of a Christian counselor who also 
argued that his employer’s insistence that he provide relationship and sexual therapy to 
same-sex couples subjected him to unlawful religious discrimination.168 All in all, in both 
Ladele and McFarlane it has been clear that the principle of equal treatment has played a 
central role to the reasoning of the ECtHR in justifying the restrictions applied.169 
Those cases denote that the principle of equal treatment, at least as exemplified in 
anti-discrimination laws, may sketch the scope of the right to hold religious beliefs and 
live according to them. It has also been argued that the role of the courts in a diverse and 
largely secular society should not be to stand guard over public morality but to ensure that 
the majorities will not impose their opinions ‘on those who, for whatever reason, 
comprise a small, weak, unpopular or voiceless minority’. 170  A just multi-cultural 
community of people requires judges who accept that, within limits, the law might 
tolerate lifestyles that society as a whole deems undesirable.171 
Be that as it may, are Ladele and McFarlane examples of cases where a 
traditionalist majority wishes to impose its opinion with regard to the rights of same-sex 
partnerships on an unpopular minority, namely, homosexuals? If it is true that 
‘conservative views on sexuality have moved rapidly from majority to minority 
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position’,172 then the roles may also be the other way round: it might indeed be that a 
progressive majority wants to impose its liberal views about same-sex partnerships on an 
increasingly less popular minority group of Christian people that embrace traditional 
family values.173 In fact, that is precisely what the applicants have argued before the 
ECtHR. They believe that marriage is the union between one man and one woman. Why 
should they not have the right to behave according to their beliefs? Should the majority 
opinion prevail because it is more liberal, or because it is just right? 
The reason-blocking theory of rights defended so far does not deny that sometimes 
it might be necessary to balance rights against one another. It suggests, however, that the 
way that this should be done is by focusing on whether the reasons that one or the other 
right is supposed to block are really present in a given political conflict, on one side or the 
other. This is where an analysis of the reasons for the limitations on freedom of religion in 
question, which is no other than an analysis of the reasons for having laws protecting 
against sexual orientation discrimination, proves valuable. Prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation aims to secure our sexuality as a matter of self-respect,174 
which we have to be able to fulfill through relationships with others175 as a matter of 
human dignity. In Bull v Hall,176 where the UK Supreme Court held that refusing to 
accommodate a same-sex couple in a double bedroom constitutes unlawful discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation,177 Lady Hale argued that denying to homosexuals the 
possibility of fulfilling themselves through relationships with others for a long time is ‘an 
affront to their dignity as human beings which our law has now (some would say 
belatedly) recognised.’ 178  Her analysis is congenial to theories locating the harm of 
discrimination in the relationship between ‘stigma, denial of opportunities and the 
historical facts of disadvantage.’ 179  Rights and liberties do not depend on sexual 
orientation. Rather, each human being embodies equal moral status by virtue of her 
humanity;180 equal moral status is then the basis of certain moral entitlements in the form 
of rights that everyone should enjoy regardless of gender or social position or sexuality.181 
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The right not to be discriminated against on ground of sexual orientation is one of those 
rights.  
A useful and minimalistic snapshot of our moral duties towards others is embedded in 
what Jeremy Waldron calls assurance.182  Assurance means that everyone should feel 
secure in that she has ‘an elementary entitlement to justice, and [that] all deserve 
protection from the most egregious forms of violence, exclusion, indignity and 
subordination.’ 183  In that sense the legislation and courts should secure those 
fundamentals in people’s minds, even if we are unable to agree on the more detailed 
principles of a theory of justice. Abstract though it might sound, assurance is 
tremendously important especially for vulnerable members of our community. Criminal 
law, anti-discrimination legislation, and human rights laws secure equal respect for some 
of the most elementary entitlements to justice that everyone should be assured about. But 
assurance means more than placing and enforcing legal rules: just like dignity, which is 
silently carried by everyone, assurance is mainly conveyed in an implicit way via 
everyday unnoticeable marks that lead everyone in a well-ordered society take for granted 
that the fundamental principles of dignity are widely shared and state guaranteed. 
The gist of that interpretation corresponds to the Rawlsian depiction of a well-ordered 
society as ‘a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the 
very same principles of justice.’184 Open to all public places, equal access to education 
and employment, public services and goods available to everyone, are all hints that 
everyone is accepted as full member of a community. 185  Sometimes assurance is 
conveyed explicitly as well, for example through spots or leaflets informing customers 
about their rights, but it is mostly its implicit aura that alludes to a community committed 
to the fundamentals of justice.  In that sense it constitutes a silent public good that 
‘depends on and arises out of what hundreds or thousands of ordinary citizens do singly 
and together.’186 Moreover, assurance relies heavily on self-application, just like anti-
discrimination legislation: its efficiency cannot depend only on state enforcement 
measures, but clings to the application of such laws on an every-day basis in every-day 
social and financial relations by everyone.  The point is that assurance – just like anti-
discrimination laws – would simply be fallacious if a policeman was required every time 
someone is refused access to a hotel or a bus or employment because of his race or 
religious membership or sexual orientation. Rather, its realisation entails everyone to play 
her part. 
I think that an interpretation of the right to freedom from sexual orientation based 
on the need to assure homosexual people that they and their partnerships ‘are worthy of 
equal respect and esteem’187 explains why the ECtHR requires very weighty reasons to 
                                                        
182 J. Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, 2012) 81-89. 
183 ibid 83. 
184 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) 35. Also J. Rawls, ‘Distributive justice: 
Some addenda’, in S. Freeman (ed.) John Rawls: Collected Papers (Harvard University Press, 2001) 158. 
185 On the justification and requirements of fair access to the public forum see J. Cohen, ‘Freedom of 
Expression’ (1993) 22(3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 207, 245-250. 
186 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, 87-89. 
187 Bull v Hall, §36. 
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justify exceptions to prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.188 By 
the same token, when same-sex couples enter into a mutual commitment equivalent to 
marriage, it is substantively and symbolically important that the suppliers of goods, 
facilities and services treat them equally to different-sex couples. The legacy of 
discrimination and persecution against homosexuality189 explains why we should hesitate 
‘to accept that prohibiting hotel keepers from discriminating against homosexuals is a 
disproportionate limitation on their right to manifest their religion.’ 190  This is not to 
suggest that the limitations on the right to freedom of religion under investigation are 
justified because religion is less important than equal treatment regardless of sexual 
orientation. There is nothing indicating that the results in these cases would be different 
were the refusal to provide the service grounded in a protected characteristic other than 
sexual orientation. Rather, in the hypothetical case that the applicants refused services 
based on the customers’ race, age, or religion, limitations on their right to freedom of 
religion would be equally justifiable. Recall that the interpretation that this chapter 
defends associates rights to freedom from discrimination with the exclusion of other 
people’s dislikes and prejudices as grounds for coercive prohibitions. The argument of the 
applicants in Ladele and McFarlane that the ECtHR should leave space for the lifestyles 
of devout people, who wish to live honouring their most important commitments in life, is 
based on an ultimately inadequate theory of rights. Strong protection for anti-
discrimination is not meant to constrict religious lifestyles, but to achieve the exact 
opposite: to allow different, unconventional lifestyles to arise and flourish. 
 
5.7.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter developed and defended an interpretation of the right to freedom from 
religious discrimination that trails the normative connections between that right and the 
right to freedom of religion or belief. I argued that the two rights share parts of their 
normative foundations on the reason-blocking quality of the more general right to equal 
respect for our ethical independence, which excludes certain reasons, such as prejudice, 
from justifying state action. This interpretation explains the interchangeable deployment 
of freedom of religion and freedom from religious discrimination in recent complaints 
about lack of accommodation of religious beliefs before the ECtHR, and unravels the 
doctrinal confusion surrounding their relationship. What follows is that arguments 
building on the distinction between the rights to freedom of religion and freedom from 
religious discrimination and claiming that individual complaints under Article 9 of the 
Convention would fare better if framed as anti-discrimination claims may be valuable 
                                                        
188 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, No. 1263, at 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/1263/pdfs/uksiem_20071263_en.pdf>. 
189 On that matter Lady Hale also referred to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6, §117, where the South African Constitutional Court held that ‘while recognising the 
unique worth of each person, the Constitution does not presuppose that a holder of rights is an isolated, 
lonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodies and socially disconnected self. It acknowledges that 
people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places and their times. The expression of 
sexuality requires a partner, real or imagined.’ 
190 Bull v Hall, §53. 
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suggestions for litigation strategy. But they ultimately do not offer an attractive account of 
the wrong of religious discrimination and of its profound interconnections with the very 
sorts of reasons and considerations that the right to freedom of religion itself aims to 
protect us from.  
At this point, it would be useful to enquire whether the normative account of the 
right to freedom of religion that the present Chapter, along with Chapters Two and Three, 
developed is reflected in other distinctive areas of law and religion under the ECHR. The 
next two chapters play that role. They will examine and evaluate the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR based on the normative account of the right thus far defended. Chapter Five will 
examine cases on the wearing of religious symbols in public. Chapter Six will then focus 
on state regulations of blasphemy and on their justifiability. 
Chapter 6 | Religious Symbols, Blanket Prohibitions and Public Space 
 164 
 
6 
 
Religious Symbols, Blanket Prohibitions and Public Space 
 
 
 
[T]he question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil 
in public places constitutes a choice of society. In such circumstances, the 
Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of Convention 
compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has been 
struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question. 
 
S.A.S. v France1 
 
 
How do you liberate women by criminalising their clothing? 
 
Shami Chakrabarti2 
 
 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
Chapters Two, Three and Five have so far developed and defended an interpretation of the 
right to freedom of religion that embeds equal respect and reinforces the relationship of 
the right with other rights, including the right to freedom from religious discrimination. 
Discriminatory measures that fail to show equal respect regardless of conscience and 
affiliation are incompatible with the right to freedom of religion or belief. This chapter 
will examine the application of this normative framework in European cases of ‘blanket’ 
prohibitions on the wearing of religious symbols in public. As Chapter Two briefly 
discussed, individual conscience gives rise to countless practices with varying effects on 
our communal space. Nevertheless, due to space constraints, the analysis of this chapter 
will be confined to cases involving the right to religious manifestation through the 
wearing of religious symbols in public and will not pursue any detailed examination of 
cases on places of worship,3 and cases on religious symbol prohibitions in schools and 
                                                        
1 Application no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber), §§153-154. 
2 ‘Burka Ban “Does Not Violate Human Rights” Rules European Court – Despite Outcry from UK Group, 
Liberty’, The Huffington Post, 1 July 2014, at <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 2014/07/01/ burka-ban-
france_n_5547071.html>. 
3 See e.g. M. Foblets and K. Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project, Summer 2013, 26-27. 
On the Swiss minaret ban see D. Moeckli, ‘Of minarets and foreign criminals: Swiss direct democracy and 
human rights’ (2011) 11(4) Human Rights Law Review 774-794. In 2011, the ECtHR dismissed two 
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universities,4 despite that those sets of cases embody key principles on the expressive 
dimensions of the right. This is not to suggest that the following analysis will bracket off 
those principles. The principles developed in cases involving religious symbols in 
classrooms5 and the wearing of headscarves by teachers6 and students7 are central to the 
European jurisprudence of law and religion and the analysis will refer to them, even if in 
passing. It is important, however, to note from the outset that drawing analogies between 
cases of symbols in education and cases of symbols in the ‘general’ public space requires 
care to ensure accuracy.8 For the reasons behind limitations vary significantly in different 
sets of cases. For instance, cases on religion in education involve distinct interests, such as 
the role of teachers in the hierarchical school environment and the right of parents to 
educate their children in accordance with their religious or philosophical convictions.9 
Those distinctive considerations, which can prove decisive in our interpretation of the 
reasons behind limitations, are unavailable in cases on symbols in the general public 
space. 
This chapter will start with a discussion of cases on blanket prohibitions of religious 
symbols in public, with a focus on the recent S.A.S. v France. I will then turn to cases 
where limitations on manifestation of religion or belief have been more clearly associated 
with security concerns, such as in airport checks or photo IDs. In line with the arguments 
thus far discussed, I will argue that in cases involving tensions between rights, or between 
rights and legitimate collective interests such as public safety, the ECtHR has to carefully 
interpret the reasons behind the limitations in order to highlight whether reasons that our 
right to freedom of religion is supposed to exclude are present in particular political 
conflicts. Although the UN Human Rights Committee has engaged in that kind of 
scrutiny, this is not always the case with the ECtHR. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
complaints about the Swiss minaret ban as the applicants failed to demonstrate that they were direct, 
indirect, or even potential ‘victims’ of the alleged violation of the Convention in accordance with Articles 
35(3) and 35(4) ECHR. See Ouardiri v Switzerland, Application no. 65840/09, 8 July 2011 (inadmissible) 
and Lique des Musulmans de Suisse and Others v Switzerland, Application no. 66274/09, 8 July 2011 
(inadmissible). 
4 For more detailed analyses of religious symbols in the area of education, see M. Hunter-Henin (ed.), Law, 
Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe (Ashgate, 2011); D. McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European 
public square and in European public life – Crucifixes in the classroom?’ (2011) 11(3) Human Rights Law 
Review 451-502; E. Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European Bans on the Wearing of 
Religious Symbols in Education (Routledge, 2012). 
5 Perhaps the most important case is Lautsi v Italy, Application no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011 (Grand 
Chamber). See also I. Trispiotis, ‘Lights, camera, action: The Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights on Lautsi v Italy’ (2011) 12(3) Education Law Journal 41-46. 
6 Dahlab v Switzerland, Application no. 42393/98, 15 February 2001 (inadmissible). Also Kurtulmus v 
Turkey, Application no. 65500/01, 24 January 2006 (inadmissible). 
7 For schools see Köse and 93 Others v Turkey, Application no. 26625/02, 24 January 2006 (inadmissible); 
Dogru v France, Application no. 27058/05, 4 December 2008, and Kervanci v France, Application no. 
31645/04, 4 December 2008 (only in French); Aktas v France, Application no. 43563/08, 30 June 2009 
(inadmissible). For university students see Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Application no. 44774/98, 10 November 
2005 (Grand Chamber). 
8  See e.g. T. Lewis, ‘What not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of 
Appreciation’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395-414; I. Rorive, ‘Religious 
Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’ (2009) 30(6) Cardozo Law Review 2669-
2698. 
9 See right to education, Article 2, Protocol 1 ECHR. 
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6.2.  The Full-face Veil in General Public Space 
 
6.2.1.  Full-face veil regulations in Europe 
 
In July 2013, an officer in Trappes, a western suburb of Paris, asked a woman to remove 
her Islamic full-face veil in order to conduct a routine identity check. After an angry 
wrangle her husband tried to strangle the officer, but he was promptly arrested. A few 
hours later hundreds of people attacked the suburb’s police station with stones and set fire 
to bus shelters and cars demanding the immediate release of the man.10 The rioting lasted 
for two days. The French government reacted via the minister for interior affairs, who 
issued a statement defending the ban on full-face veils in order to protect women ‘from 
those who try to impose other values’.11 In April 2011, France enacted a law prohibiting 
full-face covers in public, which the next section will discuss in more detail. 
Before that discussion, it is worth considering, even briefly, our shared European 
legal practice on the matter, namely whether full-face veils are banned elsewhere in 
Europe. According to a recent report, 12  we could distinguish between three different 
forms of regulation regarding the full-face veil in Europe. The first includes national laws 
prohibiting any form of clothing designed to conceal the face in public.13 The moment I 
am writing these lines such laws exist at national level only in France and Belgium.14 
Human rights organisations, among others, have questioned the necessity of such 
legislation given that in Belgium, for instance, it is estimated that only ‘several dozen out 
of the country’s 375,000 Muslims wear the burqa.’15 Others though have argued for a 
European-wide ban on full-face covers in public.16 This area of law has arguably resulted 
in heated political debates in Europe,17 if not in actual political manipulation by populist, 
xenophobic parties.18 Good understanding of the values underlying protection of human 
                                                        
10  ‘France veil row sparks Trappes unrest’, BBC News, 21 July 2013, at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-23395770>. 
11 ‘Riots in France: Trouble in Trappes’, The Economist, 27 July 2013, at <http://www.economist.com/ 
news/europe/21582314-violence-erupts-over-controversial-burqa-ban-trouble-trappes.> 
12 Foblets and Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project, 24. 
13 On the Belgian burqa ban see L. Peroni, S. Ouald-Chaib and S. Smet, ‘Would a niqab and burqa ban pass 
the Strasbourg test?’, Strasbourg Observers blog, 4 May 2010, at <http://strasbourgobservers 
.com/2010/05/04/burqa-and-niqab-ban/>. 
14 The moment I am writing these lines the ECtHR is examining an application by two Muslim applicants 
who complain about the ban in Belgian law on the wearing of the full-face veil. See Belkacemi and Oussar 
v Belgium, Application no. 37798/13 (communicated to the Belgian Government on 9 June 2015). 
15 Amnesty International, Choice and Prejudice; Discrimination against Muslims in Europe, Report, 2012. 
See also E. Brems, ‘Equality problems in multicultural human rights claims: The example of the Belgian 
“burqa ban”’, in M. van den Brink, S. Burri and J. Goldschmidt (eds.), Equality and Human Rights: Nothing 
but Trouble? Liber Amicorum Titia Loenen (Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 2015) 67-85. 
16 Despite those data that put the issue in its right (small) dimensions, there are certain voices in the 
European Parliament demanding a Europe-wide burqa ban; see L. Phillips, ‘Top German Liberal in EU 
Parliament Wants Europe-wide Burqa Ban’, EU Observer, 3 May 2010, at 
<http://euobserver.com/justice/29991>. 
17 See H. Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion (Oxford University Press, 
2014) 41-72. 
18 See e.g. the debate on the possibility of introducing a ‘local’ ban on the burqa in Frankfurt; ‘Should 
Germany ban the burqa?’, The Local de, 14 July 2014, at <http://www.thelocal.de/20140715/should-
germany-ban-the-burqa-too-opinion>. 
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rights as well as of the meaning and importance of their equal protection becomes 
therefore all the more important. 
A second form of regulation of full-face covers does not involve bans applying 
throughout a state’s territory, but limitations ‘introduced by mayor or other local 
authorities by means of administrative provisions.’19 At the moment, Italy20 and Spain21 
follow this form of regulation. As might be expected, local bans on full-face covers have 
steered constitutional controversy at the domestic level. In February 2013, the Spanish 
Supreme Court held that the ban on full-face covers in the municipality of Lleida,22 which 
was introduced in 2010 to protect public order, social peace and women’s rights, violated 
the right to freedom of religion because it was not shown to be necessary to protect 
women from discrimination and violence.23 According to the Spanish Supreme Court the 
most important factor is whether a woman ‘freely chooses to wear a full face veil.’24 
Finally, a number of European states, including the United Kingdom,25 abstain from 
general (legislative or administrative) prohibitions on full-face covers at national or local 
level. An example of a common approach comes from Denmark, where religious and 
political symbols are prohibited in court, but there are neither general laws forbidding the 
wearing of the full-face veils nor any local administrative provisions outlawing them. 
Instead there are court judgments, guidelines issued by professional bodies and 
government directives that provide some guidance on how to deal with the most 
controversial cases, such as for instance the wearing of full-face covers on means of 
public transport. 26  Specifically with regard to the wearing of religious symbols in 
courtrooms, it is noteworthy that at the moment there is an individual application pending 
before the ECtHR from a lawyer who complains about her expulsion from a courtroom in 
Spain because she was wearing her hijab. 27  The wearing of religious symbols in 
courtrooms – especially the wearing of the full-face veil – has recently sparked public 
debate in a number of European countries, including the United Kingdom,28 which is all 
the more reason for expecting the upcoming judgment of the ECtHR with keen interest. 
 
                                                        
19 Foblets and Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project, 24. 
20 S. Pastorelli, ‘Religious dress codes: the Italian case’, in S. Ferrari and S. Pastorelli, Religion in Public 
Spaces (Ashgate, 2012) 235-254. 
21 One of these local bans, issued in the municipality of Lleida, has been declared unconstitutional by the 
Spanish Supreme Court on 28 February 2013. See Foblets and Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the 
Religare Project, 24. 
22 Amnesty International, ‘Spain: Supreme Court overturns ban on full-face veils; AI concerns remain about 
restrictions on headscarves in schools’, EUR 41/001/2013, 8 April 2013, at <http://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/library/info/EUR41/001/2013/en>. 
23 The Supreme Court held that ‘the ban may have the effect of confining women wearing such a dress to 
the home.’ See Amnesty International, ‘Spain: Supreme Court overturns ban on full-face veils’ (cited 
above). 
24 ibid 
25 In 2010, the UK minister for immigration characterised prohibition of full-face veils ‘un-British’, see at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/18/burqa-ban-unbritish-immigration-minister. 
26 Foblets and Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project, 24. 
27  Barik Edidi v Spain, Application no. 21780/13 (communicated to the Spanish Government on 2 
September 2013). 
28 F. Cranmer, ‘Niqabs and Burqas: The UK’s pop-up debate’, Law & Religion UK, 24 September 2013, at 
< http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2013/09/24/niqabs-and-burqas-the-uks-pop-up-debate/>. 
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6.2.2.  S.A.S. v France 
 
In July 2014 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR published its much-awaited judgment on 
S.A.S. v France.29  The case is important because it is the first time that the ECtHR 
examines a complaint that challenges a national ban on full-face veils in public. The 
applicant of the case, a young French lady, is a devout practicing Muslim. According to 
her submission to the Court, she wears the burqa or the niqab in virtue of her religious 
and cultural convictions. Before the ECtHR the applicant stressed that neither her husband 
nor any other members of her family have pressurised her to wear the face-veil.30 She 
further noted that she wears her niqab ‘non-systematically’, namely that she does not wear 
it when she visits a doctor, when meeting friends in public, when she wants to socialise, 
or when she has to pass security checks in banks, airports or other public places where 
those are required.31 Despite accepting those limitations, she wishes to have the choice to 
publicly manifest her religion through wearing the niqab depending ‘on her spiritual 
feelings’32 and especially during religious events such as the Ramadan. She argued that 
she does not want to divide, but to ‘feel at inner peace with herself.’33  
The applicant complained that the Law no. 2010-1192 (hereinafter ‘the Law’), 
which prohibits individuals from wearing clothing that is designed to conceal the face in 
public places,34 violates, among others, her right to respect for private life, freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression taken separately and together with freedom from 
religious discrimination.35 Amnesty International, Article 19, the Human Rights Centre of 
Ghent University, Liberty, and the Open Society Justice Initiative 36  intervened with 
supportive of the applicant’s complaint statements.  
The Grand Chamber accepted that the ban on the full-face veil constitutes a form of 
interference with the applicant’s rights and embarked on an ‘in-depth’ examination of the 
legitimacy of its aim.37 The French government argued that the Law pursued two aims: 
public safety and protection of the rights and freedoms of others through securing the 
‘minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.’38 The ECtHR held that the 
public safety justification was disproportionate, but accepted the second legitimate aim 
behind the ban, namely the French argument that protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others entails securing a minimum set of values that are fundamental in a democratic 
society. Those included respect for equality between men and women, respect for human 
dignity, and respect for the minimum requirements of life in society. The ECtHR swiftly 
dismissed the argument about gender equality because, as the majority held, states cannot 
‘invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women, such as the 
                                                        
29 Application no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014 (Grand Chamber). 
30 ibid §11. 
31 ibid §§12-13.  
32 ibid 
33 ibid §12. 
34 Law no 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 ‘prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public places’ (in 
force since 11 April 2011), at s. 1. 
35 S.A.S. §§69-74. 
36 ibid §§102-105. 
37 ibid §114. 
38 ibid §116. 
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applicant.’39 This part of the judgment is noteworthy because it marks a significant shift in 
the Court’s approach to gender equality,40 compared to previous cases such as Dahlab v 
Switzerland 41  and Leyla Sahin v Turkey, 42  where the ECtHR held that the Islamic 
headscarf is hard to square with tolerance, respect for others, and equality and non-
discrimination.  
Similarly to the argument about gender equality, the ECtHR swiftly dismissed the 
French argument on respect for human dignity because, as the majority held, human 
dignity could not justify the general ban in question. The full-face veil expresses a cultural 
identity relating to a different notion of decency about the human body43 and, moreover, 
there is no evidence that women who wear it show contempt for others.44 With regard to 
respect for the minimum requirements of life in a democratic society, the French 
government argued that the ban responded to an incompatible practice ‘with the ground 
rules of social communication and more broadly the requirements of “living together”.’45 
The ban aimed to protect social interaction, which is essential to pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness.46 The ECtHR conceded that the face is important to engage in open 
interpersonal relationships, and noted that the explanatory memorandum accompanying 
the Law recognised that voluntary concealment of the face contravenes the ideal of 
fraternity and the minimum requirements of civility that are necessary for social 
interaction.47 On that account, the Court accepted that the full-face veil raises a barrier in 
breach of ‘the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier.’48 Although the majority expressed its concerns about the ‘flexibility’ and 
‘the resulting risk of abuse’ of securing ‘living together’, it accepted that in principle ‘it 
falls within the power of the State to secure the conditions whereby individuals can live 
together in their diversity.’49 
For reasons that, due to space constraints, cannot be fully examined in this chapter, 
the majority of the ECtHR concluded, by fifteen votes to two, that the ban was necessary 
in a democratic society50 and therefore compatible with the Convention. The ban was 
found proportionate to the legitimate aim of preserving the conditions of ‘living together’ 
as required by the rights and freedoms of others.51 The ECtHR was partly aided to reach 
that conclusion by allowing a wide margin of appreciation to France on the basis that ‘the 
                                                        
39 ibid §119. 
40 S. O. Chaib and L. Peroni, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Missed opportunity to do full justice to women wearing a 
face veil’, Strasbourg Observers, 3 July 2014, at <http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-
france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil/#more-2475>. See also M. 
Foblets and K. Alidadi (eds.), Summary Report on the Religare Project, Summer 2013, at 24. 
41 Application no. 42393/98, 15 February 2001 (inadmissible). 
42 Application no. 44774/98, 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber). 
43 S.A.S. §120. 
44 ibid 
45 ibid §153. 
46 ibid 
47 ibid §25 and §141. 
48 ibid §§121-122. 
49 ibid §141. 
50 ibid §158. 
51 ibid §157. 
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question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places 
constitutes a choice of society’.52 
 
6.2.3.  Two interpretations of ‘living together’ 
 
Do the Convention and the ECtHR allow states to decide not only what rights people 
have, but also whether ‘living together’ is inherently valuable, why it is so, and to what 
extent this can be enforced? We cannot resolve that question as quickly as a libertarian 
approach might suggest: we cannot simply contend that people should be free to engage 
in any kind of conduct in public, including wearing any kind of clothing they might wish. 
That would be at odds with the familiar idea that we share certain social duties towards 
others, which translates in common prohibitions of certain forms of individual conduct in 
public, 53  such as nudity. 54  As the applicant herself accepted in S.A.S., sometimes 
protecting ‘living together’ may involve coercion, especially when security reasons are 
implicated. For instance, the applicant maintained that she is happy to remove her full-
face veil whenever she has to undergo identity checks in airports or banks without arguing 
that those instances of state coercion violate her right to private life or freedom of 
religion.55 
The idea of ‘living together’ may well be over-broad and unclear, as the dissenting 
judges argued.56 However, a careful reading of the arguments of the parties shows that the 
French government understands protecting ‘living together’ more dynamically than mere 
conservation of the current state of affairs. It means that the government has an interest in 
protecting our common social life through requiring its members to acknowledge certain 
values, such as fraternity and the minimum requirements of civility that are necessary for 
social interaction, in their individual decisions. 57  But if that interpretation of ‘living 
together’ is accurate, then the idea is uncontroversial, even in the context of the case. 
Throughout the consultation procedure preceding the enactment of the Law there was no 
disagreement on the value of fraternity, or on the importance of open interpersonal 
relationships. Neither the applicant nor the third-party interveners argued or implied 
before the Court that the ‘minimum requirements of life in society’58 are not worthy of 
protection.59 The disagreement did not concern therefore the values underlying ‘living 
together’. But if the parties do not dispute that sometimes securing ‘living together’ may 
justify coercive action, and do not doubt the values underlying ‘living together’, then what 
was the disagreement about?  
                                                        
52 ibid 
53 See Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom, Application no. 7050/75, 12 October 1978, §19; Kalaç v Turkey, 
Application no. 20704/92, 1 July 1997, §27; Leyla Şahin v Turkey, §§105 and 121. 
54 R. McCrea, ‘The ban on the veil and European law’ (2013) 13(1) Human Rights Law Review 57, 78-80. 
55 S.A.S. §§12-13. 
56 S.A.S., Dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, §§5-7. 
57 S.A.S. §153. 
58 In the words of the French government; see ibid §121. 
59 The third-party interveners focused on the fact that prohibition is linked to fear and feelings of uneasiness 
associated not with the full-face veil per se but with the philosophy associated with it, that questions the 
value of ‘living together’; see S.A.S. §§89-105. 
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The statement that the French government has an interest in securing ‘living 
together’ is ambiguous because it alludes to two different and antagonistic goals.60 The 
first is the goal of responsibility. A state may aim that its citizens treat social interaction 
as a matter of moral importance, that they recognise that a democratic state is founded on 
certain values, including solidarity and fraternity, and that they decide reflectively 
whether particular ways of conduct are respectful towards others or not. The second is the 
goal of conformity61 or homogeneity.62 A state may compel its citizens to embrace forms 
of social interaction that the majority believes best capture certain values, such as 
fraternity and civility, and that they manifest their religion in public only in ways that the 
majority considers appropriate in virtue of the ‘right of others to live in a space of 
socialisation which makes living together easier.’63 I think that the disagreement that the 
Court had to resolve in S.A.S. concerns which of the two state goals, responsibility or 
conformity, is compatible with our equal entitlements to respect for private life and 
freedom of religion in a liberal democracy. 
As Dworkin has noted, the goals of responsibility and conformity are not only 
different, but also antagonistic in the following way.64 The state goal of responsibility 
entails that citizens should be left free to decide how they may behave because this is 
what a society committed to personal liberty is expected to do. Conversely, conformity 
denies citizens that decision. Through the conformity conception of ‘living together’ a 
state may often demand that its citizens act in violation of their conscience and they are 
discouraged from developing their own account of ‘living together’ in as much 
compliance as possible with their religious beliefs. 
The legislative history of the ban echoes those two different goals. Before the 
French Parliamentary Commission and the Conseil d’État there was a contrast between 
‘soft’ approaches (e.g. raising awareness, strengthening education for both genders, a 
declaration against oppression of women) and ‘hard’ ones that included criminalisation of 
the wearing of full-face veils in public. 65  That contrast foregrounds the antagonism 
between responsibility and conformity. Likewise, the applicant’s submission interprets 
‘living together’ through the lens of responsibility. Through a series of carefully framed 
qualifications (i.e. no systematic wearing of the full-face veil in public, willingness to 
remove it for security checks) the applicant attempted to convince the ECtHR that she 
takes social interaction as a matter of moral importance. However, according to her 
submission, reconciling her religious commitments with the prevailing social norms of the 
French society should be part of her own personal responsibility. 
                                                        
60  Dworkin draws a comparable, although not exactly similar, distinction between responsibility and 
conformity in abortion cases to interpret the state interest in ‘protecting human life’. See R. Dworkin, 
Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 1996) 95-96; also R. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? 
(Princeton University Press, 2006) 78-79. 
61 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, 95. 
62 M. Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age 
(Harvard University Press, 2012) 13-19. 
63 S.A.S. §122. 
64 ibid. 
65 S.A.S. §§17 and 22. See also S. Mancini, ‘The power of symbols and symbols as power: Secularism and 
religion as guarantors of cultural convergence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2629, 2643-2649. 
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So, does a government that aims to secure our common social life through 
demanding conformity to the majority’s interpretation of the values underlying ‘living 
together’ violate our rights to freedom of religion, respect for private life, and freedom 
from discrimination? An important point has to be clarified here. ‘Living together’ is a 
portmanteau term that covers numerous values bearing on our social practices. Various 
laws are designed to secure conformity in certain domains of our social practice, but they 
are not always wrong. Demanding conformity in urban planning, environmental 
protection or prohibition of violence is right – and expectable in a just and caring political 
community – because those constraints do not rely on personal morality. A political 
community that requires us to pay taxes, to respect scarce environmental resources, and to 
drink no more than a small glass of wine if we are to drive home afterwards does not deny 
our personal responsibility to define ethical value for ourselves. As Chapter Three 
discussed, none of these rules aims to usurp our responsibility to define success in our 
lives, despite having serious consequences on how we design our lives. But is demanding 
conformity in religious manifestation in public for reasons of fraternity and civility 
morally the same? Or else, could such conformity be grounded on reasons that do not 
reflect the moralistic preferences of the majority about how others should live? 
There are serious doubts about that. Despite its neutral formulation, the ban on full-
face covers is suspect, to use a familiar term from discrimination theory, because of its 
disparate impact on Muslim women, who have to choose between their faith and facing 
criminal sanctions. But, perhaps more importantly, the argument that concealing our face 
in public is so inescapably incompatible with civility that its criminal prohibition is 
imperative is questionable. As the dissenting judges argued, it is a mystery how we can 
distinguish between ‘other accepted practices of concealing the face, such as excessive 
hairstyles or the wearing of dark glasses or hats’ and the wearing of the full-face veil.66 In 
fact, familiar activities such as skiing, driving a motorcycle with a helmet, or wearing 
costumes in carnivals pose no problems for social interaction.67  As Nussbaum notes, 
during the freezing Chicago winters people are used to cover their faces with scarves and 
hats but that is not considered troubling for transparency, solidarity or security.68 But if 
the notion of civility cannot be extended to cover those practices, why wearing the full-
face veil is different? 
Those difficulties are complemented by the fact that, as the ECtHR has recognised, 
social values such as pluralism and tolerance underlying ‘living together’ are amenable 
and at variance with conformity. In cases regarding respect for private life the ECtHR has 
held that there is no individual right to interact with other people. On the contrary, respect 
for private life entails a right not to interact with others in public.69 In cases concerning 
the rights and independence of religious groups, moreover, the ECtHR has held that 
pluralism and tolerance command an integrationist approach that does not restrict 
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68 Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance, 106. 
69  S.A.S., Dissenting opinion, §8. 
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pluralism by eliminating the cause of the tension70 but ensures tolerance ‘between the vast 
majority and the small minority.’71 
To be clear, a political community must somehow decide collectively, through 
courts or legislatures, whether wearing the full-face veil violates the personal 
responsibility of women to make their choices of ethical values independently and 
authentically. If the full-face veil does upset women’s dignity by denying them 
independence and authenticity, its ban does not violate respect for private life or religious 
freedom because no plausible interpretation of those rights could justify protection of 
practices that destroy their very point.72 But that is not the case in S.A.S. Recall that the 
ECtHR accepted that the interpretations of the niqab and the burqa as symbols of 
hostility73 and subservience74 were not the only available,75 and rejected the argument that 
the full-face veil harms gender equality and violates human dignity.76 However, banning 
the full-face veil because that would satisfy the majority’s conception of what constitutes 
a good life is at odds with respect for our ethical independence. It also contradicts 
previous case law on freedom of expression, where the ECtHR established the principle 
that free expression protects also opinions that offend, shock or disturb because otherwise 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness would be meaningless.77 
But there is another problem still. The interpretation of ‘living together’ pursued by 
the French government in order to justify the blanket ban sits uneasily with core political 
dimensions of secularism. That is particularly problematic because ‘living together’ 
springs conceptually from the constitutional implications of the principle of laïcité. 
However, according to its best interpretation in political theory, secularism (or laïcité) 
aims at reinforcement of civic equality and social inclusion,78 rather than at the exclusion 
of certain people (i.e. Muslim women) from the public sphere on grounds of their 
religious conduct.79 More than just an institutional principle of church-state separation, 
secularism thus understood encompasses the state duty to treat religious and nonreligious 
people with equal respect80 including a strong anti-discrimination principle that covers 
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believers of all faiths.81 Inclusive state neutrality and even-handed justice require seeking 
non-confrontational ways to tackle those issues by carefully assessing the different 
problems that public concealment of faces may pose to an orderly enjoyment of our 
common space.82  
So, if we reconceptualise ‘living together’ in light of secularism – given its key 
constitutional role in a number of European states including France83 – then the wearing 
of the full-face veil does not infringe the principle of ‘living together’ correctly 
understood. Just like laïcité, ‘living together’ is intended as a guarantee, not a limit, to 
freedom of religion.84 If solidarity and fraternity are indeed the underpinnings of ‘living 
together’, as the French government argues, then the idea is intertwined with promotion of 
social inclusion in a way that it is hard to see how excluding veiled women from the 
public space can be compatible with its very essence. Ensuring that citizens treat social 
interaction as a matter of moral importance and decide reflectively without coercion 
seems the best way to promote solidarity and fraternity in our social communication and 
interaction. Grounding our normative commitment to religious pluralism on the 
fundamental moral principle that our common culture should be formed organically 
through individual ethical choices and not through collective action leads to the 
conclusion that, at least with regard to the case in question, it is a responsibility, rather 
than a conformity, conception of ‘living together’ that has to be preferred. 
Of course the state has an interest in fostering solidarity and fraternity, along with a 
plurality of other values underlying ‘living together’, but that has to be in accordance with 
the political duty to treat everyone as an equal. Raising awareness, strengthening 
education for all sexes, and advancing our collective commitment against oppression of 
women – the ‘softer’ measures that parts of the French Parliamentary Committee 
recommended over a criminal ban85 – do not usurp our personal responsibility to develop 
our public religious conduct in as much compliance with the civic values of a society as 
possible. Recall that if we agree that the normative justification of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief rests on the need to protect our ethical independence from coercive 
manipulation motivated by the moral preferences of the majority about how everybody 
should live, any answers on what the right to freedom of religion requires in more specific 
cases have to be fixed and defended by asking what that abstract right requires. Any 
contrary argument about the scope of the right to freedom of religion and its interaction 
with equality and discrimination has to fit that principle.  
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6.3.  State Regulation of Religious Symbols for Reasons of Public Safety 
 
The analysis will now turn to cases involving bans on religious symbols, albeit for 
security reasons and only for a limited amount of time and in specific parts of the public 
space. Naturally, under certain particular circumstances ability to see someone’s face is 
necessary. Checking in a flight or entering a bank are common examples, but other 
activities, such as driving, may also be impeded by the wearing of particular types of full-
face covers.86 Would that mean that limitations on our right to freedom of manifestation 
of religion are always justifiable when security reasons come into play? If not, then how 
do we know which bans on the wearing of religious symbols in public space can be 
justified, and under what circumstances? 
 
6.3.1. Security checks 
 
In October 2003, Suku Phull was supposed to board on the morning flight from 
Strasbourg to London for a business trip. Phull was a practising Sikh, whose faith 
required him to always wear a turban. Shortly before reaching the departure gate he was 
asked by the airport’s security staff to remove his turban for inspection. His complaint 
about a violation of his right to freedom of religious manifestation eventually reached the 
ECtHR, where he argued that the fact that the airport authorities obliged him to remove 
his turban as part of a security check constituted an unjustifiable limitation on his right.87 
More specifically, he argued that there was no need to have his turban removed, given 
that he agreed to be checked through the scanner or by the hand-held detector.  
The ECtHR held that the disputed security measure constituted an interference with 
the applicant’s freedom of religious manifestation, but it was prescribed by law and 
pursued the legitimate aim of guaranteeing public safety. What was left to be determined 
was whether the interference was also necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety. To that end, the ECtHR reminded a landmark judgment of the European 
Commission on Human Rights (‘EComHR’). More specifically, in X v United Kingdom, 
the EComHR has held that fining a practising Sikh for not wearing a motorcycle helmet, 
despite the fact that his religious duty to wear a turban made it impossible, did not violate 
Article 9 ECHR. 88  The obligation to wear a helmet was a necessary safety measure 
justified by the need to protect public health by virtue of Article 9§2.89 In Phull, the 
ECtHR reached a similar conclusion based on the same considerations. The applicant’s 
right to freedom of religious manifestation was not violated because security checks in 
airports are necessary in the interests of public safety and the specific measures to 
implement them fall within the national margin of appreciation.90  
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The ECtHR reached a similar conclusion in El Morsli v France.91 The applicant was 
a Moroccan national married to a French citizen. Her application for an entry visa to 
France was declined because she refused to remove her headscarf for an identity check by 
male personnel at the French Consulate General in Marrakech. The ECtHR declared the 
application inadmissible, reiterating that identity checks are necessary in a democratic 
society for reasons of public safety and that, in any event, the interference with the 
applicant’s right to freedom of religion was too limited in time to be disproportionate. 
 
6.3.2. Identity cards 
 
Similar considerations have informed the approach of the ECtHR in cases on religious 
symbols in various types of identity cards, including university certificates and driving 
licences. In Karaduman, 92  the applicant upon completion of her university studies, 
applied to the university’s registry for a provisional certificate stating that she obtained a 
bachelor’s degree. However, the photo attached to the application depicted her wearing a 
headscarf. The Dean of the faculty subsequently informed the applicant that the certificate 
in question could not be issued, as the identity photograph did not comply with the 
university’s regulations. Ms. Karaduman appealed to the Ankara Administrative Court 
seeking annulment of the administrative decision due to an unjustifiable limitation on her 
right to freedom of religion. Both the Ankara Administrative Court and the Council of 
State upheld the decision of the university based on the specific provisions of the 
university’s regulations and their compatibility with the constitutional principle of 
secularism. Ms. Karaduman filed a complaint to the EComHR under Article 9 and Article 
14 read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR. Her non-discrimination claim was based on 
the fact that female foreign nationals enjoy total freedom as to how to dress in Turkish 
universities, whereas Turkish female students are subject to the above-mentioned 
restrictions. 
The Turkish government argued that asking for bareheaded identity photographs, as 
part of the university’s regulations, does not constitute an interference with the student’s 
right to freedom of religion and that, in any event, the university’s regulations derive from 
the constitutional principle of secularism, which prohibits the wearing of headscarves in 
higher education institutions. The EComHR reminded the principles of the Arrowsmith 
case, which held that the right to freedom of religion does not always guarantee the right 
to behave in public in any way dictated by a religious belief.93 Moreover, the EComHR 
held that the applicant chose to pursue her studies in a secular university, whose rules 
limited her right to freedom of religious manifestation in order to secure peaceful 
coexistence in a religiously diverse student body. Those restrictions aimed to secure 
public order and the rights of others, and at the same time a university degree photograph 
was not a suitable forum to manifest her religious beliefs. All in all, regulating students’ 
dress and qualifying the available administrative services do not, as such, constitute an 
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interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion and do not therefore violate 
the Convention. 
Some years later, the ECtHR partly confirmed those findings in Mann Singh v 
France. 94  The applicant was a practicing Sikh, who complained that the general 
requirement of a bareheaded photograph on his driving licence, which made no provision 
for separate treatment for members of the Sikh community, amounted to an interference 
with his right to freedom of religion in violation of the Convention. 95  The ECtHR 
declared his application manifestly ill-founded on grounds that bareheaded identity 
photographs for use on driving licences were necessary to pursue the legitimate interests 
of public safety, especially to facilitate driver identification in checks carried out under 
traffic regulations. Moreover, the detailed arrangements for implementing such checks 
fell ‘within the respondent State’s margin of appreciation, especially since the 
requirement for persons to remove their turbans for that purpose or for the initial issuance 
of the licence was a sporadic one.’ 96  The impugned interference was again found 
legitimate and proportionate to the aim pursued. 
More recently, in Ahmet Arslan v Turkey,97 127 members of a religious group were 
criminally convicted for wandering around the streets of Ankara in religious attire 
including turbans, distinctive trousers and tunics on occasion of a ceremony held at a 
mosque. The legal basis of their conviction lies on domestic legislation prohibiting 
religious attire from the public space, with the exception of places of worship and 
religious ceremonies. 98  Contrary to previous cases justifying limitations on religious 
symbols for public safety reasons, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 9 ECHR as the 
interference with the right of the applicants to freedom of religious manifestation was not 
justified in the instant case. More specifically, the ECtHR accepted that, in the 
circumstances of the case and given the importance of secularism for the Turkish 
constitutional system, the interference may be taken to serve the legitimate aims of 
protection of public order and the rights of others.99 However, the ECtHR stressed that the 
aim of the provisions under examination was to avert provocation, proselytism and 
religious propaganda in a secular democratic state.100 Since the applicants were not state 
representatives and were not exercising any public function, they were divested of any 
state authority.101 
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Furthermore, the majority was unconvinced by the argument that the applicants 
posed a threat to public order. Rather, according to the facts before the ECtHR, the 
applicants just gathered outside a mosque with the sole aim of participating in a religious 
ceremony. Their purpose was not to inflict undue pressure on other people or to promote 
their beliefs.102 As a result, the ECtHR held that in the instant case the restriction was 
disproportionate, in violation of Article 9 of the Convention. It is noteworthy that the 
ECtHR did not weigh the interests of the applicants to wear their religious symbols in 
public against the interests of the state to adhere to constitutional secularism through 
securing a religion-free public space. Rather, the judgment undertook an interpretation of 
the reasons behind the ban, which were found inadequately supported by public order 
considerations. By contrast, the state limitation in question was motivated by 
impermissible reasons that express dislike, if not contempt, for the applicants’ lifestyle. 
As Judge Sajó argued in his concurring opinion, in cases such as Ahmet Arslan it is 
important to interpret secularism as a set of principles imposing obligations on the state, 
not on individuals. This is not to suggest that individuals are not expected to behave 
according to the requirements of public order. But Judge Sajó’s interpretation matches 
what parts of political theory describe as egalitarian accounts of secularism.103 Every 
government should enjoy discretion in the design and enforcement of rules and policies 
safeguarding public order. Moreover, specifically in the Turkish context, there are 
distinctive socio-historical reasons that, as the ECtHR itself has recognised, require 
vigilance for religious extremism and might justify more intrusive limitations on the 
individual and group rights to freedom of religion or belief.104 The interpretation of the 
moral right to freedom of religion or belief defended here is congenial to an egalitarian 
interpretation of secularism, which according to Judge Sajó requires that the government 
always demonstrates, on the basis of concrete evidence, that the restriction of the 
applicants’ conduct served a pressing social need or was necessary to safeguard public 
order. In Ahmet Arslan the domestic courts did not take into account the right to freedom 
of religious manifestation in their interpretation of the domestic criminal code and the 
government failed to show how considerations of public order necessitated the criminal 
convictions under scrutiny. It was this very lack of consideration that led to the violation 
of the right to freedom of religion on behalf of the applicants in the instant case.105 
 
6.3.3.  The UN Approach 
 
Just one month after the ECtHR reached its decision about the inadmissibility of the 
complaint in Mann Singh v France, the applicant submitted an almost identical complaint 
to the UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) under the individual communications 
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mechanism.106 Slightly twisting the facts,107 he claimed that the prohibition to wear a 
turban on his passport photograph – instead of his driving license108 – was in violation of 
his right to freedom of religious manifestation under Article 18 ICCPR. It is noteworthy 
that submission of the same individual complaint to two different human rights bodies is 
quite exceptional in international human rights legal practice. 109  It would be useful 
therefore to contrast the two decisions and examine any potential differences in the 
interpretative approach followed by the two mechanisms.110 
The HRC based its reasoning on a previous case, Ranjit Singh v France,111 which 
was decided in 2011 and is factually similar to Mann Singh v France. Contrary to the 
ECtHR, the HRC found a violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of religion under 
Article 18 ICCPR.112 The applicant in Ranjit Singh v France was an Indian national 
residing under refugee status in France. When his permanent residence permit was due for 
renewal, Mr. Singh had to provide the French authorities with two full-face bareheaded 
photographs. His application for an exemption from the requirement that in the relevant 
photos he should appear bareheaded, based on his religion, was rejected. Before the HRC, 
Mr. Singh complained about a violation of his right to freedom of religion under Article 
18 ICCPR, arguing that the photo requirement could not be justified on public order and 
public safety, and constituted an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with his 
right. The applicant added that it is deeply humiliating for Sikhs to appear bareheaded in 
public and that ‘an identity photograph showing him bareheaded would produce feelings 
of shame and degradation every time it was viewed.’113 The French state, in his case, did 
not take into account that he would be repeatedly humiliated ‘whenever proof of his 
identity is requested.’114 Furthermore, since he always wears a turban, he would not be 
more readily identifiable if his identify photograph depicted him bareheaded.115 Other 
European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden use 
to issue residence cards with photographs of Sikhs wearing turbans. It would be odd to 
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believe that someone wearing a turban would be harder to identify in France compared to 
those countries.116 
The HRC turned to the principles of the General Comment 22 on Article 18 ICCPR, 
according to which freedom of religious manifestation includes the right to wear 
distinctive clothing or head coverings. 117  The conditions for renewal of permanent 
residence in France constituted therefore interference with the exercise of the individual 
right to freedom of religion.118 The HRC examined then whether that interference was 
necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim of public safety and public order.119 On 
that account, it held that  
 
[t]he State party has not explained why the wearing of a Sikh turban covering the 
top of the head and a portion of the forehead but leaving the rest of the face 
clearly visible would make it more difficult to identify the author than if he were 
to appear bareheaded, since he wears his turban at all times. Nor has the State 
party explained how, specifically, identity photographs in which people appear 
bareheaded help to avert the risk of fraud or falsification of residence permits.120 
 
As a result, the HRC concluded that the French authorities failed to demonstrate that the 
limitation was necessary within the meaning of Article 18 ICCPR. Moreover, the HRC 
agreed with the applicant that the interference would also be continuing because 
appearing without a turban in his identity photograph could compel him to remove it in 
every future identity check.121  
In Mann Singh v France, the HRC employed the above principles and, contrary to 
the ECtHR, decided again that limitations on the wearing of religious symbols that do not 
cover the whole face, such as the turban, on ID photographs require convincing 
explanation of why the particular limitation is necessary to guarantee public safety, 
otherwise they violate Article 18 ICCPR. The two different outcomes in Mann Singh v 
France can be traceable to the fact that the HRC applied stricter scrutiny of the public 
safety justification. By contrast, at least until Ahmet Arslan, the ECtHR used to allow a 
generous margin of appreciation to the respondent states in cases involving limitations on 
the right to wear religious symbols for reasons of public order or public safety, leaving the 
relevant state arguments practically unscrutinised.  
 
6.3.4.  Differences between the UN and the ECtHR 
 
Similar discrepancies between the approaches of the two international human rights 
mechanisms also arise in cases on religious symbols in schools. In a well-documented122 
                                                        
116 ibid §3.4. 
117 General Comment No. 22, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993), §4. 
118 Ranjit Singh, §8.3. 
119 ibid §8.4. 
120 ibid §8.4. 
121 ibid 
122 See M. Hunter-Henin, ‘Law, religion and the school’, in S. Ferrari (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Law 
and Religion (Routledge, 2015) 259-271; N. Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction 
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series of cases against France,123 including Dogru and Kervanci v France,124 Jasvir Singh 
v France, 125  and Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn, Ghazal and Singh v France 126  – all 
applications concerning cases of expulsion of students from public schools for wearing 
conspicuous religious symbols – the ECtHR has held that the expulsions in question were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others as well 
as public order, through safeguarding laïcité in public schools.127 The approach of the 
ECtHR has attracted plenty of criticism for applying its familiar proportionality test 
without scrutinising the legitimacy of the claim that the manifestation of religion on 
behalf of the individual applicants interferes with the rights and freedoms of others. One 
explanation of this lack of scrutiny is that measures taken by virtue of the constitutional 
principle of laïcité fall within the respondent state’s margin of appreciation.128 
By contrast, in factually similar cases on prohibition of religious symbols in public 
schools, such as Bikramjit Singh v France,129 the HRC follows a strict scrutiny test vis-à-
vis the public order arguments of the state and, contrary to the ECtHR, it has found 
violations of the right to freedom of religion under the ICCPR. In similar fashion to the 
ECtHR, the HRC accepts that secularism is a valuable means to safeguard equal 
enjoyment of freedom of religion in schools. 130  However, the HRC has held that 
secularism is insufficient by itself to justify limitations on the individual freedom to 
manifest religion. 131  More specifically, in Bikramjit Singh, France failed to provide 
‘compelling evidence’ to support the claim that the wearing of a small turban (called 
keski) by the applicant would jeopardise the rights and freedoms of other pupils or the 
school order in general. 132  According to the HRC his expulsion was therefore 
disproportionate in the instant case. All in all, the HRC focused on the legitimacy of the 
reasons behind the limitations on the wearing of symbols.133 Instead of yielding to mere 
worries or fears,134 a more thorough investigation of the state claim that the individual 
applicant posed a threat enabled the HRC to pursue a more robust analysis of the reasons 
behind the limitation in question. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 188-212; B. Chélini-Pont, ‘The French model: Tensions between laïc and 
religious allegiances in French state and Catholic schools’, in M. Hunter-Henin (ed.) Law, Religious 
Freedoms and Education in Europe (Ashgate, 2011) 153-171; C. Evans, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 52. 
123 In France the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and colleges is prohibited by Law no. 2004-
228, 15 May 2004, Article L. 141-5-1. 
124 Application nos. 31645/04 and 27058/05, 4 December 2008. 
125 Application no. 25463/08, 30 June 2009 (only in French; inadmissible). 
126 Application no. 27561/08, 30 June 2009 (only in French; inadmissible). 
127 ibid §1. Other cases discussing limitations based on secularism include Köse and 93 Others v Turkey, 
Application no. 26625/02, 24 January 2006 (inadmissible). 
128 I. Leigh, ‘Recent developments in religious liberty’ (2009) 11(1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 65-72. 
129 Bikramjit Singh v France, Communication no. 1852/2008, 4 December 2012, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008. 
130 ibid §8.6. 
131 S. Chaib, ‘Freedom of religion in public schools: Strasbourg court v UN Human Rights Committee’, 
Strasbourg Observers, 14 February 2013, at <http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/02/14/freedom-of-
religion-in-public-schools-strasbourg-court-v-un-human-rights-committee/>. 
132 Bikramjit Singh, §8.7. 
133 ibid 
134 See Judge Tulkens dissenting opinion in Sahin v Turkey, §5. 
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The cautiousness of the ECtHR in cases of religious symbols has been critically 
received on various grounds. It has been argued, for instance, that the commonly used 
proportionality analysis shifts the burden of proof away from the state and onto the 
applicants, who should then prove that the restrictions against their right to freedom of 
religion are disproportionate.135 That line of criticism is grounded on concerns about the 
procedural justice of the approach of the ECtHR. 136  Furthermore, the permissible 
limitations on the right to freedom of religion have often been construed in a manner that 
permits restrictions against the right to freedom of religion of minority groups because of 
the worries, fears, and ideologies of the majority. 137  By contrast, the HRC has been 
praised for following an interpretation that looks more suitable to protect unpopular 
minorities, who are clearly more vulnerable to unjustified limitations of their rights.138 Its 
stricter scrutiny along with the fact that the HRC, contrary to the ECtHR, does not allow 
margin of appreciation to the respondent states, entail that if states wish to introduce 
limitations on freedom of religion in compliance with Article 18 ICCPR, they should 
ensure that those should be absolutely necessary to achieve the legitimate aim sought,139 
even in cases of limitations supported by arguments of public order and public safety. 
The contrast between the two approaches provides valuable insights on some 
practical implications of a reason-blocking account of the right to freedom of religion. At 
least in cases of religious symbols, the approach of the HRC seems closer to a reason-
blocking account. The HRC focuses not on whether the applicant’s interest to cover his 
head according to his religion is more ‘weighty’ compared to the state interest to protect 
public order or public safety. Rather, the investigation focuses on whether the state 
distribution of burdens shows equal respect for the religious commitments of the applicant 
in the circumstances of the case. I think that that explains why the HRC has placed 
emphasis on the questionable efficacy of certain measures highlighting, for instance, that 
bareheaded identity photographs have often failed to avert the risk of fraud or falsification 
of residence permits.140 A rigorous examination of the reasons behind state limitations on 
rights, even if those reasons cite public order and public safety, is better suited to smoke 
out impermissible motives such as majoritarian preferences about how others should live, 
what they should wear, and how they should behave in public. Recall that, as Chapter 
Five discussed, the availability or unavailability of comparable cases is not constitutive of 
a violation of the right to freedom of religion. Rather, in the cases on the wearing of 
religious symbols above discussed comparators proved diagnostically useful as indicators 
                                                        
135 S. Berry, ‘Freedom of religion and religious symbols: Same right – different interpretation?’, EJIL: 
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minorities at the European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2009) 49 Harvard 
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capable of pointing the courts towards possible violations of the fundamental right to be 
treated with equal concern and respect. Contrary to the HRC, the ECtHR has evaded strict 
scrutiny of public order justifications despite that as Marx, not least, claimed long ago, 
states can manipulate security to legitimise almost all actions taken in its name, simply by 
citing a need for the action to protect national security.141 Refraining from meaningful 
scrutiny of public order reasons incurs the risk to miss significant opportunities to track 
and block impermissible reasons from grounding state limitations on the right to freedom 
of religion or belief. 
 
6.4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter offered an interpretation of the ban on the wearing of full-face covers in 
public and argued that a responsibility, rather than conformity, conception of ‘living 
together’ is compatible with ethical independence. It also developed a bit further some of 
the practical implications of the reason-blocking account of freedom of religion defended 
so far, especially with reference to cases involving limitations on the wearing of symbols 
for reasons of public order. That context is theoretically and practically challenging, but it 
is also a distinctive theme of law and religion that any substantive theory of the right 
should address. Again, the aim of such a substantive account is not to resolve every issue 
relevant to religious manifestation, but to channel further thought about the principles that 
should guide our interpretation of Article 9 ECHR. The next, final chapter will discuss 
another distinctive theme of law and religion, namely state limitations on blasphemous 
expression. 
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7 
 
Freedom of Expression, Religion and Offense 
 
 
 
For the citizen who is ‘unmusical’ in religious matters, (tolerance) entails the 
demand – which is not in the least trivial – that he identify self-critically the 
relationship between faith and knowledge, on the basis of what all the world 
knows. This is because the expectation that there will be continuing 
disagreement between faith and knowledge deserves to be called ‘rational’ 
only when secular knowledge, too, grants that religious convictions have an 
epistemological status that is not purely and simply irrational. 
 
J. Habermas1 
 
 
[T]he very purpose of Article 10 of the Convention is to preclude the State 
from assuming the role of watchman for truth and from prescribing what is 
orthodox in matters of opinion. 
 
Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, Dissenting opinion2 
  
 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
 
Why should our community tolerate people’s freedom to express offensive speech, 
especially when it attacks or ridicules figures and beliefs that many consider sacred? This, 
last chapter of the thesis will examine state regulations of blasphemy and their 
compatibility with our rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Given that 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on blasphemous speech does not seem to conform with 
the principles thus far defended, this chapter, similarly to the approach followed in 
Chapter 6, will criticise the approach followed because the more general duty to treat 
                                                        
1 J. Habermas, ‘Pre-political foundations of the democratic constitutional state?’, in J. Cardinal Ratzinger 
and J. Habermas, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (Ignatius Press, 2006) 50. 
2 Dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, Application 
no. 16354/06, 13 July 2012 (Grand Chamber), at 67. 
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everyone’s ethical responsibility with equal respect3 is incompatible with a right not to be 
offended in one’s religious beliefs. This chapter will also argue that a reason-blocking 
approach would improve consistency both internally, given that the ECtHR has repeatedly 
held that freedom of expression protects speech that ‘offends, shocks or disturbs’,4 and 
externally with international human rights law, where the latest soft law developments 
support criminalisation of expression inciting to violence and not bans on merely 
offensive forms of expression. According to a reason-blocking approach limitations on 
offensive forms of expression are unjustifiable neither because we think that we can 
secure more individual rights by rejecting such limitations, nor because the interests of 
the artists are more important than the interests of the affected religious believers. They 
are unjustifiable simply because the values and considerations supporting the putative 
right not to be offended in one’s religion are incompatible with the very idea of equal 
respect for our personal ethical responsibility that the moral right to freedom of religion 
asserts. If this interpretation is true, then the right not to be offended is a prima facie right 
that does not ground duties on others not to interfere with that particular liberty, and there 
is no reason to balance freedom of expression against it. What seemed to be a brute 
confrontation between two individual interests, that is, between free artistic expression 
and freedom from offense independently understood, ends up being resolved by focusing 
on the internal substantive relation that applies in our interpretation of the respective 
right-claims. 
The argument will deploy in two main parts. The first will discuss various 
judgments of the ECtHR on offensive speech and will highlight some key challenges for 
the Court. The second will examine the conflict between freedom of religion and freedom 
of expression and will argue that its resolution requires a systemic approach highlighting 
the internal connections between different moral considerations, such as those underlying 
freedom of expression and freedom from offense in the enjoyment of our conscience. 
 
7.2.  The ECtHR on Religiously Offensive Speech Cases 
 
In May 1985, the Otto-Preminger Für audiovisuelle Mediengestaltung (OPI), an Austrian 
organisation that runs an art-house cinema in Innsbruck, announced a series of six 
showings of a film called Das Liebeskonzil (Council in Heaven). The film was a 1982 
reproduction of the homonymous movie originally written by Oskar Panizza in late 19th 
century. In the words of the Austrian government, the film presented ‘God the Father… as 
a senile, impotent idiot, Christ as a cretin and Mary Mother of God as a wanton lady with 
a corresponding manner of expression.’5 God is also portrayed as ‘swearing by the devil’6 
and ‘other scenes show the Virgin Mary permitting an obscene story to be read to her and 
the manifestation of erotic tension between the Virgin Mary and the devil.’7 Back in 1895, 
those obscenities led the German authorities to ban the film and convict Panizza for 
                                                        
3 See pp. 82-102 above. 
4 See e.g. Handyside v United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, at §49. 
5 Otto-Preminger, §38-39. 
6 ibid §22. 
7 ibid 
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crimes against religion. But as the film was still considered provocative in 1985, the Otto-
Preminger Institute made sure to circulate an information bulletin presenting the plot in 
advance of the screening. In due time the bulletin was mailed to its 2,700 members, 
whereas it was also placed in various display windows in Innsbruck including the 
windows of the cinema itself. Finally, the film was classified as suitable only for viewers 
of 17 years and older. 
Despite those preventive measures, the Church Authorities of Innsbruck called for 
the pre-emptive seizure and forfeiture of the film asking the Public Prosecutor to initiate 
criminal proceedings against the cinema. The case was legally based on Section 188 of 
the Austrian Penal Code that criminalises disparagement of religious doctrines.8 Both at 
first instance and on appeal, the Austrian courts dismissed the Institute’s arguments 
because under Section 188 its right to freedom of expression was limited by the rights of 
others not to be offended in their religious beliefs, as well as by the State duty to foster a 
well-ordered and tolerant society. In October 1987, the Otto-Preminger Institute applied 
to the ECtHR claiming a violation of its right to freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR held that the restriction served the legitimate aim of protecting public 
order and the rights of others. Regarding the rights of others, the majority found that 
whereas believers should be ready to tolerate criticism, or even offense against their faith, 
‘the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied…may engage 
the responsibility of the state’ because certain forms of expression nullify freedom of 
belief and manifestation.9 According to the majority, blasphemous speech violates the 
right of believers ‘not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of 
views of other persons.’10 More specifically, although offensive artworks are protected 
under freedom of expression,11 ‘gratuitously’ offensive forms of expression violate the 
rights of others and could therefore be legitimately restricted.12 Moreover, the assessment 
of whether a particular form of expression is gratuitously offensive falls within the margin 
of appreciation of the national authorities, who are better placed to decide on the necessity 
of restrictive measures against it on an ad hoc basis. 13  Finally, in the case under 
discussion, the fact that the majority in Tyrol were Roman Catholics exacerbated the 
danger of a widespread violation of the rights of the believers which might in turn 
jeopardise religious peace and public order. That evidence was deemed sufficient to 
render the preemptive seizure and forfeiture of the film a necessary and proportionate 
state limitation on Article 10 ECHR. 
One of reasons that the judgment on Otto-Preminger has been criticised is that the 
distinction between offensive and gratuitously offensive speech is obscure.14 Which kinds 
                                                        
8 Otto-Preminger, §§11 and 25. Section 188 of the Austrian Penal Code remains in force. 
9 Otto-Preminger, §56. 
10 ibid §57. 
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12 Otto-Preminger, §57. 
13 Otto-Preminger, §50. 
14 I discuss the problems of state limitations on religiously offensive speech in I. Trispiotis, ‘The duty to 
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of expression should be classified as gratuitously offensive, and why? If the majority of a 
state is to decide which forms of expression are gratuitously offensive to its religious 
beliefs, the distinction is vulnerable to exactly the kind of state arbitrariness that human 
rights protect us from. But even if we agree – which, I will later argue, we should not – on 
the criteria that distinguish between speech consistent with the decencies of controversy 
and speech that is unacceptably offensive and damaging for the public order and debate, 
those criteria should follow ‘social norms of dialogue that are endorsed by a democratic 
state, in part because they are deemed compatible with the function of democratic 
legitimation.’ 15  The distinction between gratuitous (unprotected) and non-gratuitous 
(protected) offensive forms of expression should be based on principles that show equal 
respect for our individual responsibility for our own lives and reflect, for instance, 
universally applicable standards of civility.16 As Chapter Three discussed, human rights, 
including freedom of expression, cannot be restricted merely because their free enjoyment 
might be inconsistent with the religious beliefs of others, even if those form a state’s 
majority. 
Those difficulties notwithstanding, two years later the ECtHR applied the same 
distinction in Wingrove v United Kingdom.17 Nigel Wingrove was the director of a video 
work entitled Visions of Ecstasy. During the video, a Carmelite nun, intended to represent 
St. Teresa of Avila, had ecstatic raptures ‘of overtly sexual nature’18 with Jesus Christ on 
the crucifix. Both the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) and the Video Appeals 
Committee (VAC) refused to issue a classification certificate on the basis that the video 
was blasphemous.19 It is noteworthy that in the British context refusal of a classification 
certificate amounts to total preclusion of the circulation of the film.20 Soon after those 
decisions, Wingrove applied to the ECtHR and complained about a violation of his right 
to freedom of expression. Unsurprisingly, the UK Government based its submissions on 
the principles of Otto-Preminger and claimed that it should be able to discretionally 
restrict blasphemous art in cases of disparagement of religious beliefs. The majority of the 
                                                        
15 R. Post, ‘Religion and freedom of speech: Portraits of Muhammad’ (2007) 14(1) Constellations 72, 81. 
16  I. Cram, ‘The Danish cartoons, offensive expression, and democratic legitimacy’, in I. Hare and J. 
Weinstein (eds.) Extreme Speech And Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) 311, 325-7. 
17 Wingrove v United Kingdom, Application no. 17419/90, 25 November 1996. 
18 ibid §61. 
19 Possibly influenced by the UK cases in R v Lemon [1978] 3 W.L.R. 404 and Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd. 
[1979] 2 W.L.R. 281. In that case the publishers of a magazine were found guilty of blasphemy because of 
an article, which included a poem and a drawing describing sexual acts upon the body of Jesus Christ. 
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May 1982. According to the matter vs. manner distinction – which resembles the style considerations that 
cut across the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on blasphemy – intention to blaspheme is not required to ground 
the offense. Rather, proving that the publication has been intentional and that its content has been 
blasphemous is sufficient. See P. W. Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (Brill, 2001) 209-210. 
20 On prior restraints and their incompatibility with freedom of press see The Sunday Times v. United 
Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 229, § 51 (1991); The Observer and The Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 153, at § 60 (1991). However, in cases on obscene art prior restraints have not triggered a higher 
level of scrutiny. Judge Lohmus pointed to that weakness in his dissenting opinion in Wingrove, at §3. 
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ECtHR, following the Otto-Preminger doctrine, agreed with the UK government, whereas 
it also added an important parameter to the existing principles. Unlike cases of limitations 
on political speech,21  states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation under Article 10(2) 
ECHR ‘when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend 
intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion.’ 22 
Notably, the evolution of the state margin of appreciation from certain (in Otto-
Preminger) to wide (in Wingrove) meant that the UK restrictive measures were found, 
almost automatically, compatible with the individual right to freedom of expression under 
the Convention.23  
The wide national margin of appreciation applying in cases of state limitations on 
blasphemous speech was reaffirmed in later cases. In Murphy v Ireland,24 the ECtHR 
found unanimously that domestic laws prohibiting religious advertising did not violate 
Article 10 ECHR, given the ‘religious sensitivities’ of the predominantly Christian Irish 
society.25 In I.A. v Turkey,26 the ECtHR held that the criminal conviction of a Turkish 
author for blaspheming against the Prophet did not violate his right to freedom of 
expression. Before the ECtHR, the Turkish government highlighted that the majority’s 
religious beliefs are sufficient to justify restrictions on profane speech and added, more 
specifically, that ‘the criticism of Islam in the book had fallen short of the level of 
responsibility to be expected of criticism in a country where the majority of the 
population were Muslims.’27 By a small margin – four to three – the ECtHR maintained 
that the book was not just provocative or shocking, but constituted an abusive attack on 
the Prophet.28 The punishment of the author under scrutiny served therefore a reasonably 
pressing social need.29 The restrictive measures were deemed proportionate also because 
the book was not seized and the fine imposed on the author was ‘insignificant’ (16 
                                                        
21 According to the test followed in political speech cases, there must be a ‘pressing social need’ for the 
restriction of freedom of press, which should be ‘convincingly established’ through ‘relevant and sufficient’ 
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advertising and the broadcast media after Murphy v Ireland’ (2004) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 
181. 
26 I.A. v Turkey, Application no. 42571/98, 13 September 2005, §§32-33. 
27 ibid §35. 
28 ibid §44. 
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dollars).30 In their joint dissenting opinion Judges Costa, Cabral-Barreto and Jungwiert 
vigorously criticised the reasoning of the majority because the fundamental quality of 
freedom of expression, namely to protect not only inoffensive but also shocking and 
disturbing types of speech,31 was consistently defied by the principles set out in Otto-
Preminger and Wingrove. According to the dissenting judges, the ECtHR had to revisit its 
jurisprudence on blasphemous speech, since it places ‘too much emphasis on conformism 
or uniformity of thought’ and reflects ‘an overcautious and timid conception of freedom 
of the press.’32 
Although the ECtHR has yet to fully address those concerns, its approach in more 
recent cases has been more protective of religiously offensive speech. For instance, in 
Giniewski v France,33 the ECtHR examined a complaint of a journalist, who was fined for 
defaming Christian beliefs through an article heavily criticising a Papal encyclical. In the 
article in question the journalist attacked the encyclical for promoting a particular 
theological doctrine, which he associated with anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.34 The 
ECtHR held unanimously that the conviction was disproportionate, given that the article 
sought to develop an argument and contribute to a ‘wide-ranging and ongoing debate’35 
with a content neither ‘gratuitously offensive’, nor inciting to ‘disrespect or hatred.’36  
A similar result was reached in Klein v Slovakia.37  Similarly to Giniewski the 
applicant, a journalist, had published an article criticising the Archbishop of the Slovakian 
Roman Catholic Church for his protest against the showing of a film. In due course he 
was arrested and convicted for defaming the Archbishop and for offending the members 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Again, the ECtHR found unanimously that the applicant’s 
conviction violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR since his 
publication ‘neither unduly interfered with the right of believers to express and exercise 
their religion, nor did it denigrate the content of their religious faith.’38 By the same token, 
in Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria,39 the ECtHR held that the decision of the 
Austrian authorities to cease the exhibition of a large collage in a public gallery, which 
depicted public and religious figures in sexual activity, was in violation of the right to 
freedom of artistic expression secured under Article 10 of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, in July 2012, a divided (9 to 8) Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found 
in Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland no violation of the right to freedom of 
expression in a case where state denial of authorisation to a poster campaign of a religious 
                                                        
30 I.A., §47. According to the dissenting opinion, the low fine should not played any role for the majority. 
Freedom of press relates to ‘matters of principle, and any criminal conviction (however negligible) might 
have a chilling effect on authors and publishers.’ See G. Letsas, ‘Is there a right not to be offended in one’s 
religious beliefs?’, in L. Zucca and C. Ungureanu (eds.) Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: 
Debates and Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 239-261, 258-259. 
31 Handyside, §49. 
32 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Cabral-Barreto and Jungwiert, I.A., §§6-8. 
33 Giniewski v France, Application no. 29134/08, 30 June 2009. 
34 ibid §17. 
35 ibid §50. 
36 ibid §52. 
37 Klein v Slovakia, Application no. 72208/01, 31 October 2006. 
38 ibid §52. 
39 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria, Application no. 68354/01, 25 January 2007. 
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group was based on the fact that its message contravened public morals.40 The applicant 
association, the ‘Raëlian movement’, is a religious group founded in 1976 with the aim to 
communicate and connect with extraterrestrials. In March 2001, its Swiss branch 
requested authorisation from the municipal authorities in order to conduct a poster 
campaign in the city of Neuchâtel. The poster featured a title reading ‘The Message from 
Extraterrestrials’ while further down on it was the web address of the Raëlian movement. 
Although the poster contained nothing unlawful or shocking, the advertised website 
included ideas and links associated with ‘geniocracy’ (a political model based on 
individual’s intelligence), human cloning, and ‘sensual meditation’ (allegedly associated 
with paedophilia). The Swiss authorities considered those ideas likely to undermine 
public order, safety and morality, and as a result they denied authorisation to the 
campaign. The religious group appealed against the refusal and when domestic courts 
rejected the complaint, it submitted an application to the ECtHR about a violation of its 
right to freedom of expression. The majority of the ECtHR held that the content of the 
expression in question was not political but commercial, given that the main function of 
the poster was to draw attention to Raëlism.41 The Swiss authorities enjoyed therefore a 
wide margin of appreciation with regard to the necessity of the ban on the poster 
campaign for reasons of public order, health, morals, and the rights of others. The 
limitation was also proportionate given that it was limited to the display of posters. 
According to the majority, the Raëlian movement could continue to disseminate its ideas 
through its website or other means. 
Similarly to Otto-Preminger and Wingrove, what is most worrying in the approach 
of the ECtHR to Raëlien is that the Court justifies content-based limitations on freedom of 
expression, effectively without scrutinising the reasons behind those limitations. But such 
lack of scrutiny cripples the main function of rights, which is to preclude state action 
motivated by reasons that disparage or express contempt for certain unpopular or minority 
members of the community. As the dissenting judges Sajó, Trajkovska and Vučinić put it 
in Raëlien Mouvement  
 
[I]t is particularly regrettable to see the protection of freedom of expression being 
diminished in respect of the world view of a minority. Moreover, at least the 
original justification for the ban given by the local police reflects the fact that the 
poster contained ideas and opinions which were at odds with the prevailing 
opinions of the local authorities and, perhaps, the majority of citizens of Neuchâtel. 
The accommodation of such sentiments as a ground for the restriction of freedom 
of expression is incompatible with the goals of the Convention.42 
 
This is exactly the reason-blocking view that we discussed in Chapter Three, namely that 
rights are activated in cases where invocations of the common good are likely to have 
                                                        
40 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, 13 July 2012. 
41 I discuss this distinction between political, commercial and quasi-commercial speech in I. Trispiotis, 
‘Spot the differences: How broad can commercial speech be?’, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 28 October 
2012, at <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/spot-the-differences-how-broad -can-commercial-speech-be/>. 
42 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Trajkovska and Vučinić, Mouvement Raëlien, at 35. 
Chapter 7 | Freedom of Expression, Religion and Offense 
 191 
been polluted by impermissible kinds of reason. In fact, the powerful dissenting opinions 
in Raëlien Mouvement and I.A, along with the results in more recent cases such as 
Giniewski, Klein and Vereinigung Bildender Künstler hint at a possible change of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR towards more rigorous protection of religiously offensive 
speech. In Giniewski, Klein and Vereinigung Bildender Künstler the ECtHR has followed 
a more restrictive interpretation of the scope of the rights of others and has found the 
impugned limitations on freedom of expression not necessary in a democratic society, 
given that the journal articles and artworks in question did not incite to hatred. Even so, 
the ECtHR has yet to expressly abstain from the principle that offense to the majority’s 
religious feelings is a legitimate ground for limitations on freedom of expression. 
Inevitably it follows that parts of the Otto-Preminger and Wingrove doctrine survive until 
today, although the change of language in recent cases might be taken to imply that the 
ECtHR – or at least certain parts of it – shares the concerns of the Council of Europe 
about decriminalisation of blasphemy and robust protection of religiously offensive 
speech.43 
 
7.3.  Religious Beliefs and Free Expression 
 
7.3.1.  Three main arguments 
 
A close reading of cases involving state limitations on blasphemy exposes three main sets 
of arguments that the ECtHR employs to mitigate the contradiction between safeguarding 
a public discourse open to everyone’s voice and excluding from the discourse those who 
deny what particular religions regard as sacred.44 First, certain types of offensive speech 
may undermine the spirit of tolerance, which is fundamental in a democratic society. 
Without elaborating on what tolerance means or entails,45 the ECtHR has repeatedly held 
that blasphemous art may be legitimately restricted as a ‘malicious violation of the spirit 
of tolerance which must be a feature of a democratic society.’46 A second related but 
                                                        
43 See discussion under 7.3.4. of this chapter.  
44 Post, ‘Religion and freedom of speech’, 78. 
45 There are various interpretations of, and extensive literature on, toleration and tolerance. See e.g. J. 
Waldron, ‘Toleration: Is there a paradox?’ (2012) NYU Public Law Research Paper No. 12-75; L. Zucca, A 
Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford University Press, 
2012) 3-23; J. Collins, ‘Redeeming the Enlightenment: New histories of religious toleration’ (2009) 81(3) 
The Journal of Modern History 607; J. Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project (Polity Press, 2009) 59-
78; S. Bruce and D. Voas, ‘Religious toleration and organisational typologies’ (2007) 22(1) Journal of 
Contemporary Religion 1; R. Forst, ‘The limits of toleration’ (2004) 11(3) Constellations 312; C. 
McKinnon and D. Castiglione (eds.) The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance 
(Manchester University Press, 2003); T. M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 187-202; A. E. Galeotti, ‘Citizenship and equality: The 
place for toleration’ (1993) 21(4) Political Theory 585; W. Kymlicka, ‘Two models of pluralism and 
tolerance’ (1992) 13 Analyse & Kritik 33. 
46 Otto-Preminger-Institut, §47; Wingrove, §52. Although the ECtHR does not elaborate on the concept of 
toleration, a series of judgments on freedom of religion suggest that the ECtHR may prefer a thin, modus 
vivendi, conception of toleration at least in cases where speech upsets traditional religious beliefs. It is true 
that both Europe and the United States have envisaged secularisation of State power as the appropriate 
answer to an atrocious history of religion and politics in the West. See R. Geuss, History and Illusion in 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 14-37 and 69-85. Secularisation has assumed various 
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distinct argument focuses on the distinction between offensive and gratuitously offensive 
speech. As above mentioned, the ECtHR grounds the distinction on the assumption that 
gratuitously offensive speech hinders believers from freely exercising their right to 
freedom of religion through breaching their right not to be insulted in their beliefs. Both 
the argument from tolerance and the distinction between offense and gratuitous offense 
place significant weight on the style of the speech in question. This underlying (and 
implicit) distinction between style and content has helped the ECtHR to uphold state 
limitations on speech without targeting specific groups of people whose right to free 
expression is curtailed. Rather, all kinds of speech are protected by human rights – even 
those kinds that shock, offend or disturb47  – insofar as certain rules of courtesy are 
respected by all public speakers.  
There is a third argument employed to justify state limitations on blasphemous 
expression, based on public order, but mainly due to space constraints this chapter will 
not discuss it in any detail. As it happens in the cases of state limitations on the wearing of 
religious symbols that Chapter Six examined, the ECtHR has again been overly generous 
with regard to limitations on blasphemous expression grounded on public order 
concerns. 48  That might be sensible given that the ECtHR, as a remotely positioned 
international human rights mechanism, should be amenable to the judgments of better-
placed state authorities in cases of practices endangering their public order. But this is not 
to suggest that national authorities should get (or expect) a carte blanche whenever they 
fear for social disorder – quite the reverse. The right functioning of the ECHR depends on 
meaningful scrutiny of every kind of justification for limitations on rights, including 
public order. Meaningful scrutiny could entail, for instance, weighing the proposed 
measures against the rights in question and checking the availability of alternative, less 
restrictive, ways of state action in light of the distinctive facts of each case. 
Returning to the first two arguments, an analysis of the justifiability of limitations 
on offensive speech could be pursued through deciphering toleration. The analysis could 
focus on what toleration entails in a liberal democracy and whether it involves a logical 
contradiction where we judge a practice to be wrong but nevertheless we have to refrain 
from acting against it in ways that might otherwise be thought appropriate. We could then 
balance between the reasons underlying toleration as a political principle and other 
stronger reasons related, for instance, to autonomy of believers in order to decide whether 
blasphemy (and its ban) is compatible with the concept of toleration.  
The justifiability of state limitations on offensive speech could also be examined 
through a more thorough analysis of the distinction between the content and style of 
speech. We could, for instance, scrutinise the distinction and possibly reject it because the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
translations in philosophy and distinctive institutional forms in each legal system, but still the concept of 
toleration stands for the way to prevent civil strife in a society deeply divided over different conceptions of 
the good. See J. Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project (Polity Press, 2009) at 66; C. McKinnon and D. 
Castiglione, ‘Introduction: Reasonable tolerance’, in C. McKinnon and D. Castiglione (eds.) The Culture of 
Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance (Manchester University Press, 2003) 1, 3-8. 
47 This is a well-established principle of freedom of expression under the ECHR and the majority of the 
ECtHR restated it in all the above-discussed cases on religiously offensive speech. See e.g. Otto-Preminger, 
§49; Wingrove, §57. 
48 I discuss this point in Trispiotis, ‘The duty to respect religious beliefs’, 544-552. 
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two are inextricably linked and because, even though the ECtHR claims the opposite, it is 
ultimately the content of the speech, that is, its offensiveness to the ethical values of the 
majority, or ‘morals’ according to Article 9(2) ECHR, that leads to its restriction.  
I think that both those arguments could successfully expose various significant 
flaws in the justifiability of state limitations on offensive speech. But, in the same fashion 
to Chapters Five and Six, the following pages will follow a different approach. In line 
with the substantive account of the right to freedom of religion or belief that this thesis 
defended in Chapter Three, the following pages will analyse the limitations on offensive 
speech through the right not to be offended in one’s religious beliefs and will examine 
whether such a right is compatible with the state duty to treat everyone’s ethical 
responsibility with equal respect. 
 
7.3.2.  Pro tanto and prima facie rights 
 
Is there a right not to be offended in one’s religious beliefs? Consider an example. Lies 
and loud music are annoying to many people. Think of someone who systematically lies 
to his friends. He always comes late at dinners, he pretends to like their new clothes and 
hobbies although he actually hates them, and he is a terrible gossipmonger with their 
secrets. Yet he enjoys his friends’ punctuality and honesty. He relies on their discreetness. 
And he is aware that his behavior falls woefully short of what being a good friend actually 
requires. Sometimes he may even think that his lies would disappoint his friends if they 
found out. But lying is convenient and he does not think that he has to change. Consider 
now someone else, a person listening to her iPod full-volume on the packed afternoon 
Tube. She knows that her manners are annoying for several fellow commuters. She has 
read signs about mutual respect on public transport and has noticed people sitting close-by 
feeling uneasy or glancing at her with contempt. But listening to her favourite playlist 
relaxes her and she prefers the volume to the maximum. 
Thinking of those examples, we might agree that tricking one’s friends is morally 
wrong. Loud music often irritates fellow commuters. But are the bad friend and the 
irksome commuter under a duty to change their behavior? If we want them to change, for 
instance because we believe in the value of good and honest friendship and because we 
appreciate mutual respect in public means of transport, what could we do? Could we 
claim, for instance, that we have a right to good and honest friendships or a right to be 
respected by fellow commuters? Perhaps in those cases it might seem natural to agree that 
no such rights exist, at least not in the sense that their existence would generate duties on 
others to turn their iPod down, or tell always the truth about their friends’ style and 
hobbies. But would our intuitions indeed lead us to that answer, and why? Why do we 
think, for instance, that introducing iPod volume regulations would be an unjust and far-
reaching state policy? Why does regulating friendships sound illogical and intimidating? 
We certainly deserve honest friends and respect from others, but do we have a right to 
those? Would those rights, if real, be human rights? 
Part of the answer comes from a seminal distinction between pro tanto and prima 
facie rights. Most of our fundamental human rights are pro tanto, that is, they may be 
justifiably limited if certain important considerations arise and provided that invocations 
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of those considerations are not polluted by impermissible kinds of reason.49 The right to 
freedom of religious manifestation is a pro tanto right. Contrary to the right to believe and 
change one’s beliefs (which are absolute50) freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief 
may be subject to limitations such as public safety, health, morals, and the rights of 
others. Moreover, the right to freedom of religious manifestation includes more specific 
pro tanto rights, such as freedom to teach one’s religion,51 to worship, to practice, and to 
observe.52 It also includes pro tanto rights that are not explicitly protected by the text of 
the Convention, such as a right of religious groups to be conferred legal recognition on an 
impartial basis.53 But that does not mean, on the other hand, that all forms of religious 
manifestation are instances of the right. Rather, there are cases of pseudo-rights that 
present themselves as instances of the right to freedom of religious manifestation, but are 
not pro tanto rights. Those pseudo-rights that seem to spring from other pro tanto rights – 
but are actually not – are also known as prima facie rights. Prima facie rights dress up as 
rights in the sense that they apparently generate duties on others not to interfere with 
certain individual or collective freedoms. The difference, however, between prima facie 
and pro tanto rights is that prima facie rights are mere interests and not actual rights. They 
do not therefore ground duties on others not to interfere with particular liberties. Prima 
facie rights have no weight and there is no reason to balance other legitimate pro tanto 
reasons for limitations against them. 
As Chapter Three discussed, a pro tanto right, such as the right to freedom of 
religion, provides weighty reasons for others not to interfere with the liberty of the right-
holder in certain ways. But pro tanto means that the weight of those reasons can be 
outweighed by other legitimate (and weightier) reasons in the circumstances. If that 
happens one can act unjustifiably with regard to the right in question, yet justifiably all 
things considered, i.e. on the balance of reasons. But even when pro tanto rights are 
justifiably restricted they still leave duties to apologise, and possibly make amends, 
because one has acted against a pro tanto reason.54 Recall that one of the main differences 
between non-teleological reason-blocking and teleological interest-based theories of 
rights is that an unjustifiable restriction of a pro tanto right is independent of any harm, 
loss or setback to the right-holder’s interests. If someone borrows your car in your 
absence and there is no chance that you find out, your rights to property and respect for 
private life would still be infringed despite that no harm to your interests might have been 
caused. 55  By contrast, unlike pro tanto rights, violating prima facie rights does not 
generate duties to apologise or compensate because limitations on those do not violate any 
                                                        
49 In contrast to some rights that are absolute, viz. they may not be restricted no matter how weighty other 
considerations are. A common example is the right to freedom from torture, secured under Article 3 ECHR. 
50 See Article 9(1) ECHR. 
51 See e.g. Kokkinakis v Greece, Application no. 14307/88, 25 May 1993. 
52 See e.g. Jakóbski v Poland, Application no. 18429/06, 7 December 2010. 
53  See e.g. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, Application no. 45701/99, 13 
December 2001; Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia, Application no. 72881/01, 5 October 
2006. Also discussion in Chapter Three under 3.4.3. 
54 G. Letsas, ‘The scope of balancing of rights: diagnostic or constitutive?’, in E. Brems and J. Gerards 
(eds.) Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the 
Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 38-64, 50. 
55 ibid 
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moral duties. Finally, whereas balancing between pro tanto rights and other pro tanto 
considerations (e.g. public safety, public health) is possible, balancing is not possible vis-
à-vis prima facie rights because those have no weight. By the same token, state 
interference cannot be ‘justified’ in cases involving prima facie rights, simply because we 
have no right to those. 
In our two examples, the right to honest friendships and the right to courtesy in 
one’s journey are prima facie rights. There is no right to travel free from disturbance, 
which means that pro tanto considerations stemming from freedom of expression and the 
right to privacy do not have to be weighed against the interest grounding the right not to 
be offended in one’s journey, in order to see whether others should be held under a duty 
to turn down their iPod’s volume in the tube. The fact that most people feel that they 
ought to respect their fellow commuters (i.e. serve their interests) by toning down their 
music does not mean that they are under a duty (which would imply a right) to behave in 
that way. Importantly enough, having good reasons to behave in a certain way does not 
entail that someone is under a duty to behave in a certain way. Feeling that we ought to 
turn our iPod’s volume down in the tube or that we ought to be punctual in our 
appointments or that we ought not to lie to our friends does not mean that we could not 
behave the other way. We might then be rude or untrustworthy or bad friends, but we are 
free to do so.56 
 
7.3.3.  Freedom of expression and freedom from religious offense 
 
What does the distinction between pro tanto and prima facie rights entail in cases where 
fundamental beliefs, central to many people’s personalities, are publicly ridiculed? How, 
if at all, could we justify restrictions on videos or books that ridicule objects of religious 
veneration and display sacred figures in obscene settings? Recall that European 
authorities often ask for special leniency when restricting expression that would offend 
the religious sensibilities of their majorities. Their main contention is that no one should 
unconditionally satirise holy figures and sacred artifacts. For blasphemous expression can 
be tremendously and deeply offensive for a significant number of people who value 
religion, due to the central role religion plays in their identities. 57  Several faithful 
members of the community go even further and believe that it is their religious duty to 
stand guard over religious ideals and thwart blasphemous art or journalism. The violent 
wave in the aftermath of the Danish cartoons and the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video are 
sad corroborations for the endurance of that type of attitude. But still, is the significance 
of religion for certain people good enough a reason to justify legal measures against 
blasphemy and religious insult? In other words, could the interest to enjoy one’s religion 
                                                        
56 On the distinction between having a right to X and claiming that X is the ‘right’ thing to do see R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 184-205; J. Waldron, ‘A right to do wrong’ (1981) 92 
Ethics 21. 
57 J. Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1985) 192-
198. Also M. Pinto, ‘What are offences to feelings really about? A new regulative principle for the 
multicultural era’ (2010) 30(4) OJLS 695; R. Post, ‘Cultural heterogeneity and law: Pornography, 
blasphemy and the First Amendment’ (1988) 76 California Law Review 297; P. Jones, ‘Blasphemy, 
offensiveness and law’ (1980) 10 British Journal of Political Science 129, 135-139. 
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peacefully and without being offended, important as it is, ground duties to refrain from 
certain types of expression? Is it true, as the ECtHR has suggested, that there is a right not 
to be offended in one’s religious beliefs? 
Those questions unveil considerable intricacies of the application of the distinction 
between prima facie and pro tanto rights. Even if the moral difference between the two 
remains intelligible, how do we know which rights are pro tanto? For instance, is the right 
not to be offended in one’s religious beliefs pro tanto? Or is it a prima facie pseudo-right? 
I think that the answer to this question depends not on the terms of the formulation of the 
right, but on the values and deep considerations that support it. It partly depends therefore 
on how we conceive of rights in general. Consider more specifically the terms of the 
conflict that emerges when one group of people proposes to ridicule what others deem 
sacred. If we think that there is a real danger that that kind of religiously offensive 
expression will have the effect of depriving people from important aspects of their 
freedom of religion, we may have to think in terms of a conflict between the artists’ 
freedom of expression and the believers’ right to freedom of religion. The conflict means 
that what we might have to decide to secure the latter right might contravene what respect 
for the former right requires. 
If we think of this conflict in utilitarian terms, all we have to do is aggregate the 
number of the affected members in each group, calculate the probability that the offensive 
artworks in question will threaten the right to freedom of religion, multiply throughout, 
and develop a strategy that will secure violation of the smallest number of rights. But as 
we discussed in Chapter Three this is an unsatisfactory view of human rights. Instead of 
viewing freedom of expression simply in terms of individual interests, we might think of 
it in ways that make the conflict between blasphemous art and freedom from offense 
easier to resolve. The two rights could be balanced, for instance, based on whether the 
reasons that those rights are supposed to exclude are present in the particular political 
conflict on one side or the other – exactly as we dealt with conflicts between freedom of 
religion and freedom from discrimination.  
But the assumption I will explore in the following pages is different. I will argue 
that limitations on offensive forms of expression are unjustifiable neither because we 
think that we can secure more individual rights by rejecting such limitations, nor because 
the interests of the artists in cases such as Otto-Preminger and Wingrove are more 
important than the interests of the affected religious believers. They are unjustifiable 
simply because the values and considerations supporting the putative right not to be 
offended are incompatible with the very idea of equal respect for our personal ethical 
responsibility that the moral right to freedom of religion asserts. If this interpretation is 
true, then the right not to be offended is a prima facie right that does not ground duties on 
others not to interfere with that particular liberty, and there is no reason to balance 
freedom of expression against it. What seemed to be a brute confrontation between two 
individual interests, that is, between free artistic expression and freedom from offense 
independently understood, ends up being resolved by focusing on the internal substantive 
relation that applies in our interpretation of the respective right-claims. 
The argument I have in mind can be produced most economically by developing a 
conception of freedom of expression that makes room for a form of public life where 
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everyone may participate and speak his mind regardless of conscience. It would be useful 
therefore to start with a brief discussion of some of the reasons for strong protection of 
freedom of expression. One of the best arguments for the importance of free speech 
focuses on the significance of open discussion to the discovery of truth. That argument 
emphasises that restricting speech may prevent valuable opinions and evidence from 
being published, and have detrimental consequences for the discovery of truth and for the 
better information of individual and collective decisions.58 Silencing opinions we may be 
silencing the truth, whereas even wrong opinions may contain grains of truth necessary to 
find the whole truth. Also, opinions, even when objectively true, tend to become 
‘prejudices over time if not argued over and defended; and uncontested opinions lose their 
vitality and effectiveness.’ 59  Free speech is thus pivotal for the creation of new 
knowledge. 
 Another prominent set of arguments for freedom of expression focuses on its 
intrinsic value. Intrinsic value theories hold that free expression has value independently 
of the various benefits associated with strong protection of free speech. For freedom of 
expression is cardinal for self-development and self-fulfillment. People develop their 
personalities and their intellectual capabilities through freely expressing their thoughts; 
they can become more thoughtful and mature. Restrictions on freedom of expression 
obstruct those ways of interaction and interfere with the development of our identities. As 
Shiffrin has argued, the most convincing account of freedom of expression is ‘thinker-
based’ because free expression facilitates core interests of autonomous agents by 
rendering their mental contents available to others (and vice versa) and by enhancing self-
understanding.60 
Those arguments, however, face significant difficulties when we reach a question 
that any theory of freedom of expression will at some point have to face, that is, why 
should our society tolerate people’s freedom to express degrading, false, malign, or 
                                                        
58 A famous elaboration of that argument is in Areopagitica: A Speech Of Mr. John Milton For The Liberty 
Of Unlicenced Printing To The Parliament Of England (1644) (reprinted: Penguin Classics, 2014). See also 
the seminal J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Ticknor and Fields, 1863) (reprinted: Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford 
University Press, 1998). The importance of the discovery of truth coupled with fears about the interests of 
the government to hide it has led to the famous ‘market-place of ideas’ version of Mill’s theory. The ‘free-
market of ideas’ argument (whose name echoes liberal economic theories against governmental interference 
in goods and services markets) has been particularly influential in the United States, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court employs a strict scrutiny test on content-based speech restrictions. The dissenting opinion of 
Holmes J. in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-631 (1919), first introduced the idea that content-
based restrictions may be justified only in cases of emergency, viz. when there is clear and present danger. 
See G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, M. Tushnet and P. Karlan, The First Amendment (Wolters Kluwer, 
2012) 31-36. For an insightful normative analysis of Mill’s theory see T. Scanlon, ‘A theory of freedom of 
expression’ (1972) 1(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 204. 
59 Mill, On Liberty, 101-102. See also J. Petley, Censoring The Word (Chicago University Press, 2007) 46-
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60 S. Shiffrin, ‘A thinker-based approach to freedom of speech’ (2011) 27 Constitutional Commentary 283, 
294. For more general discussion of individual autonomy arguments for freedom speech see C. E. Baker, 
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 1989); E. Barendt, Freedom Of 
Expression (Oxford University Press, 2005) 7-18; R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 
1996) 199-213; D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 751-802; K. Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities and Liberties of Speech 
(Princeton University Press, 1995) 3-7. For a historical account of the foundations of free speech protection 
see among others D. Bogen, ‘The origins of freedom of speech and press’ (1983) 42(3) MLR 429. 
Chapter 7 | Freedom of Expression, Religion and Offense 
 198 
offensive speech?61 Recall that, if we aim at a thorough analysis of the right not to be 
offended in one’s religious sensibilities, our question should focus on why religiously 
offensive speech should be tolerated in a society. First, a normative justification of 
freedom of expression rooted upon the importance of free speech for the discovery of 
truth or pointing to its intrinsic value is unhelpful in our inquiry into the protection of 
religiously offensive speech. This is because in cases of speech offending believers the 
autonomy of a speaker conflicts with the autonomy of his audience. Yet if autonomy were 
the master value by which clauses protecting freedom of speech were to be interpreted, 
the doctrine would lack resources to systematically resolve such conflicts.62 That danger 
is particularly eminent vis-à-vis religious followers.63 For they could hardly be convinced 
that there is any truth to be discovered by ridiculing sacred figures and texts. Moreover, 
stronger versions of the discovery-of-truth argument are also difficult to pursue since they 
would entail that the search for knowledge should prevail over other potentially 
conflicting values. But if weakened to accommodate other interests that may at times 
prevail, then the argument from truth says ‘little more than that the quest for knowledge is 
a value that ought to be considered.’64 Even if we argue that the moral distress blasphemy 
may cause is valuable as a way of ethical confrontation leading to social progress and 
fresh ideas,65 our argument would still fail to fit well-established religious assertions, such 
as that truth is to be found in scriptures and faith. 
Intrinsic value theories of speech might fill the gap by adding that all kinds of 
speech, even those whose contribution to personal-development is questionable, such as 
those ridiculing saint figures, should be allowed because of their value for the 
development of our identities and self-fulfillment. But the argument would still be 
unpersuasive.66 That is because the right-holder’s interest, i.e. self-fulfillment, conceived 
independently from its consequences for the public interest, seems awkwardly remote – 
and insufficient by itself – to justify holding others under the extensive and burdensome 
duties that the right to freedom of expression generates.67 In other words, despite being 
important, personal development and freedom of thought seem insufficient to ground a 
duty on religious people to tolerate blasphemy or other forms of religiously offensive 
speech. 
I think that a good way to overcome those difficulties is to rely on arguments 
suggesting that we should rigorously protect free expression as an important public good. 
According to that approach, freedom of expression is a right we should safeguard because 
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preserving democracy is good for everyone, a good not merely to its holders but to the 
public at large.68 Everyone benefits from democracy, regardless of the religious or secular 
bases of his conscience. It is noteworthy that public good arguments rely on the close link 
between freedom of expression and democracy. Placing democracy at the epicentre make 
those arguments more suitable – compared to the arguments focusing on the importance 
of free speech for the discovery of truth or on its intrinsic value – to explain why states 
have to refrain from taking restrictive measures against offensive speech. Their rationale 
is more intelligible to religious followers, too. 
A first public good argument that I would like to discuss focuses on the legitimising 
function of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is central for democracy 
because laws and policies are legitimate only when they result from democratic decision-
making. But there can be no democratic decision-making unless everyone is free to 
express his convictions on the laws or policies under discussion.69 An intuitive objection 
emerges here. Is provocative artistic expression a valid input in law or policy-making? 
Although freedom of political speech is clearly important to secure democratic 
participation and legitimise decision-making, could we say the same about other forms of 
expression? It seems that strong protection of art – especially of the obscene pieces that 
offend several members of the community – could not be properly explained solely 
because of its contribution to democratic legitimacy. 
It is exactly that type of skepticism lurking beneath the reasoning of the ECtHR in 
Otto-Preminger and Wingrove. The now familiar proportionality test includes unusually 
detailed descriptions of the erotic scenes of the artworks in question – as if the sexual 
element and its quality determine the level of their protection by human rights legislation. 
It is interesting that in both cases the majority has taken into account the ‘provocative 
portrayal’ of holy figures70 and the engagement of the viewers in a ‘voyeuristic erotic 
experience’71 as features capable of outraging Christians and meeting therefore the ‘high 
threshold of profanation’ required in the definition of the criminal offence of blasphemy.72 
The proclaimed low aesthetic quality of the banned films is closely linked with the 
conclusion that the impugned limitations fall within the state’s wide margin of 
appreciation. But more generally, indeed, how relevant can a video depicting a nun 
fantasising Jesus Christ be to public participation and democratic legitimacy? Could we 
regard such a film as a meaningful input in a public discussion about, for instance, the 
place of religion in society? How can cartoons depicting the Prophet as a bomber 
contribute to socio-political debates on cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism?   
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Intuitive questions like these seem to embarrass arguments for freedom of 
expression connecting its value with democratic participation. Perhaps we should take 
some steps back and consider principles that identify ‘more abstract value in the human 
situation.’73 For although we disagree on matters of political participation there are certain 
basic principles making up the conception of human dignity.74 As discussed in various 
earlier parts of this thesis, two main principles lie at the core of dignity: first, that each 
human life has intrinsic value, and second that everyone should have personal 
responsibility to define success in his life.75 On an abstract level those two principles 
reflect two fundamental liberal ideals: equality and liberty respectively. In other words, 
equality and liberty are conditions of human dignity; they lie at the heart of our humanity. 
Every person just by virtue of being human intrinsically carries them. 
The two principles of dignity, namely that all lives are equally and intrinsically 
valuable and that everyone should be responsible to define success in her life 
independently and authentically, are intricately connected with the principle of democratic 
legitimacy, namely that the government has to treat everyone with equal respect and equal 
concern. That principle of legitimacy does not contest that majoritarian procedures lie at 
the core of the democratic political realm. However, fair democracy requires that 
everyone should have a real and equal chance to influence collective decision-making.76 
Crucially, that requirement involves more than just the right to vote. Full social 
membership entails that everyone should have equal chances to express his voice, which 
apart from opinions or arguments includes also prejudices, fears, tastes, attitudes, and 
countless other forms of expression via which we may contribute to the public culture.77 
In that sense freedom of expression carries the same symbolic value as the right to vote, 
i.e. ‘its denial implies less than complete membership.’78 As a result a government that 
uses coercive power to impose decisions on dissenting people, without giving them the 
chance to express their beliefs, flouts human dignity. Such undemocratic decision-making 
spoils legitimacy too,79 in the sense that it produces decisions that are illegitimate vis-à-
vis muted individuals.80  
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Thus, this argument for strong protection of freedom of expression is based on the 
moral interconnections of the right with ethical independence and democratic legitimacy. 
It would be useful to contrast it therefore with the approach of the ECtHR. In cases such 
as Otto-Preminger, Wingrove, and I.A. the majority of the ECtHR has mainly reproduced 
the arguments of the respondent governments without explaining how the state interest in 
safeguarding respect for the religious beliefs of the majority can be reconciled with the 
requirements of this abstract principle of political legitimacy. That approach runs counter 
to an interpretation of freedom of expression as a public good, that is, because as a matter 
of democratic legitimacy everyone should have the chance to participate in the formation 
of our public culture with an equal voice. That loss in democratic legitimacy might be 
acceptable in a heteronomous state that exempts from democratic decision-making people 
with beliefs deviating from the state sanctioned orthodoxy, e.g. in a theocracy. But that is 
not the kind of state envisaged by the ECHR,81 whose preamble stresses the importance of 
democracy and equal protection of everyone’s rights and freedoms within the jurisdiction 
of the contracting states.82 
Thus far the argument from legitimacy partly answers why offensive speech is 
important for democracy, but there is an additional point. The moral and cultural 
environment of a community has remarkable impact on legislation and policy. People’s 
tastes, prejudices, views, activities and emotions – what is habitually pronounced as the 
public culture – determine collective decision-making more than ‘editorial columns or 
party political broadcasts or stump political speeches.’83 It is also a matter of fact that 
most members of a community refrain from exercising their right to free public political 
speech ‘in more than a minimal way.’ 84  Rather they commonly select to influence 
decision-making by their informal participation to the configuration of public culture. 
Artistic expression is a notable example of such participation. The argument that freedom 
of expression serves fair democracy as a public good entails that it is equally unfair to 
impose a collective decision on someone who was hindered from informally contributing 
to public culture, be that through filmmaking or writing erotic novels, as to someone 
whose public political speech was censored. 
Besides, the importance of protection of artistic expression as a form of public 
participation is particularly relevant in cases of blasphemous art that ridicules rituals or 
objects of religious veneration. As a matter of fact ridicule is a distinctive type of 
expression, which cannot be fine-tuned to become less offensive or more politically 
correct.85 Its aim is satire, teasing, and scorn. Given that ridicule reflects certain people’s 
views and tastes, distorting or banning it is equivalent to unfairly withholding someone’s 
opportunity to express her voice. That means that collective decisions against those muted 
individuals will be deprived of democratic legitimacy. 
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Furthermore, it follows from the above that the argument that everyone should have 
an equal chance to influence public culture does not make an exception for speech 
offending the majority. We cannot refuse participation in the moral environment to certain 
people just because most people dislike their views and tastes. Art or speech that ridicules 
religious convictions, rituals and holy figures abhors significant numbers of the 
community, perhaps the majority in certain European states.86 But that is not a good 
enough reason for forfeiting the principle that collective decisions should not be imposed 
to anyone deprived of a fair opportunity to express her attitude. Recall that the abstract 
right to equal respect for our ethical responsibility blocks exactly those impermissible 
kinds of reason and that this is why certain state limitations on free religious 
manifestation are unjustifiable. Of course that does not mean that racism or sexism, or 
other kinds of discriminatory, exclusionary or undemocratic stances will be tolerated at a 
later stage. 87  Recall that the starting point is that the democratic state should treat 
everyone with equal respect and equal concern, which means that vulnerable groups must 
be protected in various positive ways, such as those discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
In fact, anti-discrimination legislation, criminal law, positive measures and many other 
policies are enacted in order to secure equal and full social membership for everyone. 
However, the problem is that if we intervene ‘further up-stream’ and mute certain voices 
at the time when the collective opinion is formed, we spoil the only justification we have 
for insisting that everyone should respect the laws even if she fundamentally disagrees 
with them.88 
Moreover, there is a second public good argument for the protection of offensive 
speech, which is related to (but distinct from) the argument from democratic legitimacy.  
Content-based censorship is illegitimate because it amounts to official condemnation of 
certain ways of life mirrored by the restricted expression. Freedom of expression is a 
public good also because it contributes to everyone’s well-being inasmuch as ‘ways of life 
which are portrayed and expressed are validated through their portrayal and expression.’89 
Expressing ourselves we feel confident that others may share our problems, attitudes, 
tastes, and views. We can realise the worth of our selected way of life noticing that we are 
free to integrate into our society through it. We may also feel that several and diverse 
ways of life are attractive and selectable. 
 That validation of various ways of life through their public portrayal is intertwined 
with the ability of social identification, which is fundamental for individual well-being, 
given that everyone should at least have the chance to feel a full member of his 
community. In that sense, content-based censorship not only blocks validation, but also 
constitutes an official condemnation of certain ways of life that are expressed via the 
restricted speech. Thus, in our case, banning religiously offensive speech (i.e. content-
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based censorship) amounts to officially condemning certain people who find holy figures 
and rituals funny, or even arousing. In such cases, state authorities may counter-argue that 
their only purpose was to ban that particular expression and not to condemn a whole way 
of life. Yet the social symbolism of content-based restrictions is that ‘the government 
restricts and impedes the ability of that way of life as a whole, and not just the offending 
aspect, to gain public recognition and acceptability’90 with damaging consequences for 
the well-being of certain people. 
It is important to note at this point that the public good argument from the pervasive 
nature of content-based censorship is in two senses narrower than the public good 
argument from democratic legitimacy. First, it places weight on the symbolic nature of 
content-based restrictions, but does not include a positive right to equal access to public 
expression. Second, it does not hold that speech should never be restricted. It seems that 
sometimes certain forms of expression may have such adverse consequences that their 
restriction could be justified, provided that those consequences be weighed against the 
negative implications for individual well-being and the public good outlined above. In 
fact, Raz does not deny that some lifestyles, e.g. joining a racist neo-Nazi group, are 
deprived of moral value and might have to be officially condemned. 91  However, the 
implications (and desirability) of perfectionist theories of moral value fall outside the 
scope of this thesis. What is important is to keep in mind that both justifications thus far 
discussed are public good arguments because they consider restrictions on freedom of 
expression harmful not only to the muted individuals but to fair democratic participation 
in general. 
Robust protection of freedom of speech for reasons of democratic legitimacy and 
social identification begs the question why expression offending religious beliefs should 
be regulated with stricter criteria than those applying to other types of expression. Many 
believe that since religion is central to the identities of many members of our community 
it deserves special protection. But the public good arguments thus far defended do not 
leave space for such an exception. They do not leave space for such exceptions partly 
because of the same reasons that justify strong protection for the right to freedom of 
conscience itself: because a state that equally respects our individual responsibility for our 
own lives cannot grant some parts of the community the right to deploy collective power 
in order to shape an ethical culture more suited to their tastes. A right not to be offended 
in one’s religious beliefs is therefore a prima facie pseudo-right precisely because it is 
incompatible with the very idea of ethical responsibility that freedom of religion asserts. 
This section argues therefore that freedom of expression is, at least to a certain extent, 
supported by the very same moral principle.  
Certainly, blasphemy and other types of religiously offensive expression are 
upsetting, if not deeply hurtful, for the religious followers whose faith is ridiculed. The 
arguments of this section do not bypass or underestimate those people’s sorrow. They just 
indicate that there are certain important reasons of political, rather than personal, morality 
that defeat the reasons grounding a right not to be offended, at least in cases of 
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blasphemous expression or expression that aims to ridicule religious beliefs, figures or 
symbols. 
 
7.3.4.  Blasphemy, religious hatred and violence 
 
Blasphemous speech must be distinguished from speech inciting to religious hatred and 
violence, although the distinction is less easy to draw than certain parts of the theory 
suppose.92 Space restrictions again prevent a more thorough analysis of the distinction, 
but the principles grounding rights on the fundamentals of human dignity suffice, I think, 
to affirm that the right to freedom of expression does not protect speech inciting to 
violence. There is, however, disagreement – including disagreement within liberalism93 – 
as to whether freedom of expression justifies protection of hate speech.94 From a doctrinal 
perspective, it is noteworthy that the ECtHR keeps a firm stance with regard to hate 
speech regulations, including incitement to religious hatred. According to a long and 
consistent line of cases,95 freedom of expression does not cover protection of hate speech 
because ‘this is incompatible with the values of the Convention, notably tolerance, social 
peace and non-discrimination.’96 Prohibition of incitement to hatred also derives from the 
UN ICCPR, which stipulates that ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’.97 
At the moment, virtually all member states of the Council of Europe implement 
legislation outlawing incitement to hatred, including religious hatred, with some states 
also including specific, often more stringent, provisions on incitement to hatred through 
mass media.98  Denials of certain historical facts, such as the Holocaust or particular 
genocides, are criminal offences in certain countries.99 Nevertheless, the ECtHR has been 
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criticised for being overly generous in classifying particular forms of speech as hate 
speech and approving their restriction.100 The Court usually approves three main forms of 
state justification for limitations on free speech based on Article 14 of the Convention 
(protection from discrimination); Article 17 (no rights may be manipulated to destroy 
other rights or freedoms of the Convention); and, third, on the state duty to secure public 
order and public peace. Although I will not analyse this point further here, it is important 
to stress that robust protection of free expression as an important public good requires that 
content-based restrictions, such as prohibition of hate speech, should only be reserved for 
few – and extreme – circumstances. Generous classifications of speech as hate speech 
flout that principle. The emphasis placed by the Venice Commission101 and the relevant 
Council of Europe Recommendations102 on the requirements of a direct causal link with 
danger of severe disturbance of public order and/or direct incitement to violence confirm 
the idea that only restrictions against extreme speech may qualify as necessary in a 
democratic society.103 
Apart from the ECHR, competence of the European Union with regard to state 
regulations of blasphemy is limited. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression are 
secured in Articles 10 and 11 (respectively) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Moreover, according to Article 51(1) of the Charter, these provisions apply only when 
member states are implementing EU law. Yet when enacting or maintaining national 
blasphemy laws Member States do not act in the course of implementation of EU law.104 
Therefore, according to the European Commission there is no competence to control 
whether ‘domestic legislation respects the obligations of the Member States regarding 
fundamental rights – as resulting from international agreements and from their internal 
legislation.’105 Whether and how the accession of the EU to the ECHR will affect this 
principle remains to be seen.106 
Finally, it is positive that the latest reports 107  and Recommendations 108  of the 
Council of Europe support abolition of blasphemy and religious insult legislation. Their 
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principles reflect more general trends in international human rights law.109 Moreover, the 
special attention of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1805 to the central role of 
freedom of expression for democratic legitimacy and equal public participation echoes the 
public good arguments for the protection of freedom of speech defended above.110 Lastly, 
it is noteworthy that notwithstanding the shortcomings of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on blasphemous expression certain European states have decided to repeal or amend their 
relevant domestic provisions. For instance, the UK government announced in 2013 that 
the Public Order Act would be amended to remove the word ‘insulting’, which entails that 
the use of insulting language will no longer be illegal in cases in which a specific victim 
cannot be identified.111 In 2013, the Netherlands formally repealed its 80-year-old law on 
prohibition of ‘abusive blasphemy.’112 These are progressive steps towards more rigorous 
protection of freedom of expression which, as the ECtHR itself recognised almost 40 
years ago, does include forms of expression that ‘offend, shock or disturb.’113 
 
7.4.  Conclusion 
 
In light of the more general claim of this thesis about the importance of a moral 
interpretation of the reasons behind limitations on rights in order to resolve tensions 
between them, this chapter has drawn attention to the internal connections between 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion. I argued that the right not to be offended 
in one’s religious beliefs is a prima facie right that should play no role in the balancing 
exercise of the ECtHR. What we were looking for was something to capture the sense that 
a brute confrontation between the rival interests to freedom of expression and to peaceful 
enjoyment of our conscience does not tell the whole story – the sense that, as Waldron 
puts it, in some moral conflicts the issue is not of quantitative weight of individual 
interests, but of qualitative precedence of certain moral considerations over others.114 The 
approach followed by the ECtHR to mitigate the anti-democratic consequences of 
limitations on religiously offensive speech is unconvincing and in conflict with the 
normative account of freedom of religion that Chapters Two, Three and Five of this thesis 
defended. For reasons that this Chapter discussed, it is unsurprising that that part of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been repeatedly criticised. Certain recent judgments as 
well as recent Recommendations of the Council of Europe seem to bolster confidence in 
an approach securing stronger protection of the right to freedom of expression in future 
cases. The realisation and endurance of this hope remains to be seen. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
This thesis started by setting out a fundamental dimension of human dignity that supports 
the right to freedom of religion or belief, and now I can reiterate this initial idea with the 
refinements that were added along the way. The right to freedom of religion or belief 
derives its normative force from the principle that everyone is responsible to define value 
in his life and perform accordingly, with authenticity and independent from coercion to 
conform to the ethical choices and values of others. We are equally entitled to this 
abstract principle of ethical responsibility regardless of the religious or secular nature of 
our conscience and regardless of whether we belong to a majority or a minority section of 
the community. Moreover, this principle of ethical responsibility has to be interpreted in 
light of equal respect simply because the values of liberty and equality, in their deep 
connections with human dignity, are intertwined rather than conflicting. 
Abstract principles are pointless without concrete illustrations. I attempted to defend 
my claims by showing how equal respect for our personal ethical responsibility bears on 
different issues of socio-legal controversy now: the relationship between freedom of 
religion and freedom from religious discrimination as well as between religious 
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination; the wearing of religious symbols 
including the full-face veil in public; and the regulation of blasphemous expression. In 
future times the law and religion discourse might stop discussing Ladele and reasonable 
accommodation of religion in employment, 1  the full-face veil bans in Europe, 2  and 
                                                        
1 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, 15 
January 2013. See e.g. R. McCrea, ‘Religion in the workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ 
(2014) 77(2) MLR 277; R. Wintemute, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs: Harm, clothing or symbols, and 
refusals to serve others’ (2014) 77(2) MLR 223; M. Gibson, ‘The God “dilution”? Religion, discrimination 
and the case for reasonable accommodation’ (2013) 72(3) Cambridge Law Journal 578; K. Alidadi, M. 
Foblets and J. Vrielink (eds.) A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation in the European 
Workplace (Ashgate, 2012); K. Alidadi, ‘Reasonable accommodation for religion and belief: Adding value 
to Art. 9 ECHR and the EU’s anti-discrimination approach to employment?’ (2012) 37(6) European Law 
Review 693; M. Malik, ‘Religious freedom, free speech and equality: Conflict or cohesion?’ (2011) 17 Res 
Publica 21; E. Bribosia, J. Ringelheim and I. Rorive, ‘Reasonable accommodation for religious minorities: 
A promising concept for European antidiscrimination law?’ (2010) 17 Maastricht Journal of  European and 
Comparative Law 137; L. Vickers, ‘Religious discrimination in the workplace: An emerging hierarchy?’ 
(2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280; A. McColgan, ‘Class wars? Religion and (in)equality in the 
workplace’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 1; C. Stychin, ‘Faith in the future: sexuality, religion and the 
public sphere’ (2009) 29(4) OJLS 729; L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the 
Workplace (Hart Publishing, 2008). 
2 See e.g. H. Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion (Oxford University 
Press, 2014); R. McCrea, ‘The ban on the veil and European law’ (2013) 13(1) Human Rights Law Review 
57; I. Leigh and R. Ahdar, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or how God never 
really went away’ (2012) 75(6) MLR 1064; J. Ringelheim, ‘Rights, religion and the public sphere: The 
European Court of Human Rights in search of a theory?’, in L. Zucca and C. Ungureanu (eds.) Law, State 
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religion in education,3 and begin to investigate more rigorously issues of bioethics, the 
role of church in social welfare movements, or protection of refugee religious minorities. 
But our equal entitlement to ethical independence will remain and will continue to 
command respect from legislators and policy-makers. Recall that the principle may not be 
political in itself, but sparks significant political implications. The most abstract is its 
profound connection with political legitimacy, that is, the principle that the government 
has no moral power to enforce obligations against its members unless it secures human 
rights, such as freedom of religion or belief, that make the exercise of our personal 
responsibility for our own lives possible. 
I relied on conceptions of liberty and equality that allow no compromises between 
the two values, or between them and the right to freedom of religion. This is the key to the 
interpretations of the right to freedom of religion or belief under the Convention that this 
thesis defends. I suggested, among others, that the most attractive account of the right is 
reason-blocking, rather than interest-based; that the fashionable argument that complaints 
about violations of the right to freedom of religion can be analysed either from the 
vantage point of conscience or from discrimination disregards the shared normative 
foundations of the two rights; that a state can legitimately pursue a particular conception 
of fraternity and civility in its public space insofar as its policies are framed in light of 
responsibility rather than conformity; that fair democracy requires an open to everyone’s 
voice public culture, including offensive speech and provocative art. At each stage of the 
argument I examined significant parts of the relevant case law in an effort to demonstrate 
that the interpretation of freedom of religion or belief that this thesis offers explains 
morally important parts of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR better than its rivals. Even if 
someone rejects those arguments, any alternative theory will still have to come up with 
principles that not only offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights, but 
also make sense of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in an equally systematic way to what 
this study attempted to offer. 
Some parts of the thesis, especially Chapters Four, Six and Seven, feature a shift in 
emphasis and style from the philosophical abstractness of principles to the precision of 
legal and case analysis. This is because I think that the practice of the ECtHR unveils an 
important virtue of my arguments. Time and again the moralised approach of this study 
identifies shared principles and solutions where other perspectives, driven by moral 
skepticism and an unrelenting sense of ethical division, see only incompatible extremes. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 283-307; L. 
Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford University 
Press, 2012); E. Mendieta and J. Vanantwerpen (eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere 
(Columbia University Press, 2011); C. Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and 
Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2008); T. Lewis, ‘What not to wear: Religious rights, the 
European Court, and the margin of appreciation’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
395.  
3 See e.g. M. Hunter-Henin, ‘Law, religion and the school’, in S. Ferrari (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Law 
and Religion (Routledge, 2015) 259-271; E. Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European 
Bans on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Education (Routledge, 2012); M. Hunter-Henin (ed.), Law, 
Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe (Ashgate, 2011); D. McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European 
public square and in European public life – crucifixes in the classroom?’ (2011) 11(3) Human Rights Law 
Review 451; C. Laborde, ‘Secular philosophy and Muslim headscarves in schools’ (2005) 13(3) Journal of 
Political Philosophy 305. 
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The way that a reason-blocking account of the right to freedom of religion – which 
understands it as a way of excluding certain types of reason in politics – frames religious 
accommodation in general rules or policies provides a clear illustration. The two sides of 
the controversy surrounding accommodation, informed by the familiar dipole of liberty 
and equality-based accounts, perceive it in all-or-nothing terms. Schematically, one view 
maintains that individuals or groups motivated by their conscience should enjoy a 
presumptive right to conscientious objection to general laws whenever they conflict with 
their ethical convictions. The opposing view holds that no one should enjoy special 
treatment on grounds of conscience and that full compliance with legitimate rules is 
exactly what the principle of equal treatment actually requires. These positions are of an 
all-or-nothing quality. It is either that believers are vulnerable to a hostile majority that 
militantly pursues ‘political correctness’ disrespecting various special needs of religious 
groups, or that religion is the object of unfair favouritism by a political community that 
flouts its fundamental duty to treat us as equals regardless of conscience.  
Both positions make a number of implicit assumptions, among others about the 
proper conception of the right to freedom of religion – which, I argued, depends on how 
we conceive of rights in general. But although some of those assumptions are hampered 
by serious theoretical flaws, they are habitually left unexplored in the mainstream law and 
religion discourse. Chapters Two and Three of the thesis attempted to expose and 
untangle a number of assumptions underlying the assumed rivalry between liberty and 
equality-based theories of freedom of religion. Consider only one example. Both accounts 
view the right to freedom of religion as protecting certain important individual interests 
against the demands of the common good. Liberty-based accounts consider those interests 
eligible for ‘special’ protection against majorities; equality-based accounts disagree. But 
this interest-based teleological interpretation of the right is not the only one available. As 
we discussed, an interest-based approach does not adequately capture the idea that there 
are certain kinds of reason that must be excluded from politics and, as a result, from any 
balancing exercise. Rather, an interpretation of a government’s overall behaviour is more 
suitable to unveil impermissible kinds of reason, such as prejudice, that have potentially 
corrupted otherwise legitimate majoritarian arguments. This is the kind of interpretive test 
that ultimately shows which forms of state influence and which limitations on our 
freedom of conscience can be justifiable in a fair pluralistic democracy. Concentrating on 
the assumed rivalry between liberty and equality, or between those values and freedom of 
religion, not only protracts unsatisfactory conceptions of liberty and equality, but also 
blurs the very point of judicial tests in demarcating human rights. 
This understanding of the right to freedom of religion or belief explains its abstract 
character under the Convention. Article 9 ECHR is not an attempt to define the right in 
any detail. By contrast, interpretation is required in order to outline the scope of the right 
before it becomes applicable in practice. Article 9 only contains directions pointing to the 
sensitive area of individual conscience – simply because we know based on our shared 
historical and social experience that the community’s practices in this area might feature 
unacceptable attitudes violating the fundamentals of human dignity, and most notably the 
abstract right to have our ethical responsibility treated with equal respect. The provision 
therefore poses, and invites, interpretive questions such as those discussed in this thesis.  
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Think again of religious accommodation. Does a community that provides various 
forms of accommodation to parents, carers and people suffering from health impairments, 
but does not provide similar forms of accommodation for reasons of conscience, respect 
ethical responsibility? Or does this practice show contempt for some people’s ethical 
choices? When such cases of discrepancy transpire, the ECtHR must strictly scrutinise the 
differential treatment in question because it could be a symptom of a violation of equal 
respect for ethical responsibility and of our rights to freedom of religion and freedom 
from religious discrimination as a result. But, as we discussed in Chapter Five, treating 
the availability and selection of comparators as part of the diagnosis, rather than as a 
constitutive element, of a violation of rights entails that differential treatment may well be 
compatible with treating as equals provided that the most plausible interpretation of the 
government’s overall behaviour does not betray an impermissible ethical judgment about 
how others should live. It is precisely this focus on the reasons behind limitations on 
rights that distinguishes my arguments from other egalitarian theories of the right to 
freedom of religion,4 which place too much emphasis on comparisons between religious 
and secular claims with the aim to extend different forms of accommodation of important 
interests, such as health claims, to religion. 
While an approach paying attention to whether the reasons that our right to freedom 
of religion is supposed to exclude are present in a particular political conflict might sound 
conceptually modest, it is neither a compromise nor feeble. Consider, for instance, the 
debate about the ban on the wearing of the full-face veil from public space in France and 
Belgium. One side insists that not only the ban in question, but all limitations on the 
wearing of religious symbols in public are unjustifiable because they treat religious 
people and their commitments with less respect compared to others. The other side claims 
that the majority of a state can deploy collective power to form the moral environment 
that is more suited to its tastes; that it can ban the wearing of particular clothes or symbols 
if they transgress dominant norms of civility, for instance. The right to freedom of 
religion is incompatible with the first view because it does not pay enough attention to the 
reasons behind particular limitations on the wearing of symbols. If limitations can be 
justified entirely apart from any assumption that their imposition will be ethically 
beneficial, for instance that people will lead better lives in a public culture stripped of 
certain symbols, they are compatible with the right to freedom of religion. But the right 
also rejects the competing, and equally extreme view, which unconditionally permits 
collective and deliberate forms of manipulation of our common culture by the majority. 
Consider also the example of bans on religiously offensive expression. Self-proclaimed 
proponents of freedom of conscience regard blasphemous publications as quintessential 
violations of peaceful enjoyment of conscience, which assumingly occupies prime moral 
location in the right to freedom of religion or belief. The rival position starts from similar 
premises, but it claims that the interests grounding the right to freedom of expression 
trump the interests grounding the right not to be offended in one’s religious beliefs – at 
least in cases of blasphemous expression. My approach rejects both those positions. A 
                                                        
4 The most notable example is the ‘Equal liberty’ theory; see C. Eisgruber and L. Sager, Religious Freedom 
and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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closer look at the available interpretations of the putative right not to be offended in one’s 
religious beliefs show that there is no such right, not because the interests grounding 
freedom of religion are less important than the interests grounding freedom of expression 
or other considerations of the common good, but because no conception of such a right 
could be compatible with the principle of equal respect for ethical responsibility and 
authenticity that underlies the right to freedom of religion itself.  
You might be disappointed because my arguments do not offer what certain parts of 
the current normative debate usually advertise, namely practical, simple solutions that 
straightforwardly resolve questions about the scope and application of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief. But their promises proved elusive. We discussed that a 
general right to conscientious objection is implausible, and it is equally implausible to 
deny all sorts of accommodation of conscience – with or without comparable cases 
available. What is actually remarkable about all-or-nothing approaches to religious 
freedom is not that they are unresponsive to the egalitarian principle of equal respect for 
everyone’s conscience, but that they insist on deviations from that principle. But this is a 
pity. For the underlying conceptions of religious freedom that make those all-or-nothing 
approaches attractive in the first place are – paradoxically – interlaced with equal respect 
for others regardless of conscience. We cannot discard the idea that it is really important 
to be personally responsible about how we live and that that importance belongs equally 
to all. The idea of equal respect, along with its more specific principles and instantiations, 
can explain why ‘no exceptions to general rules’ or ‘more respect for religion’ thrive as 
slogans. So the theorisation of the right to freedom of religion that this thesis pursues is 
ultimately an effort to reinstate our understanding of the right to its deep and inescapable 
normative roots. There is of course more work to be done – but its direction must follow 
the impulse towards the abstract right to be treated with equal respect and concern that 
underpins not just the right to freedom of religion, but the morality of rights as a whole. 
In any event, even if my arguments are successful, I do not mean that there is 
anything effortless or uncontroversial about the project of moving from abstract moral 
standards to their practical implementation in law. In the foregoing discussion I have tried 
to avoid simplistic formulations and tests, to illuminate some hard and complex problems, 
and to include as many views as possible. It is unlikely that you will agree with each and 
every point of the analysis, and my goal is certainly not to wipe disagreement away. I will 
be satisfied, however, if this study persuades readers that seeking fair principles of 
cooperation in religiously diverse communities is, far from ‘pragmatic’, related to more 
general principles of justice, that equal respect for ethical responsibility lies at the core of 
interpretive arguments that efforts to specify abstract human rights require, and that 
human dignity entails that collective action can only be justified in an area between 
systematically disadvantaging conscience on the one hand, and ignoring the vulnerability 
of religious minorities to hostility and insensitivity on the other. 
This is not to suggest that the appeal of those abstract principles, or even human 
dignity, is universal. Skepticism about whether morality and other departments of value 
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are independent or true is familiarly rife in moral philosophy.5 In a religiously diverse 
Europe there will always be disappointed individuals or sections of the community who 
believe that their values, lifestyles and convictions are not equally respected to others’. 
This could occur even in cases where, upon reflection, we realise that the government 
correctly understood the scope of their right to freedom of religion and the level of 
protection it requires, and treated them with equal concern to others. Those complaints are 
by no means groundless. Indeed, the objecting individuals would have had their beliefs 
and values better protected were their views about fairness to prevail. But no one should 
expect that our common moral environment be shaped in full conformity to her ethical 
commitments. No group should reasonably expect to be the sole beneficiary of a 
constitutional system of protection of our public moral space against private will. 
This is the situation in which we find ourselves. For many of us religious 
commitments matter enormously. But we should be able to recognise that value comes in 
various shapes and shades of vehemence in different systems of beliefs, religious and 
non-religious. Justice, imagination and empathy towards others should prompt us to fix, 
refine and protract fair terms of respectful coexistence. That is what equal respect for 
human dignity, including our own dignity, means; what human rights and freedom of 
religion aim to secure; that is what we have been proud to recognise in our diverse 
European legal traditions; and that is what I tried to offer in these pages. 
 
 
                                                        
5 That does not mean of course that such skepticism is justified. See R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 
(Harvard University Press, 2011) 23-69. 
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